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iKey points
The objectives of the Renewable Energy Target (RET) are to: encourage the additional 
generation of electricity from renewable sources; reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 
electricity sector; and ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable.
The RET has encouraged significant new renewable electricity generation, which has almost 
doubled as a result of the scheme. Installations of small-scale systems have exceeded 
expectations, with output from these systems already exceeding levels anticipated for 2020. 
To date, the RET has delivered a modest level of emissions reductions. 
With the renewables industry now established in Australia, the main rationale for the RET 
hinges on its capacity to contribute towards the Government’s emissions reduction target 
in a cost effective manner. However, the RET is a high cost approach to reducing emissions 
because it does not directly target emissions and it only focuses on electricity generation. It 
promotes activity in renewable energy ahead of alternative, lower cost options for reducing 
emissions that exist elsewhere in the economy. In the presence of lower cost alternatives, 
the costs imposed by the RET are not justifiable. 
The economic landscape has changed significantly since the current RET was adopted in 
2010. In particular, demand for electricity has been declining and forecasts for electricity 
demand in 2020 are now much lower. Rather than adding generation capacity to meet 
growth in electricity demand, the RET is contributing to a large surplus of generation 
capacity. 
The current RET would require a further $22 billion cross-subsidy to the renewables sector 
in net present value (NPV) terms over the remainder of the scheme (in addition to the 
$9.4 billion cross-subsidy provided from 2001 to 2013) and encourage more than $15 billion 
(in NPV terms) of additional investment in renewable generation capacity to 2020. This 
investment comes at the expense of investment elsewhere in the economy and the 
additional generation capacity is not required to meet the demand for electricity.
Analyses suggest that, overall, the RET is exerting some downward pressure on wholesale 
electricity prices. This is not surprising given that the RET is increasing the supply of 
electricity when electricity demand has been falling. Artificially low wholesale electricity 
prices can distort investment decisions in the electricity market and are unlikely to be 
sustained in the long term. Over time, all other things being equal, wholesale electricity 
prices could be expected to rise to better reflect the cost of generating electricity.
The direct costs of the RET currently increase retail electricity bills for households by around 
four per cent, but modelling suggests that the net impact of the RET over time is relatively 
small. The impact on retail electricity prices for emissions-intensive trade-exposed 
businesses and other businesses is significantly greater. The RET does not generate an 
increase in wealth in the economy, but leads to a transfer of wealth among participants in 
the electricity market. 
The Expert Panel has recommended options to the Australian Government for both the 
Large-scale Renewable Energy Target and the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme. The 
Panel considers the Government should emphasise alternative, lower cost approaches to 
reducing emissions in the Australian economy. In putting forward its recommendations, 
the Expert Panel has been mindful of the impacts particular options will have on those who 
have invested in renewables on the basis of the RET as currently legislated. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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The Renewable Energy Target review
On 17 February 2014, the review of the Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme was jointly 
announced by the Hon Ian Macfarlane MP, the Minister for Industry, and the Hon Greg Hunt MP, 
the Minister for the Environment. The Australian Government appointed an Expert Panel 
(the Panel) to undertake the review, comprising Mr Dick Warburton AO LVO (chair), 
Dr Brian Fisher AO PSM, Ms Shirley In’t Veld and Mr Matt Zema, with support provided by a 
Secretariat in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
The Terms of Reference for the review direct the Panel to examine the operation, costs and 
benefits of the RET, including the economic, environmental and social impacts, the extent to 
which the objectives of the scheme are being met and the interaction of the RET with other 
Commonwealth and state and territory policies. 
The Panel consulted with a wide range of stakeholders to inform its review. The Panel received 
around one thousand general submissions and over 23,000 campaign submissions and held 
meetings with over 200 different stakeholders around the country.
To assist the Panel, ACIL Allen was commissioned to model scenarios that examine the 
impacts of the RET as it stands and potential changes to the scheme. While this modelling 
and other modelling provided by stakeholders has helped the Panel understand the impacts 
of the RET, the Panel recognises the limitations inherent in these exercises. In forming its 
recommendations, the Panel has considered the modelling results alongside the information 
received in submissions and stakeholder meetings.
The objectives and impacts of the RET
The RET has been operating in various forms since the Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Target (MRET) commenced in 2001. As set down in legislation, the objectives of the RET 
are to: encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources; reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity sector; and ensure that renewable energy sources 
are ecologically sustainable. The expanded RET scheme, which commenced in January 2010, is 
designed to ensure at least 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity comes from renewable sources 
by 2020. To achieve this, the legislation contains annual targets for large-scale renewable 
generation, expressed in gigawatt hours (GWh) that rise each year to 41,000 GWh in 2020. It 
also provides upfront support for the installation of small-scale renewable energy systems. 
The Panel found that the RET has broadly met its objectives. It has encouraged significant 
additional renewable electricity generation, with output from large-scale renewable 
generators having almost doubled as a result of the scheme. Installations of small-scale 
systems have exceeded expectations, with output from these systems already exceeding 
levels anticipated for 2020. To date, the RET has delivered a modest level of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2-e) emissions reductions. Commonwealth, state and territory environmental 
regulation provides a framework for ensuring that the RET promotes the use of ecologically 
sustainable renewable energy sources.  
Since the current RET scheme commenced the economic landscape has shifted significantly, 
leading to questions about whether the objectives for the RET remain appropriate. Over the 
past five years demand for electricity has been significantly lower than forecast and electricity 
demand in 2020 is now expected to be much lower than when the current RET was adopted. 
At the same time the cost of renewable technologies has fallen, particularly for rooftop solar 
photovoltaic (PV) systems. These factors mean that the RET could achieve a 26 per cent share 
of electricity from renewable sources by 2020. 
Australia’s climate change policy framework has also changed since the expanded RET scheme 
began. The Government is committed to achieving Australia’s five per cent CO2-e emissions 
reduction target through the Direct Action Plan. In particular, the Government has repealed 
the carbon tax and intends for the $2.55 billion Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) to be the 
primary mechanism to reduce CO2-e emissions.
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Under current settings, the RET could be expected to result in a further $22 billion cross-subsidy 
to the renewables sector (in NPV terms) over the remainder of the scheme (in addition to 
an estimated $9.4 billion (NPV) provided over the period 2001 to 2013) and encourage 
additional investment of $15 billion in new renewable generation capacity. However, this 
investment is not required to meet likely growth in the demand for electricity, which could 
largely be met from existing generation capacity. Hence, the RET would be diverting resources 
from more productive uses elsewhere in the economy, lowering productivity and national 
income. While the RET has visibly increased employment in the renewable energy sector, this 
has come at the cost of (less visible) reduced employment in other sectors. 
Analyses suggest that, overall, the RET is exerting some downward pressure on wholesale 
electricity prices, largely because it is contributing to an increase in the supply of electricity 
when electricity demand has been falling. However, the net impact of the RET on retail 
electricity prices and electricity bills appears to be small and does not diminish the economic 
costs associated with the scheme. Also, it does not represent an increase in wealth in the 
economy, but a transfer of wealth among participants in the electricity market. In addition, 
artificially low wholesale electricity prices can distort investment decisions in the electricity 
market and are unlikely to be sustained in the long term. Over time, all other things being 
equal, electricity prices could be expected to rise to better reflect the cost of generating 
electricity.
With the renewables industry now established in Australia, the main rationale for the RET 
hinges on its capacity to contribute towards the Australian Government’s CO2-e emissions 
reduction target in a cost effective manner. However, the RET is a high cost approach 
to reducing CO2-e emissions because it does not directly target CO2-e emissions and it 
only focuses on electricity generation. It promotes activity in renewable energy ahead of 
alternative, lower cost options for reducing CO2-e emissions that exist elsewhere in the 
economy. 
Although many representatives of the renewables sector favour at least maintaining the 
current RET, the Panel is of the view that the interests of the broader community should 
take precedence and that, as the RET in its current form is imposing significant costs on the 
economy, it should be substantially reformed, with greater emphasis placed on lower cost 
alternatives for meeting the Australian Government’s CO2-e emissions reduction target. 
Options for reforming the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET)
The Panel considered various options proposed by stakeholders for reforming the LRET. 
These include extending the target to achieve a ‘real 30 per cent’ share of generation by 2030, 
reducing the target to achieve a ‘real 20 per cent’ share of generation in 2020, setting a target 
that corresponds to a ‘50 per cent share of new growth’ in electricity demand, ‘closing the 
LRET to new entrants’ and ‘repealing’ the LRET scheme. 
Setting a target to achieve a ‘real 30 per cent’ share of renewables by 2030 would have the 
effect of reducing the 2020 target (although it would still be higher than a ‘real 20 per cent’ 
target) and allowing the targets to rise between 2020 and 2030. The Panel considers that the 
adoption of a higher target and/or extension of the scheme beyond its current timeframe 
are inconsistent with the objective of reducing the cost of the scheme and would prolong a 
relatively inefficient approach to reducing CO2-e emissions. 
Adopting a ‘real 20 per cent’ target would involve reducing the legislated target for large-scale 
renewable generation to a level consistent with 20 per cent of the latest projections of 
electricity demand in 2020, taking into account higher than previously expected growth in 
small-scale renewables. While many stakeholders were in favour of this approach, the Panel is 
concerned about fixing targets once again in legislation based on electricity demand forecasts 
that are inherently uncertain. If electricity demand to 2020 is higher or lower than currently 
forecast, a ‘real 20 per cent’ target will not be achieved, and if demand is lower than forecast, 
the RET will continue to add generation capacity that is surplus to the requirements of the 
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market. Consequently, if the Government wishes to consider a ‘real 20 per cent’ target, the 
Panel suggests that targets be periodically updated as electricity demand projections are 
revised. 
Stakeholders in the renewables industry expressed concerns that complete repeal of the 
legislation would substantially affect both existing and future investments, constituting 
sovereign risk. The Panel considers that the risk of significant policy change is better 
characterised as regulatory risk and is always present. Nonetheless, the Panel recognises that 
repeal may result in adverse financial implications for existing investors. 
The Panel has therefore recommended two options to the Government for the LRET. The first 
is to allow the LRET to continue to operate until 2030 for existing and committed renewable 
generators, but closing it to new entrants, otherwise known as ‘grandfathering’. This will 
provide investors in existing renewable generation with continued access to certificates so as 
to avoid substantial asset value loss and retain the CO2-e emissions reductions that have been 
achieved so far. Importantly, this approach avoids the costs to the community associated with 
subsidising additional generation capacity that is not required to meet electricity demand.
Alternatively, the Panel suggests that the LRET could be modified to increase in proportion 
with growth in electricity demand, by setting targets one year in advance that correspond 
to a ‘50 per cent share of new growth’. This would protect investors in existing renewable 
generators and would support additional renewable generation when demand is growing. 
Targets would not be mandated for future years, exposing renewable energy investors to the 
same market risk (that future levels of electricity demand are unknown) that other investors 
in the sector currently face. If the current forecasts of electricity demand prove accurate, this 
approach would result in renewables making up a 20 per cent share of forecast electricity 
demand in 2020, but the share may be different if demand is higher or lower than expected. 
Importantly, this approach would protect the broader community from the cost of subsidising 
unnecessary additional generation capacity if electricity demand continues to fall.
Options for reforming the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES)
Small-scale renewable energy systems supported by the SRES generated or displaced around 
6,400 GWh of electricity in 2013, which is above the original expectation for the SRES of 
achieving a minimum of 4,000 GWh of annual generation by 2020. Based on information 
provided during the review, the Panel considers that the significant cost reductions of 
small-scale solar PV systems combined with the increase in retail electricity prices means that 
the small-scale renewable energy industry is becoming commercially viable. Additionally, 
the cost of the CO2-e emissions reductions achieved by the SRES is very high, in the order of 
$100-$200 per tonne and at least two or three times that of the large-scale scheme. 
Given these factors, the Panel considers that there is a strong case for winding back the SRES, 
through either closing the scheme immediately or accelerating the phase-out of the scheme. 
Modelling indicates that repeal of the SRES would have an immediate effect of reducing the 
install rates of rooftop PV by at least 30 per cent and the number of solar water heaters by 
around 16 per cent. However, by the early 2020s, the rate of small-scale solar PV systems 
installed each year would recover to a rate similar to that if the SRES was left in place. 
If the Government is concerned about the immediate impacts of repeal of the SRES and 
does not wish for the industry to contract below its long-term sustainable level, rather than 
immediately closing the scheme the Government could bring forward its closure from 2030 to 
2020. Under this approach, the Panel recommends additional measures to reduce the cost of 
the scheme, including earlier reductions in the levels of support (certificate deeming periods) 
provided for the installation of solar PV and solar water heater systems. The Panel also 
recommends reducing the size eligibility threshold for rooftop solar PV systems from no more 
than 100 kilowatts to no more than 10 kilowatts, to ensure the scheme is targeted towards 
households.
vExemption arrangements
The direct (certificate) costs of the RET are borne by electricity consumers, both households 
and businesses, through electricity prices. Businesses conducting emissions-intensive, 
trade-exposed (EITE) activities receive an exemption for a portion of RET costs in recognition 
that these businesses are price takers in a global market. Many EITE businesses claim that the 
current exemption is not sufficient to prevent a loss of global competitiveness as a result of 
the additional cost of the RET.
If adopted, the Panel’s recommendations on both the LRET and the SRES would reduce the 
costs of the RET for all electricity consumers, including EITE businesses. The Panel does not 
consider that an increase in the EITE exemption is warranted in addition to these changes, 
as this would increase the cost of the RET faced by all other electricity users, including other 
manufacturers, some of which are also trade-exposed. If the Government does wish to 
consider extending the EITE exemption, the Panel suggests that the electricity they consume 
be excluded from calculations of the target in order to avoid imposing additional costs on 
other electricity users (although this would be difficult to achieve if the RET is closed to new 
entrants). 
The RET also provides an exemption for entities that generate and use their own electricity - 
the self-generation exemption. Strict eligibility requirements result in more limited access to 
this exemption than appears to have been intended. The Panel therefore recommends that 
the self-generation exemption be amended to extend the distance limit between the point of 
generation and use, and to include a threshold to permit self-generators to supply incidental 
amounts of electricity to third parties without attracting a RET liability.
Native forest wood waste
The Panel supports the Government’s election commitment to reinstate the eligibility of 
native forest wood waste as a renewable energy source. It considers that reinstatement should 
be based upon the regulations previously in place, which allowed eligibility on the condition 
that native forest wood waste was being harvested under a Regional Forestry Agreement, 
complied with relevant government planning and approvals processes, and was demonstrated 
to be genuine waste. The Panel has not been presented with any evidence that these 
regulations resulted in unsustainable logging activities. 
The interaction of the RET scheme with other policies
A range of national and state based climate change and energy policies affect the renewables 
industry and potentially have an impact on the operation and effectiveness of the RET.
The ERF is the centrepiece of the Government’s Direct Action Plan. There is some potential 
for duplication between the ERF and RET schemes and the Panel is of the view that projects 
should not be eligible for funding under the ERF if they are eligible for support under the RET. 
In a similar vein, the Panel considers that projects that receive support under the RET should 
not be eligible to receive further assistance from the Clean Energy Finance Corporation or the 
Australian Renewable Energy Agency.
The Panel is supportive of the continuing development of a nationally consistent energy 
market framework. This framework should minimise differences between jurisdictions and 
eliminate excess regulation and duplication. The Panel also supports the reforming of network 
regulation. This will minimise cross subsidies between different customers and should lead to 
more efficient investment and energy choices, including whether to invest in solar PV systems.
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Administrative arrangements, frequency of reviews and implementation of recommendations
Based on its consultations, the Panel considers that the administration of the RET scheme is 
generally efficient and meets the expectations of most stakeholders. Nonetheless, it identified 
some areas that could be improved. The Panel has put forward suggestions that could 
provide greater certainty for liable entities over their RET obligations, reduce compliance costs 
of the scheme and improve the efficiency of the scheme’s operation. 
The Panel recommends that the requirement for statutory reviews be removed from 
legislation. The Government can initiate a review of the legislation at any time it considers 
appropriate and the Panel heard from a wide range of stakeholders that frequent statutory 
reviews undermine investor certainty, hinder the achievement of the scheme’s objectives and 
reduce the likelihood of any renewable energy target being met. 
The Panel has identified some implementation issues associated with its recommendations 
on the LRET, the SRES and the self-generation exemption. In general, these concern ensuring 
stable certificate markets and support for existing investments that were undertaken on 
the assumption of the continuation of the current RET scheme. The Panel considers that 
consultation on the detail of implementation arrangements would be required once the 
Government has decided its preferred approach.
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Recommendation Detail
1 The Renewable Energy Target (RET) should be amended in light of the changing circumstances in 
Australia’s main electricity markets and the availability of lower cost emission abatement alternatives.
2 The Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) should be amended in one of the following two 
ways:
Option  1  –  Closed  to  new  entrants  (‘grandfathering’)
In order to reduce the cost of the LRET and its impact on electricity markets, the Panel recommends 
that the LRET should be closed to new entrants. 
a. The LRET is closed to new renewable energy power stations (subject to limited exceptions 
described below). The Clean Energy Regulator (CER) should set targets annually based on 
estimated output from accredited power stations. 
b. In addition to those renewable energy power stations already accredited under the scheme, 
eligibility would be extended to:
i. Renewable energy power stations already under construction.
ii. Renewable energy power stations to be constructed where project proponents can 
demonstrate that there is full financial and contractual commitment to the project (e.g., 
final investment decision, engineering and procurement contract) within one month of the 
announcement of this approach.
c. The last year of the operation of the LRET is 2030.
or
Option  2  –  Share  of  growth  in  electricity  demand
In order to provide support for new renewable power stations and contribute to Australia’s 
emissions reduction target while achieving less reduction than Option 1 in the cost of the LRET, 
the Panel recommends that the target be set to allocate a share of growth in electricity demand to 
renewables in the following manner:
a. The target is set annually by the CER, increasing each year to 2020 by an amount equivalent to 
50 per cent of projected growth in national electricity demand, ensuring that new renewable 
energy power stations are only supported under the RET where electricity demand is increasing. 
b. Where national electricity demand is projected to remain flat or fall, the target is held at the 
previous year’s level.
c. From 2021 onwards, the target is fixed at the 2020 level until 2030, the last year of the operation 
of the LRET.
Based on current electricity demand forecasts, this approach would achieve a 20 per cent share of 
renewables in the electricity generation mix by 2020.
3 The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) should be amended in one of the following two 
ways:
Option  1  –  Abolition
In order to address the cost of the SRES (and its effect on electricity markets), the Panel 
recommends that it be closed immediately in the following manner:
a. The SRES should terminate upon announcement.
b. Those who contracted before the announcement for the installation of a small-scale system 
should receive the certificates they would have done.
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
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3 - Continued or
Option  2  –  Bring  forward  the  phase-­out  of  the  SRES
In order to reduce the cost of the SRES while providing some support for new small-scale renewable 
energy systems, the Panel recommends that the phase-out of the SRES be brought forward in the 
following manner, to take effect immediately:
a. Bring forward the last year of operation of the SRES from 2030 to 2020.
b. Reduce the period for which certificates may be created for rooftop solar PV systems from 
15 years to 10 years, and in each year from 2016 onwards further reduce the period for which 
certificates may be created, as set out below:
5RRIWRSVRODU39SHULRGFHUWL¿FDWHVPD\EHFUHDWHG
Year installed Period
Prior to announcement 15 years
From announcement 10 years
2016 9 years
2017 8 years
2018 7 years
2019 6 years
2020 5 years
2021 Scheme closed
c. Reduce system size eligibility threshold for rooftop solar PV systems from no more than 
100 kilowatts to no more than 10 kilowatts.
d. Reduce the period for which certificates may be created for solar and heat pump water heaters 
by one year each year, commencing in 2016, as set out below:
6RODUDQGKHDWSXPSZDWHUKHDWHUVSHULRGFHUWL¿FDWHVPD\EHFUHDWHG
Year installed Period
Prior to 2016 10 years
2016 9 years
2017 8 years
2018 7 years
2019 6 years
2020 5 years
2021 Scheme closed
4 The current partial exemption arrangements for emissions-intensive trade-exposed businesses 
should be maintained.
5 The self-generation exemption should be amended to extend the one kilometre radius restriction 
and to permit self-generators to supply incidental amounts of electricity (below a set threshold) to 
third parties without attracting a RET liability. The Government should consult with affected parties 
to determine an appropriate distance limit and threshold for incidental off-takes.
6 The Government’s commitment to the reinstatement of native forest wood waste as a renewable 
energy source under the LRET should be implemented through the reintroduction of the relevant 
regulations in force prior to 2011.
7 The requirement for statutory reviews of the scheme should be removed from the Renewable  
Energy  (Electricity)  Act  2000. 
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8 Projects, or components of projects, receiving support under the RET should be excluded from 
participating in Emissions Reduction Fund auction processes.
9 Projects that receive support under the RET should not be eligible to receive further assistance from 
the Clean Energy Finance Corporation or the Australian Renewable Energy Agency.
10 To further reduce the costs of the RET the Government should consider the following proposals to 
improve the operation of the scheme:
a. Bring forward the dates for setting the Small-scale Technology Percentage and the Renewable 
Power Percentage from 31 March in the compliance year to a date prior to the commencement 
of the compliance year (e.g., 1 December).
b. Align the acquittal of LRET and SRES obligations so that both are acquitted six monthly, and 
allow liable entities to carryover a shortfall of small-scale technology certificates (as is currently 
the case for large-scale generation certificates).
c. Publish the RET liable entity with whom an EITE business will negotiate the provision of the 
Partial Exemption Certificate.
d. Update guidelines for determining the renewable components in waste for electricity 
generation.
11 The Government should consult with affected parties on implementation of the Panel’s 
recommendations for the RET including:
a. Measures for ensuring that large-scale generation certificates trade in a suitable price range 
that provides an appropriate level of support for accredited power stations.
b. Methods for setting targets.
c. Setting the distance limit and threshold for third party off-takes for the self-generation 
exemption.
12 The Panel’s recommendations for progressively reducing the deeming rate for solar PV installations 
and reducing the size eligibility threshold from 100 kilowatts to 10 kilowatts should take effect from 
the date of announcement. Transitional arrangements should be provided for parties that have 
entered into contracts on the basis of the current policy at the date of announcement.
x
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11 INTRODUCTION
1.1    About this review
The Review of the Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme was jointly announced by the 
Hon Ian Macfarlane MP, the Minister for Industry, and the Hon Greg Hunt MP, the Minister for the 
Environment, on 17 February 2014. 
The Terms of Reference state that the review is to examine the operation, costs and benefits of 
the RET scheme including the economic, environmental and social impacts, the extent to which 
the objectives of the scheme are being met and the interaction of the RET with other Australian 
Government and state and territory government policies. The review is to provide advice on 
whether the objectives of the RET scheme are still appropriate and the range of options available 
for reducing its impact on electricity prices. The full Terms of Reference is in Appendix A.
An Expert Panel (the Panel) was appointed to undertake the review comprising: 
Mr Dick Warburton AO LVO (chair), Dr Brian Fisher AO PSM, Ms Shirley In’t Veld and 
Mr Matt Zema. The Panel was supported by a Secretariat in the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. 
The Panel consulted widely with interested parties to gather information for this review. A 
paper calling for public submissions was released on 5 April 2014 and in response the Panel 
received around 1,000 general submissions with a wide variety of views on the future of the RET. 
The Panel also received over 23,000 campaign letters and emails supporting the continuation 
or expansion of the scheme, including from GetUp Australia, Hepburn Wind, Australian Wind 
Alliance, Engineers Australia and Lighter Footprints. The Panel conducted around 100 face to 
face meetings with more than 200 stakeholders representing the renewables industry, electricity 
retailers and generators, electricity consumers, environmental and welfare groups and state and 
territory governments. Further details on the consultation process and submissions received are in 
Appendix B.
The Panel has drawn on information contained in submissions to this review throughout this 
report to illustrate the issues raised by and the views of various stakeholders. However, the 
inclusion of a quote from a submission does not mean that the Panel agrees with or endorses this 
material.
In addition to the submissions and stakeholder consultations, the Panel’s recommendations were 
informed by detailed electricity market modelling undertaken by ACIL Allen for the Panel that 
assessed the impacts of the current RET policy and alternative options. A consultation paper on 
the proposed approach to key modelling assumptions was released by the Panel as part of its 
Call  for  Submissions on 5 April 2014. The modelling assumptions were discussed at a stakeholder 
workshop on 23 April 2014. Feedback from both submissions and the workshop was considered 
when the Panel finalised the assumptions. 
Preliminary modelling results were presented at a second stakeholder workshop held on 
23 June 2014 that was attended by 78 participants. After the workshop, the Panel requested 
ACIL Allen to model an additional scenario, the ‘50 per cent share of new growth’ in electricity 
demand scenario. The final results of the modelling are referred to throughout this report and are 
presented in detail in ACIL Allen’s report, which is a companion document to the Panel’s report. 
The approach to the modelling scenarios is described in Chapter 4 and the executive summary of 
the modelling report is reproduced in Appendix C of this report.
The Panel also gave consideration to other modelling of the RET provided as part of submissions 
to the review.
21.2    History of the RET and context of the Review 
The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) scheme was first introduced in 2001 to achieve 
an additional two per cent of renewable energy in the electricity mix by 2010. In 2009, the 
Renewable  Energy  (Electricity)  Act  2000 (the REE Act) was amended, replacing the MRET with the 
RET. From 2010, the scheme was expanded to ensure that an equivalent of at least 20 per cent of 
Australia’s electricity would come from renewable sources by 2020. The target increased to 
45,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) of additional renewable generation in 2020, staying at that level 
until 2030. At the time the scheme was expanded, the Solar Credits multiplier was introduced to 
boost support for small-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, and Partial Exemption Certificates 
(PECs) were introduced to provide assistance with the costs of the RET to emissions-intensive, 
trade-exposed businesses (EITEs). 
Shortly after the expansion of the scheme there was a boom in the installation of small-scale 
renewable energy systems (mostly rooftop PV systems), driven by generous feed-in-tariffs 
introduced by state and territory governments, the Solar Credits multiplier under the RET and 
falling system costs. This resulted in a large surplus of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) in 
the market, causing REC prices to fall. This created uncertainty in the REC market for potential 
investors in large-scale renewable generation. In response, the Australian Government amended 
the legislation to split the RET scheme into two parts, the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target 
(LRET) and the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES). Both schemes commenced on 
1 January 2011. RECs created from the installation of small-scale systems prior to the split of the 
schemes can be used to meet obligations under the LRET, and there remains a substantial surplus 
of certificates in this market equivalent to roughly one and a half times the LRET target in 2014. 
When the schemes were split, it was estimated that small-scale systems would contribute at 
least 4,000 GWh of renewable generation to the target. To ensure that a 20 per cent share of 
renewables would be achieved, 4,000 GWh was subtracted from the original 45,000 GWh target to 
derive the current LRET of 41,000 GWh in 2020, which is fixed in legislation. 
Since the commencement of the expanded RET scheme in 2010, the policy and economic 
landscape has changed significantly. Over the past five years demand for electricity has been 
significantly lower than forecast and projections of electricity demand to 2020 have been 
repeatedly revised down, meaning that the RET is likely to achieve a greater than 20 per cent 
share of electricity from renewable sources by 2020 (Appendix D explains how the percentage 
share of renewables can be calculated). Wholesale electricity prices in the National Electricity 
Market (NEM) have been falling as demand for electricity has declined while supply has increased. 
However, this has not been mirrored in retail electricity prices, which have increased substantially 
mainly due to increasing network costs. At the same time the cost of renewable technologies has 
fallen, particularly for rooftop solar PV systems for which installations have grown much more 
quickly than anticipated. 
The RET was reviewed in 2012 by the Climate Change Authority which did not recommend any 
major structural changes to the scheme.
The Australian Government has a commitment to reduce Australia’s carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2-e) emissions by five per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 and is introducing the Emissions 
Reduction Fund (ERF), in place of the carbon tax, as the primary mechanism for achieving this. The 
Australian Government is also committed to reducing business costs, cutting red and green tape 
and minimising cost of living pressures. 
31.3    The operation of the RET
The RET scheme is underpinned by the REE Act, the Renewable  Energy  (Electricity)  Regulations  
2001 (REE Regulations), the Renewable  Energy  (Electricity)(Large-­scale  Generation  Shortfall  
Charge)  Act  2000 and the Renewable  Energy  (Electricity)(Small-­scale  Technology  Shortfall  Charge)  
Act  2010. 
The RET works by allowing renewable energy power stations and owners of small-scale renewable 
energy systems (solar water heaters, heat pumps, and small-scale solar PV, wind, and hydro 
systems) to create certificates for every megawatt hour (MWh) of renewable electricity they 
produce. Liable entities (generally electricity retailers) are obligated to purchase certificates 
and surrender them to the Clean Energy Regulator (CER) each year to demonstrate compliance 
with the scheme. This creates a market which provides financial incentives to both large-scale 
renewable power stations and owners of small-scale systems.
If a liable entity does not surrender the required amount of certificates, it must pay a shortfall 
charge of $65 per certificate to the CER.1 However, because the cost of a certificate is tax 
deductible and the shortfall charge is not, the effective price for the shortfall charge is around 
$92/MWh, depending on the liable entity’s marginal rate of tax. 
The RET scheme contains two types of exemptions. The first is a partial exemption for businesses 
that are deemed to be EITE businesses. The second is for generators producing and consuming 
their own electricity (self-generators). Further information on these exemptions is provided in 
Section 7.1. 
The LRET and the SRES components of the RET have separate certificate markets and obligations 
for liable entities. The certificates created in each of the schemes are not interchangeable.
1.3.1    The Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET)
The LRET encourages additional generation from large-scale renewable energy projects, such 
as wind and solar farms and hydro facilities, by allowing eligible renewable energy generators 
to create large-scale generation certificates (LGCs) for the electricity they produce, with each 
certificate representing one MWh of renewable generation. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the LGC market under the LRET. The CER administers the LRET 
by managing the REC Registry (a secure web-based application that facilitates the creation, trade 
and surrender of certificates), accrediting renewable power stations and establishing the annual 
LRET liability by setting the renewable power percentage (RPP). The amount of LGCs that a liable 
entity is required to surrender each year is proportionate to its liable electricity purchases – the 
RPP determines this proportion.
1 The REE Act allows liable entities to carry forward a 10 per cent shortfall of LGCs to the following year. If the shortfall exceeds 10 per cent, the liable entity is required 
to pay the shortfall charge.
4Accredited power stations can trade the LGCs they create with liable entities or other certificate 
traders through the REC Registry. The majority of LGCs are sold as part of a power purchase 
agreement (PPA), which provides a contract between a renewable generator and an electricity 
retailer for the purchase of both electricity and LGCs. If LGCs are not sold through contracts, they 
are sold in the LGC market, where the LGC spot price is determined by the supply and demand of 
certificates in the market. The CER does not regulate these prices. 
To meet requirements under the REE Act, each year liable entities purchase and surrender LGCs 
equal to their liability for the previous calendar year to the CER. The purchase of PECs from EITE 
businesses may reduce this liability.
LGCs are only awarded for renewable generation above 1997 levels. Eligible generators 
producing electricity prior to 1997 (for example hydro generators) are able to create LGCs for 
annual generation above a set baseline, which is determined by the CER based on the electricity 
generated by that power station over the period 1994 to 1996. 
The LRET includes legislated targets for large-scale generation each year that increase to 
41,000 GWh of renewable electricity in 2020 and remain at this level until 2030. Figure 2 shows 
the currently legislated annual targets from 2001 to 2030. 
Figure 1 LGC Market under the LRET
5As of 1 July 2012, electricity generated using waste coal mine gas (WCMG) from selected power 
stations that were operating prior to 2008 is also eligible to receive LGCs under the LRET, 
although it is not a renewable energy source. This forms part of transitional arrangements relating 
to the phase out of state based greenhouse gas reduction schemes and will be in place until 2020. 
The annual LRET targets were increased out to 2020 to account for this change. No new WCMG 
power stations can be accredited under the LRET.
Native forest wood waste was included as an eligible source of renewable energy when the MRET 
was established in 2001. In November 2011, eligibility for native forest wood waste under the four 
eligible sub-categories of wood waste was removed from the RET. Transitional measures were 
introduced for the 22 power stations that listed wood waste as an eligible energy source and are 
effective until 2020. As part of its election commitments, the Australian Government announced 
that it would reverse the exclusion of native forest sourced wood waste as an eligible renewable 
energy source.2 Section 7.2 discusses the administrative and regulatory arrangements that should 
be in place to ensure that the reinstatement of native forest wood waste is consistent with the 
sustainable management of native forests.
1.3.2      The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES)
The SRES supports the installation of new small-scale renewable energy generation systems such 
as rooftop solar PV and micro wind and hydro systems. It also supports solar water heaters and 
air source heat pumps that displace other sources of energy used to heat water.
2 The Coalition’s Policy for a Strong and Sustainable Forestry Industry, September 2013.
Annual targets exclude allowance for waste coal mine gas generation 
Source: Derived from data on the Clean Energy Regulator website.
Figure 2 Profile of annual targets under the LRET
6Owners of eligible systems are able to create STCs through deeming arrangements that estimate 
the quantity of electricity an eligible system will generate or displace over its lifetime. For 
example, solar PV systems are entitled to create 15 years’ worth of certificates at the time of 
installation. From 2017, support provided for small-scale solar PV systems gradually falls through 
reductions in the deeming period until it is phased out completely in 2030.
The Solar Credits multiplier was introduced in mid-2009 to provide further support for solar PV 
by multiplying the number of certificates that systems were able to create. The multiplier was 
originally set at five, so systems were eligible to create five times 15 years’ worth of certificates. 
The multiplier was scheduled to progressively phase-out by reducing by one each year to 
mid-2015, however due to rapidly falling system costs and strong uptake, the mechanism was 
terminated on 1 January 2013. 
Creators of STCs may sell certificates on the STC market for the market price or through the 
voluntary STC Clearing House at a fixed price of $40. The primary purpose of the Clearing House 
is to ensure that liable entities can meet surrender requirements at a maximum price of $40. If 
supply of certificates is greater than demand (as has typically been the case) the market price 
will be lower than the Clearing House price and liable entities will purchase from the market. 
However, if demand exceeds supply, STCs can be bought from the Clearing House at the capped 
price. To meet the requirements under the REE Act, liable entities surrender STCs to the CER on a 
quarterly basis. 
When the LRET and SRES schemes were split, it was estimated that the SRES would deliver at least 
4,000 GWh of generation by 2020. However, unlike the LRET, the SRES does not have binding 
annual targets. Rather, the scheme is uncapped allowing all eligible installations to receive 
assistance. Small-scale installations generated or displaced the equivalent of 6,400 GWh of 
electricity in 2013. 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the Small-scale Technology Certificate (STC) market. The 
CER administers the SRES by managing the REC Registry, registering and validating STCs, and 
establishing the annual SRES liability by setting the Small-scale Technology Percentage (STP). The 
STP is based on modelled estimates of the number of STCs expected to be created in that year, 
adjusted for any surplus or deficit of certificates from the previous year.
Figure 3 STC Market under the SRES
72 PERFORMANCE OF THE RET AGAINST OBJECTIVES
The RET scheme is aimed at increasing renewable energy generation and reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions from the electricity sector. It is designed to ensure that the equivalent of at least 
20 per cent of Australia’s electricity comes from renewable sources by 2020.
The scheme is established by the REE  Act. The formal objects of the REE  Act  are to:
a. encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources;
b. reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector; and
c. ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable.
2.1      Encouraging electricity generation from renewable sources
2.1.1      Installed capacity
Around 8,000 MW of large-scale renewable capacity, consisting mostly of hydro power stations, 
existed prior to 1997.3 These power stations were accredited in 2001 and annual generation needs 
to be above their 1997 ‘baselines’ (as determined by the CER) to create certificates and benefit 
from the RET. 
Large-scale renewable generation capacity has grown by around 5,100 MW to 13,100 MW in July 2014. 
2,400 MW of this capacity has been added since the RET scheme was expanded in 2010. As of 
July 2014 there were 416 renewable energy power stations accredited under the LRET, of which 
125 gained accreditation since 2010. 
3 RET Review estimate based on data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator.
Box 1: Understanding generation and capacity
A power station’s capacity refers to how much electricity it can deliver at a single instant in 
time. It is measured in watts (W). A kilowatt (kW) is a thousand watts, a megawatt (MW) is a 
thousand kW, and a gigawatt (GW) is a thousand MW.
Electricity delivered over time is typically measured in kilowatt hours (kWh), megawatt hours (MWh) 
or gigawatt hours (GWh). For example, a 10 MW generator running at maximum power 
continuously for one hour will deliver 10 MWh of electricity.
Power stations do not operate continuously at maximum power. A power station’s capacity 
factor refers to the amount of electricity it actually produces relative to the maximum it could 
produce if it were operating continuously at full power. Typically, fossil fuel power stations 
have capacity factors of around 80 per cent while renewable power stations have capacity 
factors of around 30 per cent.  
For example, a 100 MW wind farm with a 35 per cent capacity factor would generate 
306,600 MWh of electricity per year (100 MW x 35% x 24 hours x 365 days). A wind farm of 
this size in Australia might have around 40 turbines (of 2.5 MW capacity each).
84 Clean Energy Regulator, Small-‐scale installations by postcode, July 2014.
5 Green Energy Markets, 6PDOOVFDOHWHFKQRORJ\FHUWLÀFDWHVGDWDPRGHOOLQJIRUWR, January 2014.
6 Ibid.
7 Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, $XVWUDOLDQHQHUJ\VWDWLVWLFV, July 2014, Table O.
8 Renewable generation includes 2013 below baseline generation of around 16,000 GWh and excludes solar water heater displacement. There is no single data series 
that provides renewable energy generation for the period 2001 to 2013. The 2000-‐01 estimate is from Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics while the 2013 
estimate is based on data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator.
9 Based on data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator.
Eligible    
energy  
source   ACT NSW NT QLD SA Tas Vic WA
ĚĚŝƟŽŶĂů
installed  
capacity  
Total  
accredited  
power  
ƐƚĂƟŽŶƐ
MW MW MW MW MW MW MW MW MW
Biomass -­‐ 49 -­‐ 12 -­‐ 1 7 126 196 81
Hydro 1 32 -­‐ 16 3 26 174 -­‐ 252 105
>ĂŶĚĮůůŐĂƐ 4 33 1 509 1 5 27 16 597 61
Solar 21 2 4 3 1 -­‐ 7 11 50 87
WCMG -­‐ 29 -­‐ 130 -­‐ -­‐ -­‐ -­‐ 158 7
Wind -­‐ 454 -­‐ 12 1,473 312 1,070 488 3,809 75
ĚĚŝƟŽŶĂů
installed    
capacity  
(MW) 26 599 5 682 1,478 344 1,285 642 5,062 416
Table 1 Large-scale renewable capacity installed by state and fuel source, 2001 - 2014
Table 1 shows the breakdown of additional large-scale renewable capacity by state and fuel 
source. The majority of the additional capacity has occurred through wind development in South 
Australia and Victoria, with total wind capacity increasing by over 3,800 MW since the MRET was 
introduced in 2001.
Installed capacity excludes accredited co-fired power stations: Bayswater, Liddell, Gladstone, Hazelwood, Vales Point and Wallerawang.
Source: RET Review estimates based on data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator, current at 16 July 2014
Over 2 million small-scale renewable energy systems have been installed under the RET, 
including around 1.3 million small generation units (SGUs), with an installed capacity of 
3,500 MW, and 870,000 solar water heaters.4 Rooftop PV systems make up the majority of the 
SGUs and new installations increased from around 100 per year in 2001, to a peak of over 360,000 
in 2011. The rate of installation has fallen since 2011 to 215,700 installations in 20135, largely due 
to the removal of the Solar Credits multiplier and reductions in support under state and territory 
feed-in-tariffs. However the average rooftop solar PV system size has grown from 1.9 kW in 2010 
to 3.7 kW in 2013.6
2.1.2  Generation
The Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) estimated that around 18,000 GWh of 
electricity was generated from renewable sources in 2000-01, representing around 8 per cent of 
total electricity generation in that year.7 In 2013, total renewable generation was around 
33,000 GWh, representing approximately 14 per cent of electricity generation.8
Figure 4 shows that the total renewable generation or displacement supported by the RET in 2013 
was around 19,500 GWh.9 Of this, the LRET accounted for around 13,100 GWh (with wind energy 
being the largest contributor) and the SRES accounted for around 6,400 GWh. 
9Figure 4 Renewable generation and displacement supported by the RET, 2013 (GWh) 
Figure 5 LGCs created by fuel source, 2001 - 2013
Source: Data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator, current at 3 June 2014
Source: Clean Energy Regulator 5HJLVWHURI/DUJHVFDOH*HQHUDWLRQ&HUWL¿FDWHVFXUUHQWDW-XQH
Figure 5 shows the supply of LGCs by fuel source and highlights the growth in wind generation, 
which now accounts for around 60 per cent of LGCs. The total value of certificates that have been 
created by large-scale renewable generators from 2001 to 2013 is approximately $5.2 billion.10 
This represents the cross-subsidy received by large-scale renewable generators under the RET.
10 Calculation by the RET Review Secretariat based on data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator.
10
Figure 6 Historical generation and displacement from small-scale PV and SWH, 2001 - 2013 
Source: Data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator
11 Clean Energy Regulator, 5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHW$GPLQLVWUDWLYH5HSRUW, 2014.
12 Calculation by the RET Review Secretariat based on data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator.
Since the commencement of the RET, over 110 million STCs have been created under the SRES, 
with solar PV systems accounting for around 94 per cent of these.11 The total value of certificates 
that have been created by owners of small-scale renewable energy systems is approximately 
$4.2 billion over the period 2001 to 2013.12 The number of STCs created in a particular year is 
greater than actual renewable generation by small-scale solar PV in that year due to the effects 
of the Solar Credit multiplier and deeming arrangements. The CER has estimated the generation 
from small-scale solar PV and displacement attributable to solar water heaters (SWH) and heat 
pumps over the period of the scheme as shown in Figure 6. Uptake of small-scale systems has 
been strong, with generation and displacement from small-scale systems estimated at 6,400 GWh 
of electricity in 2013.
A number of submissions commented on the performance of the RET against the objects in 
the REE Act. Most submissions acknowledged that the RET has delivered on the objective of 
encouraging the additional generation of renewable electricity. For example, Pacific Hydro noted 
the considerable investment in renewables since the commencement of the RET:
The  Renewable  Energy  Target  has  performed  exceptionally  well  against  the  objects  of  the  
5(($FWRQJHQHUDWLRQLQYHVWPHQWDQGHPLVVLRQV6RPHELOOLRQKDVEHHQLQYHVWHG
LQQHZUHQHZDEOHJHQHUDWLRQZLWKDQQXDORXWSXWJURZLQJIURPXQGHU*:KWRDURXQG
PRUHWKDQ*:KWRGD\3DFL¿F+\GURS
The REC Agents Association submitted that the SRES meets the objects of the Act:
The  SRES  continues  to  meet  the  objects  of  the  Act.  It  has  certainly  encouraged  the  
DGGLWLRQDOJHQHUDWLRQRIHOHFWULFLW\IURPUHQHZDEOHVRXUFHV,QGHHGLWKDVKHOSHGWUDQVIRUP
$XVWUDOLD¶VHQHUJ\V\VWHPZLWKPRUHWKDQPLOOLRQKRPHV±PLOOLRQ$XVWUDOLDQV±LQVWDOOLQJ
VRODUSDQHOVRUVRODUKRWZDWHUV\VWHPV5(&$JHQWV$VVRFLDWLRQS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Although there is overall agreement that the RET has encouraged renewable generation, some 
stakeholders expressed the view that this has resulted from inefficient investment in non-competitive 
renewable energy, which has displaced fossil fuel generation and reduced CO2-e emissions at a high 
cost. 
The Institute of Public Affairs stated:
:LQGDQGRWKHUUHQHZDEOHVVKRXOGEHOHIWWRVWDQGRQWKHLURZQIHHWFRPPHUFLDOO\7KH\KDYH
achieved  their  current  market  position  only  through  subsidies  and  show  no  sign  of  reaching  
commercial  viability  without  them.  Their  on-­going  subsidisation  severely  weakens  the  national  
HFRQRP\DQGLPSRVHVVLJQL¿FDQWSHQDOWLHVRQFRQVXPHUVERWKGLUHFWO\DQGLQGLUHFWO\
,QVWLWXWHRI3XEOLF$IIDLUVS
Major Energy Users Inc. stated:
7KH5(($FWPDNHVQRUHIHUHQFHWRWKHSURPRWLRQRIWKHPRVWFRVWHI¿FLHQWVROXWLRQVWR
UHQHZDEOHJHQHUDWLRQ,WZRXOGEHDOOWKHEHWWHUDQGPRUHFRKHUHQWIRUGRLQJVRDQG
for  linking  explicitly  to  the  National  Electricity  Objective  and  the  long  term  interests  of  
FRQVXPHUV0DMRU(QHUJ\8VHUV,QFS
Some submissions argued that the RET encourages deployment of the most cost effective, 
commercial renewable energy technologies and suggest that it has driven down the cost of 
deployment of these technologies. In its submission, the Clean Energy Council indicated:
The  RET  has  been  fundamental  to  driving  the  development  of  the  Australian  renewable  
HQHUJ\LQGXVWU\RYHUWKHSDVW\HDUV7KLVKDVUHVXOWHGLQLQFUHDVLQJVFDOHDQGHI¿FLHQF\
DQGLQWXUQGULYLQJGRZQWKHFRVWRIGHSOR\LQJUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\HQFRXUDJLQJLQQRYDWLRQ
ERWKLQGHSOR\LQJSURYHQWHFKQRORJLHVDQGVHHNLQJZD\VWRPD[LPLVHWKHLURXWSXWEXWDOVR
in  the  development  of  new  and  exciting  technologies;;  and  developing  Australian  capability  in  
WKHVNLOOVDQGVXSSO\FKDLQVWKDWGULYHLQQRYDWLRQORFDOMREVDQGÀRZRQHFRQRPLFEHQH¿WV
&OHDQ(QHUJ\&RXQFLOS
2.2    Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity sector
The second major objective of the REE Act is to reduce CO2-e emissions from the electricity sector. 
The RET reduces CO2-e emissions by providing an incentive for additional renewable energy 
which displaces electricity that would have been generated from fossil fuels. The CO2-e emissions 
reductions achieved will depend on the emissions-intensity of the fuel source that would have 
otherwise been used. This counterfactual scenario cannot be observed, so the level of abatement 
can only be estimated, not measured. 
Figure 7 shows that total CO2-e emissions from Australia’s electricity sector over the period 
2000-01 to 2012-13 were approximately 2,500 Mt CO2-e. Historical CO2-e emissions abatement 
from the RET has been estimated by SKM to be around 20 Mt CO2-e between 2001 and 2012.
13 
The modest level of abatement achieved to date primarily reflects the small targets in effect 
under the scheme from 2001 to 2009. 
13 SKM, %HQHÀWRIWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHWWR$XVWUDOLD·V(QHUJ\0DUNHWVDQG(FRQRP\, 2012.
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Figure 7 CO2-e emissions in the Australian electricity sector, 2000-01 to 2012-13 
Source: Data provided by the Department of the Environment to the RET Review Secretariat
A number of submissions stated the RET has achieved its objectives in delivering CO2-e emissions 
reductions. The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Government submitted that:
$IWHUDORQJKLVWRU\RIJURZWK$XVWUDOLD¶VHOHFWULFLW\HPLVVLRQVKDYHGHFOLQHGRYHUWKHODVW¿YH
\HDUVLQODUJHSDUWEHFDXVHRIWKH5(7,WLVLPSRUWDQWWKDWWKHPRPHQWXPRIWKLVGHFOLQHLV
sustained  through  maintenance  of  the  current  RET  target.  The  chances  of  Australia  meeting  
its  national  greenhouse  gas  emission  reduction  targets  in  the  medium  to  long  term  will  be  
greatly  diminished  if  the  current  RET  target  is  reduced  or  pushed  out  to  a  later  year.  
$&7*RYHUQPHQWS
Although CO2-e emissions reductions have been achieved through the RET, some submissions 
have indicated that this has been at a high cost relative to other opportunities for reducing 
CO2-e emissions. For example the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal stated:
,QWHUPVRIUHGXFLQJHPLVVLRQVWKH&30>FDUERQSULFLQJPHFKDQLVP@RUWKH(5)ZRXOG
achieve  the  objective  at  a  lower  cost.  These  schemes  allow  producers  and  consumers  to  
develop  the  most  cost  effective  way  to  reduce  carbon  emissions  by  sending  a  price  signal  
DERXWWKHFRVWRIFDUERQHPLVVLRQV,QGHSHQGHQW3ULFLQJDQG5HJXODWRU\7ULEXQDOS
The cost of abatement of the RET is further discussed in Section 5.6. 
2.3      Ensuring the ecological sustainability of renewable energy sources
The third objective of the REE Act is to ensure that participants in the RET use renewable energy 
sources that are ecologically sustainable. The REE Act defines ‘ecologically sustainable’ as an 
action that is consistent with the following principles of ecologically sustainable development 
defined in the Environment  Protection  and  Biodiversity  Conservation  Act  1999  (Cth) (EBPC Act):
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a. Decision making processes should effectively integrate both long term and short term 
economic, environmental, social and equitable considerations.
b. If there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.
c. The principle of inter generational equity, which is that the present generation should 
ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the environment is maintained or 
enhanced for the benefit of future generations.
d. The conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a 
fundamental consideration in decision making.
e. Improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms should be promoted.
There are 19 eligible renewable energy sources described in the REE Act. The main eligible 
renewable energy sources are wind, hydro, solar, landfill gas and biomass sources. There are 
no specific requirements set out in the REE Act for eligible renewable energy sources to be 
ecologically sustainable. However, to become accredited under the RET a power station must be 
operating in accordance with any relevant Commonwealth, state, territory or local government 
planning and environmental approval requirements. ‘Standing notices’ to this effect must be 
provided to the CER along with annual compliance statements. The CER also conducts risk based 
compliance monitoring visits to power stations. If a power station operates in contravention of a 
relevant law then it may be suspended by the CER.
Submissions to the review generally agreed that the RET is meeting the sustainability objective. 
For example the WA Renewable Energy Alliance stated that:
7KH5(7KDVQHYHUEHHQFUHGLEO\FKDOOHQJHGRQWKHEDVLVRIHFRORJLFDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\
ODUJHO\EHFDXVHWKHHOLJLELOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWVVXUURXQGLQJWKHFUHDWLRQRIFHUWL¿FDWHVKDYH
EHHQVXI¿FLHQWO\VWULQJHQW:HEHOLHYHLWLVRIXWPRVWLPSRUWDQFHWKDWWKHVHVWDQGDUGVDUH
maintained  so  the  public  and  industry  can  have  continued  faith  in  the  legislation  to  deliver  
forms  of  renewable  energy  that  are:  
  -­ Ecologically  sustainable;;  
  -­ 'HPRQVWUDWHFOHDUHQYLURQPHQWDOEHQH¿WVUHODWLYHWRFRQYHQWLRQDOHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQ
technologies;;  
  -­ $QLPSRUWDQWDGGLWLRQWR$XVWUDOLD¶VIXHOGLYHUVLW\VHFXULW\DQGUHOLDELOLW\RIVXSSO\  
:$5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\$OOLDQFHS
The Clean Energy Council stated:              
Every  large-­scale  renewable  energy  project  is  subject  to  a  rigorous  environmental  impact  
assessment  through  the  relevant  state  planning  approval  process.  Projects  may  also  require  
planning  and  environmental  approval  by  the  Commonwealth  if  they  are  deemed  to  potentially  
DIIHFWPDWWHUVRIQDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWDOVLJQL¿FDQFHXQGHUWKH(QYLURQPHQWDO3URWHFWLRQ
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and  Biodiversity  Conservation  Act  1999  (EPBC  Act).  This  ensures  their  impact  on  the  
HQYLURQPHQWLVPLQLPLVHG&OHDQ(QHUJ\&RXQFLOS
Other stakeholders submitted that they were unclear on the meaning of this objective or how it 
could be assessed. For example Synergy stated that:
Synergy  is  not  clear  how  the  third  objective  could  be  assessed.  To  the  extent  that  the  
RET  avoids  greenhouse  gas  emissions  this  would  be  captured  by  the  second  objective.  
“Ecological  sustainability”  may  be  captured  by  the  discussion  about  the  purposes  of  the  RET  
in  the  Climate  Change  Authority’s  2012  review  which  considered  both  “promoting  energy  
security”  and  “avoiding  some  of  the  health  and  broader  environmental  costs  associated  with  
the  production  and  use  of  fossil  fuels”.  Synergy  agrees  with  the  conclusions  of  that  review  
which  found  that:  
  “the  RET  is  unlikely  to  be  the  most  appropriate  mechanism  for  reducing  the  negative  
KHDOWKHIIHFWVIURPIRVVLOIXHOJHQHUDWLRQDQGWKDWVXFKLVVXHVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WREHEHWWHU
addressed  directly  through  regulations  and  planning  permission”
7KH>&&$@5HYLHZGLGQRWFRQVLGHUZKHWKHUWKHUHLVDJHQHUDOHQYLURQPHQWDOEHQH¿WIURP
WKH5(7:KLOHLWLVOLNHO\WKDWWKHUHPD\EHORFDOLVHGHQYLURQPHQWDOFRQFHUQVDVVRFLDWHG
ZLWKVRPHIRVVLOIXHOSODQWV6\QHUJ\EHOLHYHVWKHVHZRXOGEHPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\DGGUHVVHG
by  regulations  and  planning  permission  consistent  with  the  Climate  Change  Authority’s  view  
above.  
Synergy  therefore  does  not  believe  there  is  any  strong  evidence  that  this  third  objective  has  
EHHQGHOLYHUHGE\WKH5(76\QHUJ\S
2.4   Findings: Performance of the RET against objectives
The RET has been successful in promoting additional generation from renewable sources, 
with renewable energy generation almost doubling from 2001 to 2013. This reflects the 
considerable cross subsidy that the RET delivers to owners of renewable energy power 
stations and small-scale systems, estimated to be about $9.4 billion over the same period.
The RET has resulted in a modest reduction in CO2-e emissions from electricity generation, 
reflecting the relatively small targets for renewables in effect prior to the expansion of the 
scheme in 2010.
Commonwealth, state and territory environmental regulations provide a framework for 
ensuring that the RET promotes the use of ecologically sustainable renewable energy sources. 
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3 IMPACTS OF THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET
Chapter 1 described how the RET supports additional renewable generation by requiring liable 
parties (electricity retailers) to purchase and surrender certificates created by renewable power 
stations and owners of small-scale renewable energy systems. Electricity retailers will generally 
pass the cost of purchasing these certificates to their customers. The RET is therefore not a 
government subsidy for renewable generation, but a cross-subsidy that transfers wealth from 
electricity consumers and other participants in the electricity market to renewable generators and 
owners of small-scale renewable energy systems.
3.1      Energy markets and electricity prices
3.1.1      Trends in electricity demand
In order to evaluate the impact of the RET on electricity markets and the economy it is important 
to understand the changed circumstances since the expanded scheme commenced in 
January 2010. At that time it was assumed that electricity demand would increase, in keeping 
with historical trends, to around 300,000 GWh in 2020. A target of 45,000 GWh for additional 
renewable generation in 2020 was fixed in legislation to ensure that at least a 20 per cent share of 
renewables would be achieved.14
However, annual electricity consumption sourced from centralised electricity generators has 
been declining in the NEM. Electricity demand has fallen from around 198,000 GWh in 2009-10 
to around 184,000 GWh in 2013-14, which is a drop of around 1.7 per cent per year on average.15 
This is likely to have occurred for a range of reasons, such as declining activity in the industrial 
sector (including the closure of the Kurri Kurri aluminium smelter in New South Wales in 2012), 
global economic trends, energy efficiency initiatives and consumers responding to increasing 
electricity prices. The strong growth in rooftop solar PV systems has also contributed to a 
reduction in demand for electricity sourced from the grid. 
The Australian Energy Market Operator’s (AEMO’s) latest forecasts for electricity demand in the 
NEM (Figure 8) suggest that there will be a temporary uptick in demand growth, largely driven by 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in Queensland, followed by a period of subdued growth, with 
demand in 2023-24 projected to remain below the peaks of 2009-10. The drivers for this include 
the decline in energy intensive industries (including the closure of the Point Henry aluminium 
smelter in Victoria in August 2014), strong projected growth (24 per cent annually) in rooftop PV 
installations, particularly in Queensland and Victoria, and strong growth (10 per cent annually) 
in total energy efficiency savings, with key contributions from air conditioning, refrigeration and 
electronics.16
Forecasts by the Independent Market Operator for the South-West Interconnected System (SWIS) 
in Western Australia suggest growth in electricity demand of around two per cent per year over 
the period 2015 to 2040. 
14 It was estimated that underlying generation from existing renewable generators would represent 15,000 GWh per year, so an additional 45,000 GWh would be 
required to reach 20 per cent of 300,000 GWh in 2020. When the RET was split into the LRET and SRES schemes on 1 January 2011, it was assumed that small-‐scale 
V\VWHPVZRXOGFRQWULEXWH*:KRIJHQHUDWLRQWRWKHWDUJHWVRWKH/5(7ZDVÀ[HGDW*:KLQ
15 Australian Energy Market Operator, Final NEM and Regional Forecasts (2014 NEFR – NEM), 16 June 2014.
http://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/Planning/Forecasting/National-‐Electricity-‐Forecasting-‐Report (native annual energy forecasts including small non-‐scheduled 
generation).
16 Australian Energy Market Operator, National Electricity Forecasting Report, 2014, p.2-‐1.
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Figure 8 Annual energy consumption in the NEM, actual and forecast, 2005-06 to 2023-24
Source: Based on Australian Energy Market Operator (2014) data published with the National Electricity Forecasting Report.
Regional electricity grids and off-grid electricity use is predicted to grow at a higher rate than the 
NEM and the SWIS, though this represents a small share of Australia’s total electricity demand. 
Figure 9 shows the forecast electricity demand for electricity in Australia over the period to 2040.
Falling electricity demand in recent years and a subdued outlook mean that the RET is likely to 
deliver more than a 20 per cent share of renewable energy in 2020. Modelling by ACIL Allen for 
the review suggests the RET as currently legislated would deliver around a 26 per cent share of 
renewables by 2020 (see Section 5.1). 
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Figure 9 Forecast Australian electricity demand, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
As electricity demand has declined, the RET has resulted in investment in new generation 
capacity that would not otherwise have been required, contributing to some incumbent fossil 
fuel generators being mothballed or curtailed. This was noted in a number of submissions, for 
example, EnergyAustralia stated that:
The  RET  was  not  designed  to  operate  in  a  declining  energy  demand  environment  where  
renewable  generation  capacity  is  effectively  ‘forced’  into  a  wholesale  energy  market  when  
DGGLWLRQDOFDSDFLW\LVQRWUHTXLUHG(QHUJ\$XVWUDOLDS
ACIL Allen estimates that around 4,155 MW of coal-fired generation capacity has been mothballed 
since mid-2012 and 385 MW of gas-fired capacity is due to be mothballed in October 2014.
3.1.2      Impacts on electricity prices
Until July 2014, all jurisdictions except Victoria and South Australia regulated retail electricity 
prices for residential and small business customers. New South Wales has deregulated retail 
prices from July 2014. 
Residential and small business customers in regulated jurisdictions have access to two types of 
electricity contracts – standing offer (default) contracts set by state regulators, or market contracts 
offered by energy retailers. Both types of contracts include mandatory terms and conditions, 
with market offers also including options such as different billing periods, discounts, fixed-term 
contracts, switching incentives and bundling services. 
There are three broad components of household electricity prices: the cost of generating 
electricity (wholesale costs); the cost of sending it through poles and wires (network costs); 
and costs from retailers which includes the cost of complying with government policies such 
as the RET. Figure 10 shows the proportion of these components for retail prices in 2013-14 
as estimated by the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC). On average, the cost of 
generating electricity accounts for around 19 per cent of retail electricity prices, network costs 
account for 51 per cent and retail costs account for around 30 per cent (including the cost of 
environmental schemes). 
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Figure 10 Breakdown of Australian average residential electricity prices, 2013-14 
Source: Based on Australian Energy Market Commission, 5HVLGHQWLDO(OHFWULFLW\3ULFH7UHQGVUHSRUW'HF
Over the past five years, household retail electricity prices have risen on average by 78 per cent 
nationally, largely due to increases in network costs.17 Environmental schemes such as the carbon 
tax, the RET and state and territory feed-in-tariffs have also contributed to higher prices.  
The RET influences both wholesale and retail electricity prices. The RET places a direct cost on 
liable entities (electricity retailers) who are required to purchase certificates (LGCs and STCs) to 
comply with the scheme. These costs are passed onto customers through electricity bills and 
represented an average of four per cent of residential retail electricity prices in 2013-14.18
The RET has affected the wholesale electricity market by encouraging additional generation 
capacity into the market at a time of falling demand, putting downward pressure on wholesale 
electricity prices. The additional renewable capacity deployed as a result of the RET may have 
lower short-run marginal costs than traditional fossil fuel generation, which may have the effect 
of further lowering wholesale electricity prices as it displaces coal or gas generation with higher 
short-run marginal costs. This is referred to as the ‘merit order effect’. 
Numerous submissions commented on the impact of the RET on electricity prices. For example, 
Acciona’s submission stated that:
7KHLQWURGXFWLRQRIUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\JHQHUDWLRQVXSSO\ZLWKDYHU\ORZPDUJLQDOFRVWERWK
LQFUHDVHVFRPSHWLWLRQLQWKHVXSSO\PL[DQGRQDQHFRQRPLFEDVLVGLVSODFHVFRDODQGJDV
¿UHGJHQHUDWLRQERWKKDYHKLJKHUPDUJLQDOFRVWV7KLVUHVXOWVLQWKHZKROHVDOHPDUJLQDO
FRVWRIHOHFWULFLW\VXSSO\EHLQJORZHUWKDQZKDWLWPLJKWRWKHUZLVHEH$FFLRQDS
17 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) &RQVXPHU3ULFH,QGH[&3,Cat no. 6401.0 TABLE 7. CPI: Group, Sub-‐group and Expenditure class, weighted average of eight 
capital cities electricity. (Based on the period June 2009 -‐ June 2014).
18 Australian Energy Market Commission, 5HVLGHQWLDO(OHFWULFLW\3ULFH7UHQGVUHSRUW December 2013, p.12.
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The net impact of the RET on retail electricity prices will depend on the extent to which any 
reduction in wholesale prices is passed through to consumers and offsets the direct cost of the 
certificates. As market retail prices reflect decisions by retailers in a competitive market, and there 
are many factors influencing wholesale electricity prices, the net impact of the RET on electricity 
bills cannot be directly observed. The impact of the RET on electricity prices is further analysed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
Households and small business
For households and businesses on standing offer contracts, the state regulator determines the 
maximum cost pass through for each component of the retail tariff, including the cost of the 
RET. The RET component will vary by jurisdiction according to methodologies used to calculate 
this tariff component. For example, the submission from the New South Wales regulator, the 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, stated that the RET cost around $107 for a typical 
New South Wales customer on regulated prices in 2013-14.19 According to the Queensland 
regulator, the Queensland Competition Authority, the cost impact of the RET for a typical 
household in Queensland for 2014-15 is around $65.20 In Western Australia, the AEMC forecasts 
the RET to contribute 4 per cent or $62 to electricity bills in 2013-14.21
The RET helps households with the cost of installing their own rooftop solar PV system, providing 
an opportunity for households to save on electricity bills. Some have argued that the SRES 
benefits high and middle income households who can afford to install rooftop solar PV systems 
and reduce exposure to increasing retail electricity prices, while renters and those on lower 
incomes may not be able to do so, despite the cross-subsidy. 
However, analysis by the REC Agents Association found that to date, the installation of rooftop 
solar PV systems has been higher in postcodes in outer-metropolitan and regional areas. The REC 
Agents Association concluded that:
  -­ 5XUDODQGUHJLRQDODUHDVKDYHSHUFHQWRIDOOVRODUV\VWHPVLQVWDOOHGGHVSLWHKDYLQJ
only  32  per  cent  of  the  housing  stock.  This  translates  into  rural  and  regional  areas  having  
the  highest  uptake  of  solar  systems  per  household  at  29  per  cent;;
  -­ Installation  of  solar  systems  in  the  capital  cities  were  typically  characterised  by  postcodes  
in  the  outer  metropolitan  mortgage  belt;;  
  -­ There  is  an  inverse  relationship  between  average  incomes  and  solar  penetration  levels  (as  
LQFRPHOHYHOVLQFUHDVHGVRODUXSWDNHGHFOLQHG5(&$JHQWV$VVRFLDWLRQS
The combination of premium feed-in-tariffs offered by state and territory governments and 
strong support under the RET have increased the affordability of rooftop solar PV systems for 
low and middle income households, which are more sensitive to the upfront costs of systems. 
A different trend may emerge in the future as incentives to install rooftop solar PV have been 
substantially reduced. 
19 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal submission to the Renewable Energy Target Review, p.5.
20 Queensland Competition Authority, (VWLPDWHRIWKH,PSDFWRIWKH&DUERQ7D[DQG5(7², (corrected) June 2014.
21 Australian Energy Market Commission, 5HVLGHQWLDO(OHFWULFLW\3ULFH7UHQG, December 2013.
20
22 Australian Bureau of Statistics, (QHUJ\8VH(OHFWULFLW\*HQHUDWLRQDQG(QYLURQPHQWDO0DQDJHPHQW$XVWUDOLD, Cat no. 4660.0.
23 Information provided by the Clean Energy Regulator to the RET Review Secretariat.
Large energy users
Electricity represents a significant proportion of costs for many large businesses. For example, the 
mining and manufacturing sectors are the biggest industrial consumers of electricity, spending 
around $1.6 billion and $5.5 billion respectively in 2011-12.22
Australia’s largest trade-exposed energy users receive assistance with RET costs through PECs. 
This assistance was introduced in recognition of the combined impact that the expanded RET 
and the introduction of carbon pricing would have on the competitiveness of these businesses 
that are price takers on global markets. Over recent years, highly emissions-intensive business 
activities have received an exemption for around 68 to 78 per cent of the costs of the RET, and 
moderately emissions intensive business activities have received an exemption for around 
50 per cent of the costs.23
A number of large energy users, such as aluminium smelters, have entered into long-term 
electricity supply contracts and in some instances, the location and viability of these 
energy-intensive businesses has been influenced by the availability of low cost electricity. Some 
stakeholders have indicated that where these contracts have been recently renegotiated, the 
increase in retail electricity prices has been significant while there has not been any wholesale 
price reduction associated with the RET. 
Many large energy users claim that the cost of the RET remains significant despite the partial 
exemption. For example, the Business Council of Australia submission states:
Increases  in  electricity  prices  caused  by  the  RET  add  to  the  cost  base  of  many  of  Australia’s  
HOHFWULFLW\LQWHQVLYHLQGXVWULHVVXFKDVVWHHOPDQXIDFWXULQJDQGDOXPLQLXPVPHOWLQJ$XVWUDOLD¶V
historically  low  electricity  prices  mean  there  are  many  sectors  that  have  built  up  around  what  
KDVEHHQRQHRI$XVWUDOLD¶VSUHYLRXVFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHV+LJKHUHOHFWULFLW\SULFHV
KRZHYHUDUHHURGLQJWKHFRPSHWLWLYHHGJHRQFHKHOGE\WKHVHEXVLQHVVHVDQGWKH5(7LVD
FRQWULEXWLQJIDFWRUWRZDUGVLQFUHDVHVLQHOHFWULFLW\SULFHV%XVLQHVV&RXQFLORI$XVWUDOLDS
The submission from the Cement Industry Federation notes that:
,QJHQHUDOVLQFHWKH5(7HIIHFWLYHO\VXEVLGLVHVWKHUHQHZDEOHVLQGXVWU\DWWKH
H[SHQVHRIKRXVHKROGVLQGXVWU\DQGH[LVWLQJJHQHUDWRUV±WKLVSURJUDPLPSDFWVRQWKH
international  competitiveness  of  energy  intensive  trade  exposed  industries  such  as  cement  
PDQXIDFWXULQJ&HPHQW,QGXVWU\)HGHUDWLRQS
Australia’s manufacturing sector has declined in recent years, with increasing retail electricity 
prices, the high Australian dollar and global competition all contributing to difficult trading 
conditions over a sustained period. This has particularly affected the aluminium sector. In 2012, 
the Kurri Kurri aluminium smelter ceased operation and Alcoa closed its Point Henry facility 
in August 2014. The aluminium sector argues that it is highly affected by the RET as electricity 
represents around 30-40 per cent of production costs. For example, the submission from the 
Australian Aluminium Council states that: 
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6LQFHWKHLQFHSWLRQRIWKH05(7VFKHPHDOXPLQLXPVPHOWLQJKDVJHQHUDWHG5(7OLDELOLWLHV
of  more  than  half  a  billion  dollars.  The  ongoing  RET  liabilities  generated  by  aluminium  are  
PLOOLRQSHUDQQXPLQWRWDODQGPLOOLRQSHUDQQXPSHUVPHOWHU  
$XVWUDOLDQ$OXPLQLXP&RXQFLOS
Other industries also consider the RET adds significant costs to their operations. Cotton Australia 
submitted that the RET and carbon tax equate to 20 per cent of their electricity costs, which have 
increased by 300 per cent since 2009: 
Even  a  small  cost  increase  has  a  large  impact  on  farm  business  income  and  productivity.  
There  is  already  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  rapid  escalation  in  electricity  price  
has  forced  some  growers  to  abandon  drip  irrigation  systems  in  favour  of  lower  energy  
use  methods.  Some  irrigators  are  even  borrowing  money  and  selling  water  rights  to  pay  
HOHFWULFLW\ELOOV&RWWRQ$XVWUDOLDS
These concerns have led energy intensive industries, particularly the aluminium industry, to call 
for a decrease in the target along with an increase in exemption arrangements to cover 
90 or 100 per cent of the costs of the RET. Options for adjusting the target are discussed in 
Chapter 6 and exemption arrangements are discussed in Section 7.1.
3.1.4      Impacts on electricity supply
Reliability and security of electricity supply 
Some submissions raised concerns about the implications of high levels of variable wind and 
solar PV generation on market price volatility and power system security. For instance, Synergy 
submitted:
The  RET  impacts  on  reliability  arising  from  variable  renewable  energy  resources.  Synergy  
concurs  with  the  [RET  Review]  Issues  Paper’s  conclusion  that  this  is  currently  manageable  
but  notes  the  Economic  Regulation  Authority’s  conclusion  that  the  impact  may  become  more  
VLJQL¿FDQWDVPRUHZLQGJHQHUDWLRQFDSDFLW\LVEHLQJDGGHGWRWKHV\VWHP6\QHUJ\S
3.1.3  Findings: The impact on electricity prices
The RET impacts on electricity prices in two, countervailing ways:
The direct costs of renewable energy certificates contribute to higher retail electricity 
prices. This impact on household electricity bills is estimated to be in the range of 
four per cent in 2013-14 and higher for energy-intensive businesses. 
By encouraging additional renewable energy generation into the market and increasing 
electricity supply capacity, the RET is also exerting downward pressure on wholesale 
electricity prices. This impact has likely been made more pronounced by the recent declines 
in demand in the NEM and the low fuel costs of renewables compared with fossil fuel 
generation.
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The submission from AEMO, the organisation responsible for system security in the NEM, 
concluded that:
:KLOVWWKHUHDUHWHFKQLFDOFKDOOHQJHV>IURPLQWHJUDWLQJUHQHZDEOHJHQHUDWLRQ@$(02IHHOV
WKH1(0GHVLJQLVZHOOSODFHGWRGHDOZLWKWKHP7KLVLQFOXGHVVRPHH[LVWLQJEHQH¿FLDO
IHDWXUHVVXFKDV
  -­ )LYHPLQXWHVHFXULW\FRQVWUDLQHGHFRQRPLFGLVSDWFKDQGSULFLQJ
  -­ 7KH$XVWUDOLDQ:LQG(QHUJ\)RUHFDVWLQJ6\VWHPZKLFKLVIRUHFDVWLQJYDULDWLRQVLQRXWSXW
and  thereby  assisting  non-­intermittent  plant  to  predict  dispatch.  This  system  is  being  
expanded  to  also  forecast  the  output  of  large  solar  plants.  
  -­ The  semi-­scheduled  generator  provisions  in  the  National  Electricity  Rules  (NER)  that  
requires  intermittent  generators  such  as  wind  generators  to  respond  to  AEMO  dispatch  
signals  to  reduce  output  when  network  security  is  threatened.
The  NEM  has  been  uniquely  successful  in  securely  integrating  wind  generation  to  date  at  
ORZFRVW)RUH[DPSOH$(02KDVQRWKDGWRFKDQJHRUPDWHULDOO\LQFUHDVHWKHTXDQWLW\RI
DQFLOODU\VHUYLFHVSXUFKDVHGWRPDLQWDLQV\VWHPVHFXULW\$(02S
AEMO considers that it is technically feasible to integrate the renewable energy likely to emerge 
from the current RET:
%DVHGRQH[SHULHQFHWRGDWHDQGDQDO\VLVRIOLNHO\IXWXUHRXWFRPHV$(02FRQVLGHUVWKDW
it  is  technically  feasible  to  integrate  the  renewable  energy  likely  to  emerge  from  the  existing  
RET  settings  while  maintaining  the  security  of  the  power  system.  At  higher  levels  there  is  
OLNHO\WREHVRPHDGGLWLRQDOFRVWVWKRXJKDQ\VXFKFRVWVDUHH[SHFWHGWREHRIDPXFK
ORZHURUGHUWKDQWKHFRQVXPHUDQGLQYHVWPHQWFRVWVEHLQJPRGHOOHGE\WKHSDQHOVRWKHLU
H[FOXVLRQIURPWKHPRGHOOLQJSURFHVVVKRXOGQRWXQGHUPLQHWKHDQDO\VLV$(02S
Grid integration
Notwithstanding the conclusions above, AEMO has undertaken work on the challenges of 
integrating the level of wind generation expected under the RET into the power system. These 
challenges are expected to arise first in South Australia and Tasmania, where forecast levels 
of wind generation are highest compared with demand. Further challenges could arise from 
increased distributed generation, such as rooftop PV, and from changing consumer behaviour 
contributing to declining consumption from the grid.24
The challenges identified by AEMO include lower system inertia, particularly in South Australia 
and Tasmania, making control of power system frequency more challenging.25
There are a range of options to address these challenges. Some options could be implemented 
through existing processes and systems, for example using constraint equations in the dispatch 
process to limit the dispatch of wind generation at certain times (i.e., to constrain wind off). Other 
options that could be considered would require changes to processes, systems and regulatory 
instruments, for example, new ancillary services markets could be introduced to provide frequency 
control when there is low system inertia. The costs of such measures would be passed through to 
consumers.
24 Australian Energy Market Operator, ,QWHJUDWLQJ5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\²:LQGLQWHJUDWLRQVWXGLHVUHSRUW, 2013.
25 Inertia is the rotating energy in the system. Asynchronous renewable energy does not provide this property, which affects the frequency control capability of the 
system. Ancillary service markets can provide incentives for adequate control of frequency.
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AEMO is continuing to study these issues and intends to release further reports.
SRES impacts on demand for grid electricity and network business models
In recent years there has been unprecedented growth in consumers generating their own power 
in the form of rooftop solar PV. This was initially supported through premium feed-in-tariffs in 
different jurisdictions, with the Solar Credits multiplier under the RET also playing a role. Rapid 
reductions in solar PV costs combined with higher retail electricity prices have underpinned 
ongoing growth in solar PV, albeit at a slower pace, despite moves away from premium 
feed-in-tariffs and reductions in support under the RET. This expansion in solar PV has 
contributed to the decline in demand for grid electricity.
Solar PV connections and reduced demand from the residential sector in turn affect network 
business models and may, in part, contribute to higher network charges as network businesses 
seek to recover expenditure from fewer units of energy sold. 
Concerns have been raised that consumers without solar PV may subsidise those that have it. 
Consumers with solar PV use less total electricity from the network and pay less, while still using 
the infrastructure for reliable supply, especially in locations where the output from their own 
systems is low at times when electricity use is high. Other consumers therefore have to pay more 
per unit of energy to cover the fixed costs of the network, which have not changed.26
This raises the issue of how to reflect the full costs and benefits of rooftop PV systems connected 
to the grid. Structuring tariffs to recognise the many cost drivers and incorporate time-of-use 
pricing could help provide the right price signals for efficient investment decisions by both 
consumers and network operators.
The potential for cross-subsidisation of electricity prices between consumers in the context of 
rapidly changing technology capabilities is not part of the scope of this review but is a priority 
area for energy market reform, which is discussed further in Section 8.4. 
3.2      Environmental and social impacts
There are socio-economic and environmental impacts of wind and solar farm developments 
supported by the RET, particularly in regional and rural communities (aside from CO2-e emissions 
abatement which is discussed in Chapter 2). The RET has stimulated employment opportunities in 
renewable energy and associated industries and communities have benefited from the increased 
investment in their local regions. There is also potential for renewables to reduce the grid 
dependency of rural communities.
26 ACIL Tasman, 'LVWULEXWHG*HQHUDWLRQ²,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU$XVWUDOLDQHOHFWULFLW\PDUNHWV, Prepared for the Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA), April 2013.
3.1.5  Findings: The impact on electricity supply
While the integration of significant levels of intermittent renewable generation into electricity 
markets has presented new challenges for market operators, the reliability and security of 
electricity supplies have so far been maintained.
Electricity market operators and regulatory authorities will need to continue to analyse 
and, where appropriate, respond to the implications of future growth in the deployment of 
renewables for the safe, reliable and secure supply of electricity.
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27 Clean Energy Council, &OHDQ(QHUJ\$XVWUDOLD5HSRUW, p.18. 
28 Deloitte, $VVHVVLQJWKH,PSDFWRIWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHW, July 2013, p.2.
On the other hand, concerns have been raised about uneven allocation of benefits from local 
investment in renewable energy and about the overall burden on the economy of the additional 
economic cost of the RET.
3.2.1      Employment
The RET has the effect of creating local employment opportunities in the renewable energy 
sector. The Clean Energy Council’s Clean Energy Australia report states that 21,000 people were 
directly employed by the renewable energy industry in a construction, installation, operations or 
maintenance role at the end of 2013, with over 13,000 people employed in the solar PV industry.27
A large proportion of this employment is transitory and has occurred in rural and regional areas 
where other work opportunities are not easily found. CATCON, a civil construction company that 
has been engaged with renewable energy projects, noted: 
&$7&21KDYHEHHQVXSSO\LQJVHUYLFHVWRWKH*DV)LUHG3RZHU6WDWLRQLQGXVWU\VLQFH
our  inception  (nearly  20  years)  -­  we  are  in  a  position  to  advise  that  there  are  different  
RXWFRPHVLQUHODWLRQWRORFDOFRPPXQLW\LQYROYHPHQWEHWZHHQD*DV)LUHG363URMHFWDQGD
5HQHZDEOH:7*3URMHFWDQGZHFDQFRQ¿UPWKHUHLVDVLJQL¿FDQWO\JUHDWHUEHQH¿WWRDORFDO
FRPPXQLW\GXULQJWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQSKDVHRIUHQHZDEOHSURMHFW&$7&21S
However, this employment occurs as a result of a cross-subsidy that transfers investment from 
elsewhere in the economy and is offset by other job losses, such as jobs at fossil-fuel generation 
plants. Therefore the RET does not result in an increase in employment at a national level. The 
effect of the RET on economy-wide employment was not analysed in the modelling by ACIL Allen 
for the Review, but it was considered in modelling by Deloitte undertaken for the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Business Council of Australia and the Minerals Council of 
Australia which found that an average of 5,000 full-time jobs would be created to 2030 if the RET 
was abolished.28 The submission from the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated:
Another  key  objective  of  the  scheme  is  to  stimulate  the  development  of  a  renewable  energy  
LQGXVWU\LQ$XVWUDOLD:KLOVWWKHVFKHPHKDVGRQHWKLVXSWRDSRLQWLWKDVDOVRFRPHDWD
VLJQL¿FDQWFRVWZLWKFRQVXPHUVIRUFHGWRVXSSRUWWKHUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\LQGXVWU\YLDDODUJH
subsidy  to  renewable  energy  production.  The  jobs  and  investment  created  have  been  costly  
DQGDUHPRUHWKDQRIIVHWE\WKHORVVRIRWKHUMREDQGLQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVUHVXOWLQJLQDQ
RYHUDOOORZHULQJRIHFRQRPLFZHOIDUH$XVWUDOLDQ&KDPEHURI&RPPHUFHDQG,QGXVWU\S
3.2.2      Socio-economic impacts
A diverse range of views were expressed on the impacts of the RET in regional areas. Submissions 
opposing renewable energy projects in rural areas noted the potential for wind farms to cause 
division in rural communities between landowners hosting turbines and other interests. For 
example, the Tablelands Wind Turbine Action, a group of Atherton Tableland residents concerned 
about the impacts of wind farms in far north Queensland, highlighted this potential conflict in 
relation to agriculture:
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The  experiences  overseas  and  in  other  areas  of  Australia  are  the  costs  of  wind  turbine  
GHYHORSPHQWVDUHH[WHUQDOLVHGWRRWKHUVHFWRUVHVSHFLDOO\DJULFXOWXUH7KHVHLPSDFWVDUH
ZLGHUDQJLQJEHJLQQLQJGXULQJFRQVWUXFWLRQZKHQURDGFRQJHVWLRQGLVUXSWVDJULFXOWXUDO
LQGXVWULHVZKLFKUHO\RQWKHURDGQHWZRUNWRKDXOFDQHEDQDQDVDQGRWKHUSURGXFH
7DEOHODQGV:LQG7XUELQH$FWLRQS
However, many community group and individual submissions expressed strong support for 
renewable energy including community ownership of renewable power stations. For example, 
Hepburn Wind’s submission stated that:
7KH+HSEXUQ&RPPXQLW\:LQG)DUPLVRZQHGE\DOPRVWPHPEHUVWKHPDMRULW\RI
ZKRPDUHORFDOWRWKHUHJLRQ:LWKPDVVLYHYROXQWHHUHIIRUWDQGQHDUO\PRIFRPPXQLW\
FDSLWDOWKHPHPEHUVRI+HSEXUQ:LQGKDYHVKRZQWKDWXQGHUWKHULJKWFRQGLWLRQVUHJLRQDO
FRPPXQLWLHVZLOOHPEUDFHWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVSUHVHQWHGE\ZLQGIDUPV+HSEXUQ:LQGS
The Australian Wind Alliance articulated the benefits for rural communities as:
«JUHDWHULQFRPHVHFXULW\IRUIDUPHUVRQJRLQJORFDOMREVDPRUHGLYHUVL¿HGHFRQRPLF
EDVHLQFRPHIRUUXUDOFRXQFLOVUHWHQWLRQRISHRSOHLQORFDOVFKRROVFRPPXQLW\DQGVSRUWLQJ
JURXSV«$XVWUDOLDQ:LQG$OOLDQFHS
Submissions also noted that renewable energy presents rural communities with opportunities to 
diversify their electricity supply. For example Regional Development Australia stated:
...renewable  energy  has  a  key  role  to  play  in  securing  the  energy  future  of  the  region  in  remote  
RIIJULGUXUDOIULQJHRIIJULGDQGUHJLRQDOORFDWLRQV5HJLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW$XVWUDOLDS
3.2.3      Health impacts
In general terms, submissions suggested that electricity generation from pollution free energy 
should be good for the environment and human health. Engineers Australia noted there are 
health hazards associated with the mining, transport and burning of coal, citing figures from the 
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering for the health and environmental 
costs of coal and gas fired electricity.29
The Panel also received some submissions raising concerns about adverse health impacts of 
wind farms. The Panel notes that the Government is addressing these concerns through separate 
processes involving the National Health and Medical Research Council.
The regulation and approval of wind farm developments, including the setting of noise limits, is a 
matter for the relevant state and territory authorities. The Australian Government only becomes 
involved where matters of national environmental significance trigger the application of the 
Environment  Protection  and  Biodiversity  Conservation  Act  1999  (Cth). 
3.2.4      Land uses
Increased renewable energy generation has resulted in a greater amount of land used for wind 
and solar projects and landowners leasing land for wind turbines have supported renewable 
generation as an additional source of income. However, some submissions from individuals in 
regional communities argued that there is no direct benefit to the properties surrounding wind 
farms yet there are direct negative impacts, such as potential decreases in land values. Many of 
these concerns are planning matters and are the responsibility of state and territory governments.
29 Engineers Australia, 6XEPLVVLRQWRWKHUHYLHZRIWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHW, May 2014, p.6.
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3.2.5      Broader economic impacts of the RET
The economic impact of the RET is broader than simply the impact on electricity prices. There are 
several ways these costs can be measured, which include:
The additional resource cost to the electricity sector. This includes the additional capital 
expenditure on new generation capacity, refurbishment of existing and new generators, fixed 
operating costs and variable operating costs (fuel etc.) brought on by the deployment of 
renewables under the RET. 
The total certificate cost. This is the total cost of certificates created and sold through both 
the SRES and LRET schemes (i.e., total quantity of certificates multiplied by the price). This 
represents the value of the cross-subsidy that flows to renewable generators and owners of 
small-scale renewable energy systems through the RET. 
The economy-wide impact. This represents the total economic impact of subsidising investment 
in renewable electricity generation. In the case of the RET, this is a cost as the investment in 
renewables comes at the expense of more efficient investment opportunities elsewhere in the 
economy and the benefit of the abatement brought about by the RET can be achieved at a 
lower cost through other methods. 
Chapter 5 further discusses these impacts in relation to the current RET scheme, and Chapter 6 
provides analysis of the economic impacts of various options for reforming the RET.
3.2.6  Findings: Environmental and social impacts
The RET has encouraged significant levels of employment in both the small-scale and 
large-scale renewable energy industries. However, this employment occurs as a result of a 
cross-subsidy that transfers investment from elsewhere in the economy and is offset by other 
job losses. Net employment is likely to be lower overall as a result of the RET.
Stakeholder feedback suggests that the RET has both positive and negative consequences 
for broader socio-economic outcomes such as those relating to health, land values, and 
environmental amenity. The Panel has not conducted in-depth or quantitative analysis of 
these factors. The Panel notes that there are deeply held and divergent views about the 
benefit or otherwise of renewables at the community level, with most debate focused upon 
the impacts of wind farms.
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4 APPROACH TO MODELLING THE RET
ACIL Allen was commissioned to model for the Panel the impacts of the current RET scheme and 
alternative options for the RET on the electricity generation mix, wholesale and retail electricity 
prices, CO2-e emissions, renewable energy certificate prices, capital costs and resource costs. 
While the modelling estimates the effects of the RET on the electricity market, it does not assess 
broader, economy-wide impacts, which the Panel has also considered, informed by submissions 
to the Review. 
A consultation paper on the proposed approach to key modelling assumptions was released 
by the Panel as part of its Call  for  Submissions. Feedback on the consultation paper and at the 
assumptions workshop was considered when the Panel finalised the assumptions. The details of 
the assumptions are included in ACIL Allen’s modelling report. In brief, the key assumptions were 
developed as follows:
Electricity demand – uses market operator projections for the NEM and SWIS and previous 
analysis involving ACIL Allen and the Government for other grids and off-grid generation.
Capital costs – uses Australian Energy Technology Assessment (AETA) and ACIL Allen 
projections.
Gas and coal prices – uses International Energy Agency (IEA) and ACIL Allen projections.
The modelled policy options (scenarios) were chosen to reflect a range of views expressed to the 
Panel during consultations. The scenarios are as follows:
Reference case – the current legislated scheme. This includes an LRET target of 41,000 GWh by 
2020 and an uncapped SRES scheme, where solar PV installations receive 15 years of deemed 
certificates (progressively phased out from 2017) and solar water heaters receive 10 years of 
deemed certificates (progressively phased out from 2022).
Real 30 per cent by 2030 – the LRET is reset to achieve a 30 per cent share of renewables in the 
generation mix by 2030, based on the electricity demand projections used in the modelling, 
and the targets remain at 2030 levels until 2040. There is no change to the current legislated 
SRES (it remains uncapped and the scheme is progressively phased out by 2030). 
Real 20 per cent by 2020 – the LRET targets are reset to achieve a 20 per cent share of 
renewables in the generation mix by 2020, based on the electricity demand projections used 
in the modelling. The LRET targets are maintained at 2020 levels until 2030. The SRES ceases 
in 2020, with deeming for solar PV lowered from 15 years to 10 years from 1 January 2015 and 
fixed at that level until 2020. 
50 per cent share of new growth in electricity demand (scenario added following the modelling 
workshop) – annual LRET targets are set corresponding to the previous year’s target plus a 
50 per cent share of expected growth in electricity demand on the main networks and large-scale 
off-grid demand over the next year. The LRET targets are retained at 2020 levels until 2030. The 
SRES ends in 2020. Deeming is reduced from 15 years to 10 years for solar PV installations on 
1 January 2015, and then reduces by one year each year until 2020 when the deeming rate is five years.
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Repeal of the RET – the complete removal of both the LRET and SRES schemes from 1 January 2015.
Closing the RET to new entrants – the LRET scheme continues to operate, but only large-scale 
renewable energy power stations currently accredited under the scheme and those currently 
under construction or fully committed are able to create LGCs. For modelling purposes a fixed 
price of $40 in nominal terms per LGC was chosen. The SRES ceases from 1 January 2015, with 
transitional arrangements in place for those with contracts to install systems. 
Reflecting uncertainty in key assumptions, sensitivities of the results to changes in some of the 
central assumptions were also modelled. The choice of sensitivities was informed by stakeholder 
views expressed to the Panel. Modelled sensitivities include:
Low and high electricity demand – uses low and high market operator projections for the NEM 
and SWIS, while growth in other generation is held flat in the low sensitivity case and grows 
one per cent faster in the high sensitivity case.
High capital costs – uses higher wind (around 15 per cent) and higher solar (around 20 to 
30 per cent) capital cost projections.
A shadow carbon price from 2021, starting at around $10 per tonne CO2-e and growing at 
three per cent (real) per year thereafter.
A greater withdrawal of fossil-fuel capacity in response to the large amount of renewable 
capacity installed in the reference case.
The ACIL Allen modelling has not incorporated the impact of the ERF as information was not 
avaliable at the time of modelling about the nature and magnitude of the impact of the ERF on 
electricity markets. 
In weighing the results from ACIL Allen’s modelling in its deliberations, the Panel has also given 
consideration to other modelling and analysis of the RET presented in submissions to the Review 
as well as qualitative submissions on the impact of the RET.
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5 THE CURRENT RET POLICY 
This chapter analyses the impacts of continuing with the RET under current settings (the reference 
case), measured against a scenario in which there is no RET (the repeal case).
5.1      Generation mix
ACIL Allen projects that around 26,000 GWh of additional renewable generation will be needed 
to meet the 41,000 GWh LRET in 2020. This would require around 9,000 MW of new renewable 
capacity to be built to deliver this additional generation. Figure 11 shows that wind development 
is expected to make up the majority of new renewable generation in the NEM and the SWIS 
regions over the period 2016 to 2021 and will displace primarily black coal generation. Once the 
wind development necessary to meet the LRET target is complete, the future generation mix is 
relatively static, with most generation growth beyond 2020 being met by increased output from 
existing coal-fired generators. 
A small amount of large-scale solar PV installations occur in the regional markets (the North-West 
Interconnected System, the Darwin-Katherine Interconnected System and Mt Isa) in the period 
2018 to 2020 as higher wholesale prices prevail in these regions.
Figure 11 Generation mix: Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Figure 12 shows ACIL Allen’s projections for electricity generation from small-scale systems and 
solar water heaters in the reference case. Generation from small-scale solar PV is expected to 
increase from around 5,200 GWh in 2014 to 10,000 GWh by 2020 and to 16,300 GWh by 2030. 
This growth occurs despite declining support from the SRES as certificate deeming rates decline 
from 2017. 
Growth in installations of new solar water heaters is projected to maintain a relatively stable pace, 
with total installations increasing from an estimated 916,000 at the end of 2014 to over 1.5 million 
systems by 2030. Annual installations are projected to be around 35,000 to 43,000 systems over 
2014 to 2030. The energy displaced from solar water heaters increases from around 2,900 GWh in 
2014 to around 3,500 GWh in 2020 and to 4,700 GWh by 2030.
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Figure 12 Generation and displacement from small-scale PV and SWH: Reference case, 2015 - 2040 
Figure 13 Proportion of renewables in Australia’s electricity mix: Reference case, 2014 - 2030
Source: ACIL Allen
Source: ACIL Allen
ACIL Allen’s modelling results for the RET as currently legislated indicate that the proportion of 
renewables in Australia’s energy mix will reach around 26 per cent by 2020 and will then remain 
steady to 2030 (Figure 13). This percentage for renewable generation does not include energy 
displaced from solar water heaters and voluntary LGC surrender volumes. The methodology for 
calculating the share of renewables is discussed in Appendix D.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the deployment of additional renewable generation capacity under 
the RET has the effect of displacing the output of incumbent fossil fuel generators. The ACIL 
Allen modelling projects that some of the 4,155 MW of currently mothballed coal capacity will 
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come back to service over the next couple of years as a result of the repeal of the carbon tax and 
lower gas plant utilisation (one gas-fired plant, Swanbank E, is expected to be taken offline in 
2014 and replaced with one of the currently mothballed coal-fired plants, Tarong). However, the 
modelling suggests a further 1,200 MW of black and brown coal-fired generating capacity will be 
subsequently withdrawn from the market by 2020. 
Figure 14 compares the ACIL Allen modelling results for the new generation capacity that would 
be built if the RET is repealed relative to the current RET scheme. It shows that while almost 
9,000 MW of renewable generation capacity is required by 2030 to meet the current RET, only 640 MW 
of additional new coal capacity in the SWIS and a small amount of new baseload gas capacity 
would be brought forward in the absence of the scheme. This underlines that the vast majority 
of the generating capacity that would be brought on by the LRET – predominantly wind farms – 
is surplus to market needs. Without this additional wind capacity, mothballed existing capacity 
would return to service sooner as market conditions warrant.
The 2014 Electricity  Statement  of  Opportunitites released by AEMO estimates that there is more 
than 7,500 MW of generation capacity that could be removed from the NEM without disrupting 
system adequacy.30
Figure 14 Change in new installed capacity: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
The ACIL Allen modelling shows (Figure 15 and Figure 16) that if the RET were to be repealed, the  
additional wind and solar generation that occurs under the RET would be replaced by coal and a 
small amount of gas-based generation.
30 Australian Energy Market Operator, (OHFWULFLW\6WDWHPHQWRI2SSRUWXQLWLHVIRUWKH1DWLRQDO(OHFWULFLW\0DUNHW, August 2014.
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Figure 15 Change in generation mix: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Figure 16 Percentage change in generation mix: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Source: ACIL Allen
5.2      Can the LRET be met? 
An important consideration is whether it is feasible that 9,000 MW of new renewable capacity can 
be built in time to meet the 41,000 GWh generation target by 2020. 
Information on the planning and development of large-scale renewable energy projects is 
contained in BREE’s 2013 Electricity Generation Major Projects Database and AEMO’s 2014 
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Table 2 Large-scale renewables project pipeline 
Source: Information provided by the Clean Energy Regulator to the RET Review Secretariat
Project  Status Capacity  (MW)
WƌŽũĞĐƚ^ƚĂƚƵƐDŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐͬĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĨĞĂƐŝďŝůŝƚǇͬǁĂŝƟŶŐĨŽƌZdZĞǀŝĞǁŽƵƚĐŽŵĞďĞĨŽƌĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƟŶŐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůƐ 6,850
hŶĚĞƌŐŽŝŶŐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůƐͬĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůƐĮŶŝƐŚĞĚ͕ŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƐƵĞƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŽůǀŝŶŐďĞĨŽƌĞĮŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐůŽƐĞ 4,750
,ĂƐĂůůĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůƐĂŶĚǁŝůůŐŽĂŚĞĂĚŝĨĮŶĂŶĐŝĂůůǇǀŝĂďůĞ 6,000
/ƐƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶͬǁŝůůŐŽĂŚĞĂĚ 900
Total 18,500
Electricity Planning Database. The CER has investigated the status of these projects in 2014 and its 
findings are shown in Table 2. The project pipeline consists of 16,800 MW of wind farm projects 
and 1,700 MW of large-scale solar projects, and about 6,000 MW of this has planning approval. 
Given this pipeline, it appears technically possible that sufficient projects could go ahead to reach 
the target, subject to the resolution of commercial contracts and the availability of finance. 
A number of stakeholders expressed a view on the likelihood of the current legislated target 
being met. Some had the view that the industry is on track to meet the current target. For 
example, Infigen Energy stated:
The  rate  of  build  of  new  renewable  energy  plant  is  keeping  pace  with  the  current  target  
WUDMHFWRU\WRGDWHDQGWKHUHLVFXUUHQWO\0:RISURSRVHGZLQGJHQHUDWLRQDQG0:RI
SURSRVHGVRODUJHQHUDWLRQSURMHFWVRIZKLFKa0:KDYHDOUHDG\UHFHLYHGGHYHORSPHQW
DSSURYDO7KHUHIRUHWKHUHLVDVXI¿FLHQWO\DGYDQFHGSURMHFWGHYHORSPHQWSLSHOLQHWRPHHWWKH
FXUUHQW/5(7VFKHPHZKLFKZRXOGUHTXLUH±0:RIQHZFDSDFLW\EHWZHHQQRZ
DQGVXEMHFWWRWKHUHVWRUDWLRQRIUHJXODWRU\FHUWDLQW\,Q¿JHQ(QHUJ\S
Acciona, a wind farm owner that has a pipeline of large-scale renewable energy projects in 
Australia, stated in its submission:
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKRVHSURMHFWVDOUHDG\GHYHORSHGWKHUHDUHDURXQG0:RIFDSDFLW\
WKDWLVSHUPLWWHGDQGUHDG\IRUFRQVWUXFWLRQLQDGGLWLRQWRRYHU0:RISURMHFWVLQWKH
SODQQLQJDQGSHUPLWWLQJVWDJH$FFLRQD(QHUJ\S
Other stakeholders suggested that the target will not be met on time due to the regulatory 
uncertainty surrounding the RET, the oversupply of generation capacity and the build rate 
for renewables. For example, the submission from the Energy Supply Association of Australia, 
drawing on modelling by Oakley Greenwood, stated:
Oakley  Greenwood’s  modelling  shows  that  based  on  current  market  environment  –  low  
GHPDQGORZZKROHVDOHSULFHVDQGDQRYHUVXSSO\RIJHQHUDWLQJFDSDFLW\±WKHH[LVWLQJ5(7
LVXQOLNHO\WREHPHWHFRQRPLFDOO\:KROHVDOHSULFHVKDYHEHFRPHXQEDODQFHGEHFDXVHIDOOV
in  demand  have  not  been  matched  by  falls  in  supply.  Aside  from  the  LRET  requiring  new  
HQWUDQWSODQWH[LVWLQJSODQWLVQRWH[LWLQJLQDWLPHO\PDQQHULQVWURQJPHDVXUHGXHWRWKH
VLJQL¿FDQWEDUULHUVWRH[LWWKDWH[LVW(QHUJ\6XSSO\$VVRFLDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDS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EnergyAustralia also had the view that the LRET would not be achieved:
'HSOR\PHQWRI0:RIQHZODUJHVFDOHUHQHZDEOHJHQHUDWLRQUHTXLUHGWRDFKLHYHWKH
OHJLVODWHG/5(7RI7:KE\LVYLUWXDOO\LPSRVVLEOHIRUWZRNH\UHDVRQV
  -­ The  current  ‘new  build’  rate  for  large-­scale  renewable  generation  would  need  to  increase  
PRUHWKDQIROGIURPDQDYHUDJHRI0:SHU\HDUWRDERXW0:SHU\HDU²LW
is  important  to  note  that  the  time  required  to  undertake  adequate  community  consultation  
for  the  development  of  new  projects  presents  a  challenge  at  even  the  current  rate  of  ‘new  
build’.  
  -­ suppressed  wholesale  electricity  market  conditions  are  testing  the  economics  of  
LQYHVWPHQWSURSRVDOVZKLFKDUHKLJKO\VHQVLWLYHWRWKH/5(7FHUWL¿FDWHYDOXHWKHGXUDWLRQ
RYHUZKLFKFHUWL¿FDWHVFDQEHFUHDWHGDQGWKHZKROHVDOHSULFHRIHQHUJ\RYHUWKHOLIHRI
DSURMHFW²WKHFRPELQDWLRQRIDQRYHUVXSSOLHGZKROHVDOHJHQHUDWLRQPDUNHWLPPLQHQW
UHPRYDORIWKHFDUERQSULFHDQG5(7SROLF\XQFHUWDLQW\PDNHLWH[WUHPHO\GLI¿FXOWIRUWKH
PDUNHWWR¿QDQFHDQGGHSOR\VXEVWDQWLDOYROXPHVRIODUJHVFDOHUHQHZDEOHJHQHUDWLRQ
FDSDFLW\E\(QHUJ\$XVWUDOLDS
5.3      Resource costs
There is an economic cost associated with building new generation infrastructure that is not 
necessary to meet demand for electricity. ACIL Allen estimates that new capital expenditure on 
large-scale generation required under the RET is $15 billion by 2030 in net present value (NPV) 
terms, and only $2 billion of this would be required if the RET is removed.
Other modelling reports provided to the review have also estimated the capital costs of the 
current RET scheme. For example, the modelling undertaken by Deloitte estimates there is a 
$10.2 billion increase in investment in NPV terms should the RET continue in its current form 
relative to repeal and modelling by ROAM Consulting for the Clean Energy Council suggests that 
additional investment of nearly $15 billion in NPV terms would be required under the RET by 
2019-20.31
ACIL Allen estimates that total resource costs for the generation sector in the reference case 
total approximately $122 billion in NPV terms over the period to 2040. This includes capital 
expenditure on large-scale electricity generation, investment in small-scale solar PV and solar 
water systems, refurbishment of existing new generators and fixed and variable operating costs. 
The largest component of this cost is new build costs followed by fixed and variable operating 
costs associated with fuel and maintaining the existing generation fleet Network costs are not 
included in these estimates.
If the RET were repealed, resource costs for the sector would total approximately $108 billion. 
Figure 17 shows that additional resource costs of continuing with the current RET scheme 
(compared to repealing the scheme) are estimated to be around $14 billion in NPV terms.
31 ROAM Consulting, 5(73ROLF\$QDO\VLV, 2014, p.4.
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Figure 17 Change in generation sector resource costs: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Submissions also pointed out that the economy-wide cost of the cross-subsidy to renewable 
generators could be greater than the direct costs to the electricity sector. For example, the 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network stated:
AIGN’s  submission  highlights  the  distributional  impacts  of  the  RET  on  industry  with  a  
particularly  heavy  burden  borne  by  the  Other  Metals  sector  and  other  energy  intensive  
VHFWRUV7KHEXUGHQLVLPSRVHGRQDIHZKLJKO\H[SRVHGVHFWRUVDQGLVFRQWUDU\WRWKH
general  proposition  that  climate  policies  should  allow  for  economic  growth.
2YHUDOOWKHORQJUXQUHGXFWLRQLQ*'3UHVXOWLQJIURPWKH5(7LVDURXQGSHUFHQWHDFK
year  (this  is  the  reduction  in  GDP  compared  with  what  it  would  have  been  without  the  RET).  
This  is  a  large  impact  for  a  single  policy.  The  GDP  cost  needs  to  be  assessed  against  the  
FODLPHGEHQH¿WVRIWKH5(7$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*UHHQKRXVH1HWZRUNS
ACIL Allen estimates that the total cross-subsidy provided to renewable energy through the 
RET will be in the order of $22 billion over the period 2015 to 2030 in NPV terms, $19 billion of 
which is associated with large-scale investment. The ACIL Allen modelling did not estimate the 
economy wide impacts of the RET scheme – the costs that result from investment being diverted 
to renewables and away from more efficient investment opportunities elsewhere in the economy.
The Government has identified the importance of lifting Australia’s productivity performance 
in raising the living standards of Australians in the longer term.32 The investment forced by the 
RET scheme will reduce multi factor productivity (MFP) in the electricity sector as more capital is 
unnecessarily deployed for no increase in output. The Productivity Commission noted recently 
that:
To  the  extent  that  demand  growth  can  be  met  without  the  need  for  new  investments  in  
FDSDFLW\WKLVVKRXOGSURYLGHSRVLWLYHLPSHWXVIRUPHDVXUHG0)3JURZWKLQWKHHOHFWULFLW\
VHFWRU3URGXFWLYLW\&RPPLVVLRQS33
32 Commonwealth of Australia, %XGJHW3DSHU1R6WDWHPHQW6XVWDLQLQJVWURQJJURZWKLQOLYLQJVWDQGDUGV
33 Productivity Commission, 3&3URGXFWLYLW\8SGDWH, April 2014,  p15.
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An indication of the consequences of lower productivity and the longer term cost to living 
standards comes from modelling by Deloitte that suggests that the distortionary effects of 
subsidising higher cost renewable technologies will reduce cumulative real Gross National 
Product (GNP) in NPV terms by around $33 billion to 2030.34
5.4      Electricity prices
The ACIL Allen modelling results indicate that under the current RET scheme, wholesale 
electricity prices would fall slightly over the period 2015 to 2020 due to significant amounts of 
new wind capacity entering the market. Wholesale electricity prices then rise slowly from 2025 
onwards, as demand growth begins to absorb the excess generation capacity. Lower wholesale 
prices outweigh the direct cost of certificates over the period 2020 to 2030, meaning that retail 
electricity prices over this period are lower with the RET in place.
However, the cumulative impact of the RET on household bills over time appears to be small. 
The ACIL Allen modelling shows (Figure 18) that repealing the RET would lead to a small increase 
in electricity prices over the period 2020 to 2030, but prices would remain within 1.5 per cent of 
current levels. The NPV of the cost of the RET to households is estimated to be $247 over the 
period 2015 to 2020 and one dollar over the period 2015 to 2030 (Figure 19).
Figure 18 Change in annual residential retail electricity prices: ‘Repeal’ – Reference, 2014 - 2030
Source: ACIL Allen
34 Deloitte, $VVHVVLQJWKHLPSDFWRIWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHWVFKHPH, July 2014, p25.
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Figure 19 NPV of change in residential retail bills: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Other modelling exercises present varying results for the net impact of the RET on retail electricity 
prices. 
Similar to the ACIL Allen modelling, modelling undertaken by ROAM Consulting, Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance and Schneider Electric show that repealing the RET would result in lower retail 
electricity prices initially, but higher retail prices in the medium term due to a rise in wholesale 
electricity prices. 
Modelling by Deloitte indicates that retail electricity prices will remain lower if the RET is repealed, 
on average by $50 per year from 2014 to 2020 as the savings in certificate costs are greater than 
the increase in wholesale prices.35 Modelling by Frontier Economics for the AEMC found that the 
RET will increase retail prices in the period to 2020, but from the mid-2020s the impact of the RET 
on electricity prices is uncertain. 
For businesses, the ACIL Allen modelling shows that as a share of retail electricity costs, direct RET 
costs will peak in 2020 at nine per cent for commercial consumers and 11 per cent for non EITE 
industrial consumers. ACIL Allen’s modelling indicates the cost impact of the RET for commercial 
and industrial businesses declines after 2020 due to lower wholesale prices and lower LGC prices. 
Figure 20 shows the ACIL Allen modelling results for the change in retail electricity prices for 
different consumers when the RET is removed.
35 Deloitte, $VVHVVLQJWKHLPSDFWRIWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHWVFKHPH, July 2014, p.19.
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Figure 20 Change in average retail electricity prices: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Figure 21 Revenue to generators: ‘Repeal’ and Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Source: ACIL Allen
In contrast to the ACIL Allen modelling results, the Deloitte modelling concluded that electricity 
prices for businesses would be marginally higher under the current RET and this would flow 
through to other sectors of the economy, having a dampening effect on economic activity. 
The ACIL Allen modelling indicates that the suppression of wholesale prices will come at the 
expense of revenues of incumbent generators. Figure 21 shows the net revenue of generators 
under the current RET policy compared with having no RET in place, including revenue from the 
sale of wholesale electricity and certificates. 
Some submissions questioned the extent to which incumbent capacity will respond to demand 
signals. In theory, incumbent plant will only continue operating while wholesale electricity prices 
cover variable operating and maintenance (O&M) costs. However, a number of stakeholders 
suggested that incumbent fossil fuel generators may have an incentive to keep operating even 
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when O&M costs are not covered in the short-run. If a generator could stay in operation and 
avoid being the first to exit, it may benefit from the departure of a competitor, as this would 
tighten the supply-demand balance in the electricity market and raise wholesale prices for the 
remaining generators. Other factors, such as contractual arrangements and the prospect of large 
site remediation costs may also lead to deferred exit from the market.
There is a risk that lower profits flowing to incumbent generators could lead to less investment in 
existing power stations, including maintenance expenditure, and could result in lower reliability of 
supply from these generators over time. Some submissions noted that subdued wholesale prices 
distorted investment signals away from meeting demand efficiently when needed. For example, 
the submission from the AEMC stated:
,QWKH1(0WKHHI¿FDF\RIWKHSULFHVLJQDOLVFULWLFDOWRPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDQWVPDNLQJHI¿FLHQW
decisions.  This  is  because  short  term  dispatch  and  long  term  investment  decisions  are  
driven  primarily  by  wholesale  market  prices  or  derivative  prices  in  the  contract  market.  If  
SULFHVDUHLQÀXHQFHGE\H[WHUQDOIDFWRUVXQUHODWHGWRVXSSO\DQGGHPDQGHJVXEVLGLHV
WKDWIDYRXUVSHFL¿FWHFKQRORJLHVWKLVFDQUHVXOWLQDQLQHI¿FLHQWPL[RIJHQHUDWLRQEHLQJ
GLVSDWFKHG2YHUWKHORQJHUWHUPLWFDQUHVXOWLQDQLQHI¿FLHQWOHYHORILQYHVWPHQWLQFDSDFLW\
LQFUHDVLQJFRVWVIRUFRQVXPHUV$(0&S
The extent to which renewable energy deployed under the RET can reduce wholesale electricity 
prices in the long-run is unclear. When new capacity (either thermal generation or unsubsidised 
renewable generation) is eventually required in the market, wholesale electricity prices should 
rise to equal the long-run marginal cost of the new entrant. This was noted in submissions that 
argued that while the RET may depress wholesale prices, it still represents a cross-subsidy paid by 
incumbent generators and cannot be efficient in the long-run. For example, a Principal Economics 
report provided by the Minerals Council of Australia argued that:
,QWKH1(0WKH/5(7KDVKDGWKHHIIHFWRIGHSUHVVLQJZKROHVDOHSULFHVDQGUHGXFLQJWKH
UHYHQXHVRIH[LVWLQJWKHUPDOJHQHUDWRUV)DOOLQJZKROHVDOHSULFHVWHQGWRRIIVHWVRPHRIWKH
FRVWEXUGHQRIWKH5(7RQFRQVXPHUVEXWWKLVRXWFRPHFDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDµEHQH¿W¶
$UWL¿FLDOO\GHSUHVVHGSULFHVKDYHHIIHFWLYHO\VWUDQGHGDVKDUHRIWKHUPDOFDSDFLW\ZKLFKLV
progressively  being  withdrawn  from  the  market.  Any  wholesale  price  reductions  observed  
WRGDWHDUHWKHUHIRUHOLNHO\WREHVKRUWOLYHG/RQJHUWHUPDSROLF\VXFKDVWKH5(7WKDW
reduces  wholesale  prices  undermines  investment  in  thermal  capacity  that  is  essential  to  
PDLQWDLQLQJUHOLDEOHHOHFWULFLW\VXSSO\0LQHUDOV&RXQFLORI$XVWUDOLDS
In modelling the reference case, ACIL Allen has assumed that incumbent fossil fuel power stations 
will withdraw from the market temporarily as additional renewable capacity is deployed, to ensure 
that all remaining plants are operating on a commercial basis. As market conditions improve 
over time, this capacity is returned to service. ACIL Allen also modelled a sensitivity where the 
supressed profitability of incumbent fossil fuel generators led to around 2,400 MW of capacity 
being withdrawn over the period 2017 to 2021 and not being returned to service over the 
remainder of the modelling period. 
The results for the sensitivity show that if generation plant retires permanently, continuation of 
the current RET scheme would lead to higher retail electricity prices. In the reference case, the 
RET has the effect of supressing wholesale electricity prices due to an over-supply of generation 
capacity in the market. If plant is retired permanently, the modelling suggests this wholesale 
price suppression would not occur and wholesale electricity prices would be well above the price 
estimated for the reference case (Figure 22). 
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5.5      Carbon dioxide emissions
Figure 23 shows ACIL Allen’s modelling results for annual CO2-e emissions from the electricity 
sector to 2040 under the RET. Annual CO2-e emissions increase in the short term with the 
withdrawal of the carbon tax and decreased output from east coast gas-fired generation (largely 
a result of increasing wholesale gas prices), before declining out to 2020 as a result of renewable 
energy development. Emissions increase thereafter as more fossil fuel generation is deployed.
Figure 22 Wholesale electricity prices: ‘Permanent retirement sensitivity’ and Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Figure 23 Annual CO2-e emissions from the electricity sector: Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Emissions for the generation sector only. Excludes non-scheduled generation in NEM regions and own-generation generation in 
the SWIS and off-grid generation. Source: ACIL Allen
Permanent retirement of fossil fuel plant would increase the NPV of household electricity bills by 
$584 over the period 2014 to 2030 compared with the reference case. 
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Figure 24 Increase in annual emissions from repealing the RET: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Figure 24 shows the ACIL Allen modelling results of the impact of repealing the RET on annual 
CO2-e emissions. Repealing the RET is estimated to lead to an increase in annual emissions of 
about 24 Mt CO2-e from 2020 to 2030.  Cumulative emissions would increase by 58 Mt CO2-e over 
the period 2015 to 2020 and by 299 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2030.
Average emissions for modelled grids. Excludes non-scheduled generation in NEM regions, own-generation in the SWIS and off-
grid generation. Source: ACIL Allen
A number of other modelling exercises have produced comparable results. Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance estimates that removing the RET would increase cumulative emissions from 
the power sector by 57.3 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2020 and 259 Mt CO2-e over the 
period 2015 to 2030.36 Modelling by ROAM Consulting for the Clean Energy Council found that 
cumulative emissions would be 34.7 Mt CO2-e higher by 2019-20 if the RET is repealed
37 and 
modelling by Schneider Electric suggests that removing the LRET would increase cumulative 
emissions in the National Electricity Market by around 50 Mt CO2-e by 2020 and by 260 Mt CO2-e 
by 2030.38
CO2-e emissions from the electricity sector have declined significantly from 2009 to the present. 
A number of factors contributed to this decline, including one off supply events such as milder 
weather conditions, the Queensland floods and the closure and/or reduced production from 
energy-intensive activities. Longer term trends also contributed to the decline in emissions 
including reduced absolute demand for electricity, uptake of renewable generation (both large 
and small-scale) and lower growth in economic activity. 
Projections for CO2-e emissions from the electricity sector are also lower than in the past. 
CO2-e emissions are forecast to rise slightly over the medium term to 2020 before growing 
steadily from 2020 to 2030 attributed to growth in demand from LNG facilities and increased 
generation from black coal capacity.39 The reduction in CO2-e emissions from the electricity sector 
and the lower projected growth means that a smaller contribution is required from the RET in 
order to achieve CO2-e emissions reductions in the sector.
36 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 0RGHOOLQJ2SWLRQVIRU$XVWUDOLD·V5(75HYLHZ May 2014, p.14.
37 ROAM Consulting, 5HSRUWWR&OHDQ(QHUJ\&RXQFLO5(73ROLF\$QDO\VLV, April 2014, p.44.
38 Schneider Electric, $XVWUDOLD·V/DUJHVFDOH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\WDUJHW7KUHH&RQVXPHU%HQHÀWV, April 2014, p.8. 
39 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), $XVWUDOLD·V$EDWHPHQW7DVNDQG(PLVVLRQV3URMHFWLRQV
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5.6      Cost of abatement  
The cost of abatement is an estimate of the cost of a policy measure in reducing CO2-e emissions, 
expressed in dollars per tonne of abatement. It is a tool that enables an assessment of the relative 
cost-effectiveness of different emissions reduction policies. As a key objective of the RET is to 
lower CO2-e emissions in the electricity sector, the cost of abatement of the RET is an important 
consideration when assessing the merits of the scheme.
Two methodologies were used by ACIL Allen to calculate the cost of abatement from the RET. 
Both used the present value of the change in resource costs40 (the numerator), while one method 
applied a discount factor to the change in emissions (the denominator). In addition to the choice 
of methodology, the cost of abatement estimate depends on modelling assumptions, particularly 
capital costs.
ACIL Allen’s estimates for the cost of abatement of the RET are summarised in Table 3. The cost of 
abatement of the current RET policy is estimated to be $35 to $68 per tonne over the period 2014 
to 2030, with the SRES being higher than the LRET at $95 to $175 per tonne in comparison with 
$32 to $62 per tonne to 2030.
40 Described in Section 5.3
41 Frontier Economics, 5(75HYLHZ$QDO\VLV, June 2014, p.32.
42 Deloitte Access Economics, $VVHVVLQJWKHLPSDFWRIWKHUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\WDUJHWVFKHPH, July 2014, p.20.
43 ClimateWorks, /RZ&DUERQ*URZWK3ODQXSGDWH, 2011.
Table 3 ACIL Allen estimates of the cost of abatement of the RET ($/t CO2-e)
2014  to  2030 2014  to  2040
RET LRET SRES RET LRET SRES
Undiscounted 35 32 95 25 22 79
Discounted 68 62 175 62 56 185
Similar cost of abatement estimates have recently been made elsewhere. Modelling by Frontier 
Economics estimates that the cost of abatement from the RET is between $55 and $65 per tonne.41 
Modelling by Deloitte estimates the cost of abatement (based on LGC costs alone) of the RET to 
be $72 per tonne in 2020, increasing to $82 per tonne in 2030.42
These estimates of the cost of abatement can be compared with estimates from other 
CO2-e emission reduction measures. ClimateWorks has used bottom-up modelling to develop 
a CO2-e emissions reduction cost curve that estimates the size and cost of CO2-e emissions 
reduction opportunities across Australia for the year 2020.43 This analysis helps to identify 
the scope for potential CO2-e emissions reductions that could result if various actions were 
implemented across the economy. The analysis indicates that there are many measures offering 
abatement at lower cost compared with the RET, such as energy efficiency improvements and 
pasture and grassland management measures.
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5.7   Findings: Continuation of the current RET scheme
Technically, there is a sufficient pipeline of renewable energy projects for the 41,000 GWh 
LRET to be met in 2020, subject to the resolution of commercial contracts and the availability 
of finance. However, the increasing targets to 2020 necessitate a significantly higher build rate 
of renewable energy power stations than has been required to date. 
Under current settings, assuming the 41,000 GWh target is met the RET could deliver a 
renewable energy share of around 26 per cent in 2020, with the RET resulting in an additional 
9,000 MW of new large-scale renewable generation capacity, entailing capital expenditure of 
around $15 billion in NPV terms.
In the absence of the RET, over the period to 2030 none of this investment in large-scale 
renewable generation is likely to be needed and only a very small amount of fossil-fuel 
capacity would be likely to be built. This highlights that the additional investment in 
generation capacity to 2020 resulting from the RET is not required to meet electricity demand, 
based on current projections.
Generation from small-scale solar PV is expected to roughly treble by 2030, despite support 
under the SRES gradually phasing out over this period. With the SRES in place, the installation 
of solar water heaters continues at a steady pace. 
The RET as currently legislated would deliver a cross-subsidy, as measured by the value of 
renewable energy certificates created under the LRET and SRES, to the renewable energy 
sector of around $22 billion in NPV terms from 2015 to 2030.
With the RET in place, modelling shows that retail electricity prices could be expected to be 
higher to 2020 but lower thereafter. Over the period to 2030, these outcomes balance each 
other out such that households pay almost the same with or without the RET. However, these 
results are sensitive to the response of incumbent generators. If incumbent generators shut 
down permanently, rather than temporarily, the additional renewable generation capacity 
deployed as a result of the RET would lead to increased retail electricity prices.
The RET is estimated to deliver cumulative emissions reductions of around 58 Mt CO2-e from 
2015 to 2020, compared with there being no RET in place. Modelling for the review provides 
estimates of the cost of abatement of the RET in a range from $35 to $68 Mt CO2-e over the 
period 2014 to 2030.
5.8      Conclusion
To meet its five per cent CO2-e emissions reduction goal, the Government’s projections indicate 
that Australia needs to reduce its cumulative emissions by 421 Mt CO2-e in the period to 2020, 
including by 131 Mt CO2-e in 2020. The CO2-e emissions reduction task has fallen over recent 
years due to declining industrial activity, reduced demand for electricity and a carry-over of 
surplus emissions units from exceeding the target in the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (2008 to 2012). It could fall further if industrial activity or electricity demand more 
generally, continues to decline. Nonetheless, Australia will need to lower its CO2-e emissions 
below current levels to meet the target. 
In 2012, electricity generation contributed just over one-third of Australia’s CO2-e emissions. 
Emissions from this sector have been declining, in part due to declining demand for electricity 
but also as a result of government policies including the RET, solar PV feed-in-tariffs and energy 
efficiency measures. However, access to cheap and reliable power (historically, predominately 
provided by coal) helps to underpin Australia’s economic growth and Australia needs to balance 
its emissions reduction efforts with the need to maintain this source of competitive advantage. 
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To the extent that policies are required to meet Australia’s five per cent CO2-e emissions reduction 
target and longer term goals, a policy targeted directly at CO2-e emissions reduction would be 
more efficient than a policy such as the RET that may promote renewable generation ahead of 
other lower cost abatement opportunities in other areas of the economy. The Government has 
repealed the carbon tax and is adopting the ERF as the primary mechanism for meeting the 2020 
target. 
Most recent modelling exercises suggest that the RET is exerting some downward pressure on 
wholesale electricity prices, largely because the RET is increasing the supply of electricity when 
electricity demand has been falling. There is some uncertainty over these results in the long 
term, and the ACIL Allen modelling showed that different assumptions around the permanent 
withdrawal of fossil fuel plant from the market could lead to different wholesale electricity price 
outcomes. Nonetheless, all of these studies indicate that the net impact of the RET on retail 
electricity prices, whether positive or negative, is relatively small.
The Panel considers that the RET is providing an incentive for investment in renewable generation 
that is not required to meet demand for electricity and is not viable without the cross-subsidy 
from the RET. This subsidy is substantial, in the order of $22 billion from 2015 to 2030 in NPV 
terms, and is funded by a wealth transfer from incumbent generators, electricity retailers and 
consumers. 
The Panel considers that the significant changes that have occurred, and will continue to occur, in 
the Australian economy since the expanded RET scheme was put in place in 2010 will cause the 
RET to have much greater costs to Australians than was anticipated. 
Given the findings of this review, that $13 billion of new large-scale generation capacity built 
under the RET will not be required in light of lower demand for electricity, and that the benefits 
of the scheme, in terms of reductions in CO2-e emissions, come at high cost per tonne, the Panel 
concludes that significant reform is required. 
In deciding the appropriate extent and nature of the reform that is called for, the Panel considers 
that the clear aim of such reform should be to avoid, or materially reduce, the cost to the 
community of this cross-subsidy. In doing so, the effects of potential changes and their impacts 
on different groups need to be understood and weighed, while the effect of the scheme, and 
changes to it, on the secure and reliable supply of energy services also needs to be considered. 
It is crucial that reform achieves a better balance between the interests of the renewable energy 
sector and those of the economy as a whole than the present legislation delivers.
Recommendation 1: The Renewable Energy Target (RET) should be amended in light of the 
changing circumstances in Australia’s main electricity markets and the availability of lower 
cost emission abatement alternatives.
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6 OPTIONS FOR REFORMING THE RET
During the course of this review stakeholders advocated potential changes to the RET scheme 
that broadly fall within the scenarios described earlier in Chapter 4. This chapter examines these 
five scenarios in turn and sets out the implications of each, as suggested by both the modelling 
results and stakeholders themselves, in order to assess the ability of each to achieve the 
significant reform that the Panel has identified is needed. The LRET is addressed in the first part of 
the chapter and the SRES in the second.
As outlined in Chapter 4, various sensitivities were run against the scenarios to examine how 
results change with different modelling assumptions. In most cases, the sensitivities did not 
materially affect modelling outcomes. Instances where a sensitivity makes a material impact on 
results are noted in the sections that follow. For example, the outcomes of the share of growth 
scenario are, by design, responsive to changes in electricity demand, and this is discussed in 
Section 6.1.3.
6.1      Options for reforming the LRET	
  
Figure 25 below shows the profile of targets for large-scale renewable generation under each of 
the scenarios modelled (noting that under the ‘repeal’ scenario there would be no formal target 
profile and the same level of generation would result as in closing the RET to new entrants). 
Figure 25 Target profiles for LRET options, 2014 - 2030
Source: ACIL Allen
6.1.1      Extending the LRET to a ‘real 30 per cent’
Some environmental groups, community groups and individuals expressed support for ambitious 
and increasing renewable targets that would achieve a greater share of renewables beyond 2020 
than the current RET scheme. For example, 350.org submitted:
:HEHOLHYHWKDWLWZRXOGEHDSSURSULDWHWRUDLVHWKH/5(7LQDVWHDG\SUHGLFWDEOHZD\
and  to  continue  to  raise  it  until  renewable  energy  represents  the  overwhelming  majority  
RI$XVWUDOLD¶VHQHUJ\UHTXLUHPHQWV«:HVXJJHVWWKDWWKH$XVWUDOLDQWDUJHWEHEDVHGRQD
VLPLODUREMHFWLYHZLWKDSSURSULDWHLQWHUPHGLDWHWDUJHWVVXFKDVSHUFHQWE\DQG  
SHUFHQWE\RUJS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Alternatively, some stakeholders suggested reducing the 2020 LRET, but continuing to increase 
it beyond 2020 as a means of providing long-term support for renewables, while reducing the 
current impacts of the RET on the electricity market. For example, Snowy Hydro submitted: 
7KHFXUUHQW*:KWDUJHWE\LVWHFKQLFDOO\IHDVLEOH+RZHYHUDFKLHYLQJWKLVPD\
FUHDWHVLJQL¿FDQWGLVWRUWLRQVLQWKHHQHUJ\PDUNHWGXHWRDFRPELQDWLRQRIORZGHPDQGDQG
ORZZKROHVDOHHQHUJ\SULFHV)RUWKLVUHDVRQPRGHUDWLQJWKHWDUJHWH[WHQGLQJWKHHQG
GDWHRXWIXUWKHUEH\RQGDQGNHHSLQJWKHWRWDOQXPEHURI/*&VZKROHPD\EHDPRUH
DSSURSULDWHWDUJHWDQGWUDMHFWRU\IRUWKH/5(76QRZ\+\GURS
In a similar approach, the New South Wales Government supported retaining the 41,000 GWh 
LRET target, but extending the timeframe to the stage where 41,000 GWh matches 20 per cent of 
demand:  
$QDOWHUQDWLYHRSWLRQWKHQLVWRNHHSWKHH[LVWLQJWDUJHWEXWH[WHQGWKHWLPHIUDPHIRU
DFKLHYLQJLWXQWLOLWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDWUXHSHUFHQWOHYHO7KLVZRXOGDOORZDPRUH
incremental  increase  in  renewable  energy  capacity  over  a  period  that  may  be  more  in  
line  with  forecast  requirements  for  new  capacity.  The  timeframe  for  the  target  should  give  
consideration  to  providing  industry  certainty  and  a  sensible  investment  period  for  attracting  
¿QDQFH1HZ6RXWK:DOHV*RYHUQPHQWS
In a slightly different approach, renewable energy developers, operators and financiers supported 
the current legislated target of 41,000 GWh by 2020, but proposed retaining the 41,000 GWh 
target to 2035 or 2040 (rather than 2030) to allow projects to secure PPAs, finance and earn a 
greater return on investment. 
For example Infigen Energy’s submission stated:
,Q¿JHQDOVRVXEPLWVWKDWPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHSUHVHQWWDUJHWVKRXOGDOVRLQFOXGHH[WHQVLRQRI
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWWRPHHWWKHWDUJHWXQWLODWOHDVWEHFDXVHWKHLQYHVWPHQWKRUL]RQVIRU
QHZJHQHUDWRUVDUHDWOHDVW\HDUV,Q¿JHQ(QHUJ\S
The submission from the Investor Group on Climate Change expressed a similar view:
7RRYHUFRPHWKHVHHDUQLQJVULVNVWKH*RYHUQPHQWPD\FRQVLGHUH[WHQGLQJWKHFXUUHQW
ÀDW*:KWDUJHWWR7KLVZRXOGLPSURYHWKHHFRQRPLFVRIFXUUHQWLQYHVWPHQW
opportunities  by  extending  the  life  of  revenue  supports  for  these  assets.  The  effect  of  such  
DFKDQJHZRXOGEHWRLPSURYHLQYHVWRUFRQ¿GHQFHLQPDNLQJJHQHUDWLRQLQYHVWPHQWVLQWKH
VKRUWWHUPOHDGLQJWRDQHDUOLHUEXLOGRXWRIFDSDFLW\WRPHHWWKHWDUJHWDVPRRWKHU
project  deployment  development  pipeline  and  avoidance  of  bottlenecks  in  project  delivery  in  
WKHGHFDGH,QYHVWRU*URXSRQ&OLPDWH&KDQJHS
Generation mix
ACIL Allen modelled a scenario of extending the LRET to achieve a 30 per cent share of generation 
by 2030 (‘real 30 per cent’). Under this scenario, the target profiles were set in a straight line from 
2014 to 2030. The modelling shows generation supported by the LRET in 2020 is greater than 
that achieved in the ‘real 20 per cent’ scenario discussed in Section 6.1.2. Generation rises to 
meet the 2030 target. 
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Figure 26 shows that renewable generation declines between 2014 and 2020 in the ‘real 
30 per cent’ scenario relative to current RET settings. However, from the late 2020s, strong deployment 
of renewables (mostly wind) leads to an additional 9,000 GWh of renewable generation by 2030. 
Increased generation from renewables displaces generation from black coal and baseload gas. 
Figure 26 Change in generation mix: ‘Real 30 per cent’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Electricity prices
Figure 27 shows the ACIL Allen modelling results of the impact of a ‘real 30 per cent’ scenario on 
retail electricity prices compared with the current RET policy. The modelling forecasts average 
retail prices to fall for the period 2015 to 2040 for all electricity consumers. Average residential 
and commercial customers will experience similar price reductions of around two per cent while 
industrial retail prices will fall by an average of five per cent.
The modelling indicates that average cumulative household electricity bills would be $17 
lower between 2015 and 2020 in NPV terms. Between 2015 and 2030 the additional renewable 
generation lowers wholesale electricity prices, resulting in a cumulative saving of $233 in NPV 
terms for the average household electricity bill over this period.
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Figure 27 Change in average retail electricity prices: ‘Real 30 per cent’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
The reduction in wholesale electricity prices is in part due to the RET contributing to an 
oversupply of generation capacity in the market over the period 2015 to 2040. While this may 
contribute to marginally lower wholesale electricity prices in the short-run, ultimately, renewable 
generators must recover their long-run marginal costs, which are greater than that of fossil fuel 
generators. As discussed in Section 5.4, wholesale electricity prices must be high enough in the 
long-term to allow generators to cover long run marginal costs. 
Resource costs
Adjusting the LRET to achieve a ‘real 30 per cent’ share of generation from renewables would 
decrease the resource cost to the electricity sector by $1.3 billion in NPV terms from 2015 to 2030 
relative to the current RET.
Certificate costs
ACIL Allen estimates that the NPV of cumulative certificate costs for large-scale renewable 
generation would represent around $6.5 billion between 2015 and 2020 and $15 billion between 
2015 and 2030, which is approximately $2 billion and $4 billion lower than continuing with 
the current policy, respectively. However, as the targets continue to 2040 under this scenario, 
additional certificate costs would be incurred over the period 2030 to 2040, leading to a total 
cross-subsidy to renewable generators of $18 billion in NPV terms over the period 2015 to 2040. 
CO2-e emissions
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Lower targets from 2015 to 2020 are estimated to result in an increase in cumulative emissions of 
28 Mt CO2-e compared to current settings over this period. However, strong growth in renewables 
from the mid 2020s leads to higher emissions reductions by 2030 and 2040. Cumulative emissions 
reductions are estimated to increase by 69 Mt CO2-e by 2040, compared to the current policy. 
44 Emissions results presented under each scenario arise from the modelled changes to both the LRET and the SRES; the former accounts for almost all of the impact.
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6.1.2      Reducing the LRET to a ‘real 20 per cent’
This scenario adjusts the targets in line with current projections for electricity demand in 2020 
to achieve a ‘real 20 per cent’ share of generation from renewables. This option is supported by 
many stakeholders, such as electricity retailers (including EnergyAustralia and Origin Energy), 
some peak bodies and industry groups (including Major Energy Users, the National Generators 
Forum, the Energy Supply Association of Australia and the Business Council of Australia). For 
example, EnergyAustralia’s submission stated:
In  our  view  recalibration  of  the  RET  to  equate  to  the  original  ‘20  per  cent  by  2020’  policy  
commitment  is  the  most  balanced  approach  to  addressing  the  problem  for  all  stakeholder  
JURXSV(QHUJ\$XVWUDOLDS
There are two broad approaches to implementing a ‘real 20 per cent’ target. The first involves 
retaining ‘fixed’ legislated targets in gigawatt hours but recalibrating those annual targets based 
on current projections of electricity demand, and leaving them at the revised levels for the 
duration of the scheme. Like the current scheme, the targets would remain flat at the level set for 
2020 until 2030. Setting fixed targets provides certainty to the renewable energy industry over the 
amount of new generation that is required each year. However, if electricity demand in 2020 is 
higher or lower than currently projected, the share of renewables will not correspond to 
20 per cent. If demand is lower than forecast, the additional generation from renewables will 
exacerbate the existing situation of over-capacity in the electricity market and result in further 
investment that is not required to meet demand for electricity.
Most stakeholders, particularly in the renewable energy industry, supported retaining fixed 
gigawatt hour targets in legislation. For example, Snowy Hydro stated: 
%HFDXVHGHPDQGLVGLI¿FXOWWRSUHGLFWDQGWRPLQLPLVHWKHULVNLQKDYLQJWRPDQDJHYDULDEOH
WDUJHWVZKLFKFRXOGFKDQJH\HDURQ\HDUZHDGYRFDWHWKDWWKH/5(7VKRXOGFRQWLQXHWREH
H[SUHVVHGDVD¿[HG*:KWDUJHW6QRZ\+\GURS
The second approach is to implement ‘floating targets’ where targets would be regularly updated 
in line with the most recent projections of electricity demand, ensuring the scheme delivers a 
20 per cent share of renewable generation in 2020. Some stakeholders, including the AEMC and 
the Major Energy Users support this option:
7KH/5(7WDUJHWVKRXOGEHH[SUHVVHGDVDSHUFHQWDJHRIGHPDQGZLWKDQLQGLFDWLYH
percentage  target  for  2020  and  a  ‘directional’  non  binding  target  for  2030  (rather  than  the  
FDSSHG*:KDPRXQWWR0DMRU(QHUJ\8VHUVS
This approach would result in a degree of uncertainty for the renewable energy industry and 
liable entities, and there is a risk it may not provide sufficient notice to meet the targets, given 
the lead time required to build new large-scale projects. Uncertainty over future targets could 
also mean that retailers purchase higher-cost certificates on the spot market, rather than through 
PPAs, making it harder for renewable projects to secure finance. However, this approach does 
provide a mechanism to adjust the targets should market conditions change. 
ACIL Allen modelled a ‘real 20 per cent’ scenario for the Panel. The modelling results apply to 
both a floating and fixed real 20 per cent target, but actual outcomes would differ between 
the two approaches if electricity demand outcomes varied from the assumptions used in the 
modelling. 
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Generation mix
Adjusting the LRET to achieve a ‘real 20 per cent’ share of generation in 2020 would result in a 
target of 25,200 GWh of additional large-scale renewable generation in 2020, which is 
15,800 GWh lower than the current 41,000 GWh target. A further 2,600 MW of wind capacity and 
600 MW of new large-scale solar capacity would be developed by 2020 to meet a 
‘real 20 per cent’ target. The ACIL Allen modelling suggests that, compared to the current policy, 
the output from wind capacity that would have come online to meet the 41,000 GWh target is 
offset by increased generation from existing coal fired and baseload gas generators (Figure 28). 
Growth in demand is largely met by new wind capacity with some development of large-scale 
solar in remote grids in the early 2020s. This allows fossil fuel generators to maintain their current 
level of output (assuming the current demand forecast for 2020 eventuates) and improves the 
financial position of incumbent fossil fuel generators. In this scenario there is less mothballed 
fossil fuel capacity than under current settings with some currently mothballed capacity brought 
back online sooner than would otherwise have been the case. 
Some new fossil fuel capacity is projected to enter the market around 2025, mostly baseload and 
peaking gas generation with a small amount of new coal capacity being developed in the SWIS. 
ACIL Allen estimates that a further $6 billion would be invested in the sector to 2030 (in NPV 
terms) to meet the lower target, about $8 billion less than under current settings. A majority of 
the decline in expenditure relates to reduced investment in wind capacity. 
Figure 28 Change in generation mix: ‘Real 20 per cent’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Electricity prices
Figure 29 illustrates ACIL Allen’s modelled retail electricity prices in a ‘real 20 per cent’ scenario 
compared to the current policy. The modelling estimates that reducing the target to a 
‘real 20 per cent’ will initially result in lower retail electricity prices as the cost of purchasing LGCs 
and STCs is reduced and wholesale prices remain low due to excess capacity in the market. The 
modelling forecasts average retail prices to remain fairly constant out to 2040 for all electricity 
consumers. Industrial customers could expect no change in retail prices, whilst residential and 
commercial customers could expect an increase in retail price of around one per cent. 
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Figure 29 Change in average retail electricity prices: ‘Real 20 per cent’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Average cumulative household electricity bills would be $24 lower between 2015 and 2020 in 
NPV terms. By 2020, these initial savings would be outweighed by a subsequent rise in wholesale 
electricity prices due to less renewable generation in the market compared to the reference case. 
The cumulative increase in average household bills from 2015 to 2030 would be $118 in NPV terms. 
Modelling by Frontier Economics for the AEMC also suggests that a lower target will result in 
lower retail electricity prices in the short-term, but this reverses between 2020 and 2025 as a rise 
in wholesale prices offsets the savings from reducing the target. The Deloitte modelling provides 
different electricity price outcomes. It projects retail electricity prices to remain lower over the 
period to 2030 if the target is reduced to a ‘real 20 per cent’ as the increase in wholesale prices is 
outweighed by the reduction in costs associated with purchasing certificates. 
Resource costs 
Adjusting the LRET to achieve a ‘real 20 per cent’ share of generation from renewables would 
reduce the NPV of resource costs associated with large-scale electricity generation by around 
$6.5 billion by 2030, compared with the current policy. 
Certificate costs 
The total cross-subsidy provided to large-scale renewable generation would be around $5 billion 
over the period 2015 to 2020 and $11 billion over the period 2015 to 2030 (in NPV terms), 
which is approximately $3.5 billion and $8.5 billion lower than continuing with the current policy, 
respectively.
CO2-e emissions 
If the target is reduced to a ‘real 20 per cent’, the ACIL Allen modelling estimates that cumulative 
emissions would be higher by 39 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2020, and 190 Mt CO2-e over 
the period 2015 to 2030, compared with the current policy.
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6.1.3      Target representing a ’50 per cent share of new growth’ in electricity demand
If the forecasts of electricity demand adopted by ACIL Allen for this review eventuate, adjusting 
the target to a ‘real 20 per cent’ would result in generation from renewables increasing by roughly 
10,000 GWh by 2020 over current levels, which is equal to around a 50 per cent share of growth 
in electricity demand over the period. However, there are risks that this demand forecast will 
not eventuate. ACIL Allen modelled a ‘low electricity demand’ sensitivity where demand remains 
roughly constant between now and 2020. In this situation, a ‘real 20 per cent’ target would 
lead to the deployment of renewable generation capacity that is not required, adding costs to 
the economy and reducing the output of incumbent generators. A fixed gigawatt hour target 
effectively shields renewable generators from fluctuations in demand (as they can be certain of 
receiving revenue from the sale of certificates), leaving incumbent fossil fuel generators exposed 
to most of the risk.
A ‘floating’ real 20 per cent target was discussed in Section 6.1.2 as a means of providing 
flexibility in the target. This provides some protection against low demand outcomes, but a risk 
remains that meeting a 20 per cent target would lead to additional surplus generation capacity if 
electricity demand is flat or falling. 
Another scenario considered by the Panel for addressing the problem of uncertain demand 
forecasts, is to adopt an approach whereby targets are set annually by the CER that correspond 
to the previous year’s target plus a share of expected growth in national electricity demand 
over the next year (for example, 50 per cent). If demand is forecast to decline, the target would 
be maintained at the previous year’s level and would only increase when demand is forecast 
to exceed its previous highest level. The submission from the Australian Industry Greenhouse 
Network suggested such an approach could be considered: 
8QGHUWKLVRSWLRQH[SHFWHGIXWXUHGHPDQGJURZWKZRXOGEHH[SOLFLWO\FRQVLGHUHGLQ
GHWHUPLQLQJH[SDQVLRQLQWKH5(7WDUJHW,IGHPDQGJURZWKLVH[SHFWHGWREHORZWKHQ
H[SDQVLRQZRXOGEHORZRU]HUR:KHUHGHPDQGJURZWKLVH[SHFWHGWREHKLJKHUWKH
target  could  be  increased.  The  practical  upshot  of  this  is  that  there  would  likely  be  no  
H[SDQVLRQRIWKHWDUJHWLQWKHQHDUWHUPEXWLWZRXOGUHPDLQDQRSWLRQRYHUWKHORQJHU
WHUP$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*UHHQKRXVH1HWZRUNS
This option links the RET to market needs as it would only support the deployment of additional 
renewable generation capacity when electricity demand is growing. It also means that renewable 
investors are subject to more of the risk of uncertain demand outcomes that investors in fossil 
fuel generators face.
Under the share of growth option, targets would not be mandated for future years. Uncertainty 
over future targets could make finance harder and more expensive for renewable energy 
developers to secure, potentially increasing the price of certificates and the overall compliance 
costs of the scheme. This risk could be partially mitigated by the CER publishing indicative, 
non-binding targets for future years similar to current practice under the SRES. 
Implementation of this option would need to consider approaches for calculating targets and 
whether additional mechanisms would be required to ensure a stable certificate price in situations 
of flat or declining demand and hence where there is no growth in the target. These issues are 
further discussed in Chapter 10.
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Generation mix
Based on ACIL Allen’s central assumptions for electricity demand, a target that represents a 
50 per cent of growth in demand over the period to 2020 would result in a similar level of 
renewable generation in 2020 to a ‘real 20 per cent’ scenario with approximately 10,000 GWh 
of new large-scale renewable generation entering the market. However, the total amount of 
renewable generation and the percentage share of renewable generation will depend on actual 
electricity demand each year. Figure 30 shows the profile of renewable generation that would be 
achieved under high, low and central demand assumptions in the ACIL Allen modelling.
Figure 30 LRET Target profiles: ‘50 per cent share of new growth’, 2014 - 2030
Source: ACIL Allen
Based on the central forecast for electricity demand, the ACIL Allen modelling suggests that 
scheduled and semi-scheduled wind capacity would more than double on electricity grids from 
around 2,370 MW in 2014 to 5,400 MW in 2020. This is around 4,900 MW less than modelled 
under the current policy. The reduction in renewable generation compared to the current target 
is offset by increased generation from existing coal and baseload gas generators (Figure 31). 
Fossil fuel generators maintain their current level of output, improving the financial position of 
incumbent fossil fuel generators.
Figure 31 Change in generation mix: ‘50 per cent share of new growth’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
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Figure 32 Change in average retail electricity prices: ‘50 per cent share of new growth’ – 
Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Electricity prices
Figure 32 shows that the impacts on electricity prices in this scenario are similar to the 
‘real 20 per cent’ scenario. The ACIL Allen modelling estimates that altering the target to a 
‘50 per cent share of new growth’ will initially result in lower retail electricity prices as the costs 
of purchasing LGCs and STCs is reduced and wholesale prices remain low due to excess capacity 
in the market. The modelling forecasts average retail prices to remain fairly constant out to 2040 
for all electricity consumers. Industrial customers can expect no change in retail prices, while 
residential, and commercial customers can expect an increase in retail price of around one per cent. 
The average cumulative household electricity bill would be $20 lower between 2015 and 2020 
in NPV terms. By 2018, these initial savings are outweighed by a subsequent rise in wholesale 
electricity prices due to less renewable generation in the market. The cumulative increase in 
average household bills from 2015 to 2030 would be $119 in NPV terms.
Resource costs
Reducing the RET to represent a 50 per cent share of growth in demand would reduce the NPV of 
resource costs by around $6 billion between 2015 to 2030 compared with the current scheme. 
Certificate costs
The total cross-subsidy provided to large-scale renewable generation would be around $6 billion 
by 2020 and $12 billion by 2030 in NPV terms, which is approximately $2 billion and $8 billion 
lower than continuing with the current policy, respectively.
CO2-e emissions 
The level of emissions abatement achieved under a ‘50 per cent share of new growth’ scenario 
is similar to the ‘real 20 per cent scenario,’ assuming the forecast for electricity demand adopted 
by ACIL Allen eventuates. If the target is adjusted to a ‘50 per cent share of new growth’, the 
modelling shows that emissions would be higher by 36 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2020, 
and would be higher by 189 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2030 compared to the current policy.
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Box 2: Implementing a Share of Growth Approach
A share of growth approach would involve the LRET being set on an annual basis. By 
December each year the CER would announce the target to apply for the following calendar 
year. The mechanism by which it would do so would follow a published formula such as:
Tn = MAX (T0 + ½ ( En - E0 ) , Tn-1 )
Where:
T0  =  Base  year  target
E0  =  Electricity  demand  in  the  base  year
Tn,  En  =  Target  and  forecast  electricity  demand  in  year  n
As electricity demand increases above the level of demand in the base year, the target 
increases by one half of this growth. Should electricity demand be forecast to fall or to 
remain flat in any year, the target would not change – and would only increase further when 
electricity demand exceeded its previous highest level. 
The table shows how the target would change if electricity demand follows the most recent 
forecasts, which form the core demand projection used in the modelling. Over the period to 2020 
electricity demand is projected to increase by 17,800 GWh and the target increases by 8,900 GWh. 
The CER would draw on publicly-available electricity forecasts in calculating the target, 
including the market operators’ most recent forecasts of electricity demand in the major 
markets.
While the formal targets would be set annually one year at a time, publication of the formula 
and the CER’s use of publicly-available electricity forecasts would allow businesses to make 
their own projections of the targets for future years to assist in their investment planning and 
decision making.
Year Year (n)
Electricity demand 
(GWh)
Change in demand 
(GWh)
Change in Target 
(GWh)
Target 
(GWh)
2014 0 227,500 16,100
2015 1 230,100 2,600 1,300 17,400
2016 2 236,600 6,500 3,300 20,700
2017 3 240,500 3,900 1,900 22,600
2018 4 242,300 1,800 900 23,500
2019 5 243,800 1,500 800 24,300
2020 6 245,300 1,500 700 25,000
Excludes waste coal mine gas and small-scale solar PV 
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6.1.4      Repeal of the LRET
If the RET was repealed entirely, LGCs and STCs would no longer be created and there would be 
no obligation on liable parties to purchase and surrender these certificates. This would have the 
effect of immediately removing the costs associated with the RET on electricity prices. A small 
number of stakeholders advocated this approach. For example, Stanwell Corporation stated:
Stanwell’s  primary  concern  with  the  RET  is  the  impact  of  the  RET  on  electricity  prices  and  
WKHÀRZRQHIIHFWVRIKLJKHOHFWULFLW\SULFHVIRU$XVWUDOLD¶VSURGXFWLYLW\DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK
Stanwell  supports  completely  removing  the  RET  in  order  to  reduce  the  impact  on  electricity  
SULFHV6WDQZHOO&RUSRUDWLRQS
LGCs make up the difference between the spot price for electricity and the price that renewable 
generation projects require to be financially viable. Some renewable generators have entered 
into PPAs with electricity retailers that cover both the cost of electricity and certificates. The effect 
of abolishing the RET on these contracts is not clear, in some cases electricity retailers may be 
obliged to continue covering the cost of LGCs even though renewable generators will no longer 
create these certificates. Contracts could also contain clauses allowing them to be amended in the 
event of a significant policy change such as abolishing the RET. 
Without LGCs or PPAs, the only source of revenue for existing large-scale renewable generators 
would be the spot market for electricity. These generators would not be competitive with 
non-renewable generators and there is a strong possibility that the owners of these projects would 
not remain solvent. As renewable generators typically have high capital costs and low operating 
costs, it is likely that these assets would be sold at a loss but would then continue to operate under 
new financing and ownership structures.
Many stakeholders have suggested that repealing or significantly reducing the RET would raise 
sovereign risk concerns. Sovereign risk traditionally refers to the risk of a government defaulting 
on loan obligations (sovereign credit risk), though the term is now used more broadly to refer 
to the effect of changes to government policy on both existing and future private investment. 
However, the Panel considers that these factors are more correctly characterised as regulatory 
risk. 
Not all stakeholders considered that significant change to the RET should be dismissed on the 
grounds that it would represent an inappropriate level of risk for investors. For example, the 
submission from the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated:
The  issue  of  investment  risk  has  been  raised  by  supporters  of  the  RET  as  a  reason  for  
RSSRVLQJDQ\FKDQJHWRWKHVFKHPH6XFKDQDSSURDFKWRHFRQRPLFSROLF\LIDSSOLHG
DFURVVWKHHFRQRP\ZRXOGPDNHLWYLUWXDOO\LPSRVVLEOHWRUHPHG\SROLF\IDLOXUHVRUGHOLYHU
productivity  enhancing  reform.  ACCI  believes  this  proposition  should  be  rejected  by  the  
Review  Panel.  Investors  should  have  been  well  aware  of  the  risks  of  ongoing  changes  to  
the  RET  given  the  legislative  requirement  that  the  scheme  be  reviewed  every  two  years.  
$XVWUDOLDQ&KDPEHURI&RPPHUFHDQG,QGXVWU\S
However, renewable energy project owners point out that they invested in good faith and 
in accordance with a government policy that had bipartisan support. If the RET legislation is 
repealed, they argue compensation should be provided for existing investments. For example, 
Pacific Hydro stated:
2IPRVWFRQFHUQWR3DFL¿F+\GURLVWKDWDPDWHULDOFKDQJHWRWKH5(7ZLOOOHDGWRSRWHQWLDO
sovereign  risk  and  value  destruction  that  would  impact  existing  projects….  Sovereign  risk  will  
affect  contracts  in  place  now  for  operating  projects  and  could  see  substantial  compensation  
DQGRUWUDQVLWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVGUDZLQJRQJRYHUQPHQWIXQGVIRU\HDUV3DFL¿F+\GURS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There  are  strong  risks  to  our  reputation  as  an  investment  destination  in  the  energy  sector  
and  in  other  sectors  from  materially  altering  a  policy  in  such  a  vital  sector  of  the  economy.  
The  RET  policy  uncertainty  appears  to  be  damaging  Australia’s  reputation  as  a  stable  and  
VDIHLQYHVWPHQWPDUNHW3DFL¿F+\GURS
Infigen Energy noted concerns expressed by its global investors:
,Q¿JHQKDVRYHUVHFXULW\KROGHUVRIZKLFKE\QXPEHUDUHVPDOOUHWDLOLQYHVWRUV
PDQ\RIZKRPKDYHEHHQVHFXULW\KROGHUVVLQFHWKHLQLWLDOSXEOLFRIIHULQJLQ,Q¿JHQ
also  has  many  large  global  infrastructure  investors  that  have  expressed  concern  to  us  about  
the  potential  sovereign  risk  aspects  of  possible  regulatory  change  and  have  added  their  
VXSSRUWWR,Q¿JHQ¶VVXEPLVVLRQ7KHVHLQYHVWRUVFLWHWKHLUH[SHULHQFHRIDGYHUVHUHJXODWRU\
FKDQJHLQWKHUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\VHFWRULQ(XURSHQRWLQJKRZWKLVKDVFDXVHGPXFKKLJKHU
UHWXUQKXUGOHVWREHUHTXLUHGIRUDOOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQYHVWPHQWVLQWKRVHFRXQWULHV,Q¿JHQS
The Australian Industry Group raised concerns about the impact on future investments:
Ai  Group  members  have  expressed  concern  that  such  an  about-­turn  by  the  Commonwealth  
would  have  major  implications  for  international  investment  in  Australia  due  to  perceptions  of  
increased  sovereign  risk.  These  negative  perceptions  would  have  a  lasting  impact  that  might  
EHDVVLJQL¿FDQWDVDQ\FODLPVIRUFRPSHQVDWLRQWKDWDULVHIURPWKRVHZKRKDYHLQYHVWHGLQ
UHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*URXSS
The Panel does not consider these arguments to be strong. Certainty of regulatory settings is 
an important facilitator of investment in long-term infrastructure, but this does not imply that 
regulations should be set in stone. While it is reasonable for investors to expect that they will 
not be exposed to arbitrary or capricious regulatory changes, they can have no expectation of 
government abstaining from regulatory change, even significant change, when circumstances 
warrant. Any regulatory setting involves a consideration of the balance of its impacts on groups 
in the community. When circumstances change significantly it is incumbent on governments to 
reconsider whether the balance of those impacts remains appropriate and to act if necessary. 
Generation mix
If the LRET were repealed, it is likely that all existing and committed renewable generators would 
continue to operate although ownership of these assets may change. The share of renewables 
would remain at around 16 per cent of the generation mix.
ACIL Allen forecasts that very little new generation capacity growth would be required before 
2025. Conventional fossil-fuel capacity may enter markets from around 2025 with capacity largely 
being gas-fired. A small amount of new coal capacity is projected to be developed in the SWIS, 
the only region in which new coal power stations are likely to be developed if the RET is repealed. 
There is likely to be no new wind farm development out to 2040, but some utility-scale solar is 
forecast to be deployed in regional markets from around 2034, bringing installed capacity to 
around 1,600 MW by 2040. 
Comparing the ‘repeal’ scenario to current RET policy, there would be a 75 per cent drop in wind 
generation in 2040. The reduction in renewable generation is offset by increased generation from 
existing black and brown coal generators (Figure 33). Fossil fuel generators increase their level of 
output to meet the load growth over the period to 2040, which improves their financial position. 
In this scenario there is less mothballed fossil fuel capacity than under current settings with some 
currently mothballed capacity brought back online sooner than would otherwise have been the 
case.
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Figure 33 Change in generation mix: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Electricity prices 
The impact of repealing the LRET on electricity prices was discussed in Chapter 5, which explained 
that the ACIL Allen modelling estimates that removing the RET would result in an initial retail price 
reduction before wholesale prices rise with less renewable generation in the electricity mix.
Figure 34 illustrates the modelled retail electricity prices in a ‘Repeal’ scenario out to 2040 
compared with the current policy. The ACIL Allen modelling estimates that repealing the RET 
would initially result in lower retail electricity prices, however from around 2021 retail prices would 
be on average 3.1 per cent higher for residential, commercial and industrial customers. 
In the Repeal scenario, the NPV of cumulative average household electricity bills would be $247 
lower over the period 2015 to 2020. This reduction is due to lower certificate costs and a lower 
wholesale price resulting from the return of some mothballed coal-fired generation capacity. 
However, repeal of the RET eventually leads to higher wholesale electricity prices because of 
the absence of additional (low marginal cost) renewable generation and less over-supply of 
generation capacity in the market. The NPV of retail electricity prices over the period 2015 to 
2030 is roughly the same as if the RET was left in place. By 2040, under the ‘Repeal’ scenario, the 
average cumulative residential bill increases by $115 compared to current policy. It was noted in 
Chapter 5 that other modelling produced different results, for example the Deloitte modelling 
estimated that retail electricity prices would be lower over the period to 2030 if the RET is repealed.
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Figure 34 Change in average retail electricity prices: ‘Repeal’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Resource costs
Repealing the LRET would reduce the NPV of resource costs by around $9 billion by 2030 
compared with the current policy.
Certificate costs 
Repealing the LRET would eliminate the LGC costs incurred under the current scheme of $9 billion 
over the period 2015 to 2020 and $19 billion over the period 2015 to 2030, in NPV terms.
CO2-e emissions 
If the LRET is repealed, the modelling shows that cumulative emissions would be higher by 
58 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2020 and by 299 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2030. By 
2040 cumulative emissions would be 520 Mt CO2-e higher, compared with the current policy.
6.1.5      Close the LRET to new entrants (‘grandfathering’)
Many submissions suggested transitioning away from the RET, but recognised a need to continue 
to support investments made on the basis of the current RET legislation in order to address the 
issues concerning regulatory risk. For example, Alinta Energy proposed that the LRET be capped 
at the current level and continue to 2020:
$OLQWD(QHUJ\LVRIWKHYLHZWKDWJHQHUDWRUVWKDWKDYHFRPPLWWHG¿QDQFHWRSURMHFWV
ZKHWKHUFRPSOHWHGRUXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHFXUUHQW5(7VFKHPHVKRXOG
continue  to  receive  a  subsidy.  This  is  important  to  ensure  the  risk  of  policy  change  does  not  
disincentivise  future  investment  in  the  market.  
7KHUHIRUHWRWDNHDFFRXQWRIWKHVHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV$OLQWD(QHUJ\DGYRFDWHVWKDWWKH5(7
FRQWLQXHXQWLOEXWWKDWWKHWDUJHWEHFDSSHGDWFXUUHQWFDSDFLW\ZKLFKKDVEHHQ
achieved  to  date  based  on  renewable  generation  that  has  already  been  built  or  committed  to  
EXLOG$OLQWD(QHUJ\S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The Australian Industry Group stated:
,IIROORZLQJWKLVFRQVXOWDWLRQDUHFRPPHQGDWLRQZDVPDGHWKDWWKH/5(7EHDEROLVKHG
RUVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHGXFHGWKHQLQGXVWU\ZRXOGH[SHFWVWHSVWRVPRRWKDWUDQVLWLRQWRWKH
amended  policy.  At  the  very  least  this  would  include  forewarning  to  allow  industry  time  to  
SUHSDUHIRUPDMRUVFKHPHFKDQJHVWKDWDUHEHLQJVHULRXVO\FRQVLGHUHGE\WKH*RYHUQPHQW
and  security  for  investments  in  renewable  generation  that  have  already  been  made.  The  
costs  of  such  security  should  be  taken  into  account  in  considering  net  impacts  on  energy  
XVHUVDQGWD[SD\HUV$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*URXSS
Closing the LRET to new entrants would entail setting targets in line with generation from 
existing and committed power stations and enabling these power stations to continue receiving 
revenue through the sale of LGCs. The scenario modelled by ACIL Allen assumes that renewable 
power stations that are already under construction or can demonstrate that they have reached 
full financial and contractual commitment (e.g., final investment decision, engineering and 
procurement contract) would also be entitled to create certificates and participate in the LRET.
Implementing this approach would involve consideration of an appropriate certificate price to 
support existing projects, and considering whether further mechanisms would be required to 
ensure price stability. Mechanisms that could be considered include price caps and price floors, or 
a clearing house that facilitates the sale of certificates at a fixed price similar to the STC Clearing 
House. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 10. 
Generation mix 
The modelling results for impact of closing the RET to new entrants on the generation mix 
(Figure 35) are the same as the results for repealing the RET, as both cases assume that all 
existing and committed renewable generators continue to operate, but there is no new renewable 
generation capacity installed between 2014 to 2040, aside from a small amount of solar in 
regional markets. 
Figure 35 Change in generation mix: ‘Closed to new entrants’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
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Electricity prices
With less renewables in the electricity mix, the wholesale electricity price would initially drop, but 
would then increase from 2018 onwards and would outweigh the savings from avoided certificate 
costs by around 2020; causing retail electricity prices to be higher than if the RET remained.  
Figure 36 illustrates the ACIL Allen modelled retail electricity prices in a ‘closed to new entrants’ 
scenario out to 2040, compared with the current policy. The modelling estimates that closing 
the RET to entrants would initially result in lower retail electricity prices, however retail electricity 
prices would be on average three to four per cent higher from 2019 for residential, commercial 
and industrial customers. The NPV of cumulative average household electricity bills would be 
$138 lower over the period 2015 to 2020, but $185 higher over the period 2015 to 2030. 
Figure 36 Change in average retail electricity prices: ‘Closed to new entrants’ – Reference case, 2015 - 2040
Source: ACIL Allen
Resource costs
Closing the RET to new entrants would result in a similar reduction in resource costs associated 
with large-scale electricity generation as repealing the RET. The NPV of large-scale resource costs 
are expected to be around $9 billion lower by 2030 compared with the current policy. 
Certificate costs
Closing the RET to new entrants would provide renewable generators with a cross-subsidy of 
$3 billion over the period 2015 to 2020 and $5 billion over the period 2015 to 2030 in NPV terms, 
which is approximately $6 billion and $14 billion lower than continuing with the current policy, 
respectively. 
CO2-emissions
Closing the RET to new entrants would have the same effect on CO2-e emissions as repealing the 
RET. Emissions would be higher by 58 Mt CO2-e over the period 2015 to 2020 and 299 Mt CO2-e 
higher over the period 2015 to 2030, compared with current policy.
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6.2      Reforming the LRET: Conclusions
The Panel concluded in Chapter 5 that the RET should not be continued in its current form 
because the cost of the cross-subsidy and its effects on Australia’s national income are not 
justified by the emission reduction benefits. Adoption of a higher target and/or extension of the 
scheme beyond its current 2030 timeframe are inconsistent with reducing the cost of the scheme 
to Australians. 
While the Panel does not consider that repeal of the RET constitutes ‘sovereign risk’, the Panel 
is of the view that an immediate end to the scheme would create significant adverse financial 
implications for existing investors in renewable generation. It could also deter future investment 
in the sector which may be required to meet higher greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in 
the future. 
The Panel therefore recommends that the LRET should continue, but only in a significantly 
modified form that better balances the interests of existing investors with those of the nation as a 
whole. 
This balance could be achieved by allowing the LRET to continue to operate until 2030 for existing 
renewable generators, but closing it to new entrants. This would provide investors in existing 
renewable generation with access to certificates, but importantly it would protect the broader 
community from the substantial costs of subsidising yet more surplus generation capacity.
This would retain the CO2-e emissions reductions achieved to date by the LRET, and leave the 
remainder of Australia’s CO2-e emissions reduction task to other approaches including the ERF. 
Alternatively, a suitable balance might also be achieved if the LRET were modified to increase in 
proportion with growth in electricity demand. This would protect investors in existing renewable 
generators and would support additional renewable generation when demand is growing. It 
exposes renewable investors to more of the risks that incumbent generators currently face 
in terms of uncertain demand forecasts, placing them on a more even footing. If the current 
forecasts of electricity demand prove accurate, this approach would result in renewables making 
up approximately a 20 per cent share of electricity demand in 2020, but the share may be 
different if demand is higher or lower than expected.
A key objective of both options is to support existing and committed investments made on the 
basis of the current RET policy. The Panel has identified that some additional mechanisms may 
be needed to ensure certificate prices trade in a range that will provide an appropriate level of 
support. These are further discussed in Chapter 10. 
The Panel does not favour the option of adjusting the current 41,000 GWh target to a lower 
target that might deliver a ‘real 20 per cent’ share for renewables because that would risk locking 
in the cost of billions of dollars of unnecessary capital expenditure if electricity demand proved 
to be lower than forecast. If the Government wishes to adopt a ‘real 20 per cent’ target the Panel 
considers that a ‘floating’ target should be adopted, where targets are periodically updated in 
line with electricity demand projections rather than being fixed until 2020. While providing less 
certainty to renewable investors, it would reduce the risk of the RET forcing in excess generation 
capacity, but would not eliminate it.
The LRET provides an incentive for the deployment of the most commercial renewable technology 
and as such it does not promote a range of technologies. In its current form, the LRET is expected 
to be predominately met by wind generation, which is currently the most competitive form of 
renewable energy, but it may be that other technologies, such as large-scale solar, become 
cheaper in the future. A more efficient and lower cost outcome would be achieved if the market 
were able to select the lowest-cost, best performing options to meet demand when it is needed. 
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45 CSIRO &KDQJHDQG&KRLFH7KH)XWXUH*ULG)RUXP·VDQDO\VLVRI$XVWUDOLD·VSRWHQWLDOHOHFWULFLW\SDWKZD\VWR, December 2013. 
The Panel agrees with the views put by many stakeholders during the review that all parts of the 
electricity sector will be increasingly affected by innovation in coming years – traditional business 
and engineering models of energy generation, delivery and use are likely to undergo significant 
changes. The Panel notes that the combination of rising retail electricity prices, falling technology 
costs (including solar PV panels), the development of battery storage technologies, and new 
business models that allow consumers to become more active in managing their energy costs may 
be beginning to drive a long-term transformation of the electricity sector over coming decades in 
which renewables play a significant role.45 Mandating the construction of significant quantities of 
large-scale renewable generation capacity reflects a 20th century approach to electricity and may 
hinder rather than assist the transformation of the sector in the first half of this century. 
Recommendation 2: The Large-Scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) should be amended in 
one of the following two ways:
Option  1  –  Closed  to  new  entrants  (‘grandfathering’)
In order to reduce the cost of the LRET and its impact on electricity markets, the Panel 
recommends that the LRET should be closed to new entrants. 
a. The LRET is closed to new renewable energy power stations (subject to limited 
exceptions described below). The Clean Energy Regulator (CER) should set targets 
annually based on estimated output from accredited power stations. 
b. In addition to those renewable energy power stations already accredited under the 
scheme, eligibility would be extended to:
i. Renewable energy power stations already under construction
ii. Renewable energy power stations to be constructed where project proponents can 
demonstrate that there is full financial and contractual commitment to the project 
(e.g., final investment decision, engineering and procurement contract) within one 
month of the announcement of this approach
c. The last year of the operation of the LRET is 2030.
or
Option  2  –  Share  of  growth  in  electricity  demand
In order to provide support for new renewable power stations and contribute to Australia’s 
emissions reduction target while achieving less reduction than Option 1 in the cost of the 
LRET, the Panel recommends that the target be set to allocate a share of growth in electricity 
demand to renewables in the following manner:
a. The target is set annually by the CER, increasing each year to 2020 by an amount 
equivalent to 50 per cent of projected growth in national electricity demand, ensuring 
that new renewable energy power stations are only supported under the RET where 
electricity demand is increasing. 
b. Where national electricity demand is projected to remain flat or fall, the target is held at 
the previous year’s level.
c. From 2021 onwards, the target is fixed at the 2020 level until 2030, the last year of the 
operation of the LRET.
Based on current electricity demand forecasts, this approach would achieve a 20 per cent 
share of renewables in the electricity generation mix by 2020.
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46 Clean Energy Regulator, Small-‐scale installations by postcode, July 2014.
47 To ensure the overall 20 per cent target would be met, the lower bound estimate for the SRES (4,000 GWh) was deducted from the original (combined) 45,000 GWh 
2020 target, giving the large-‐scale 2020 target of 41,000 GWh.
48 Calculation by the RET Review Secretariat based on data provided by the Clean Energy Regulator.
49 Australian Energy Market Commission, 5HVLGHQWLDO(OHFWULFLW\3ULFH7UHQGV, p.12. 
50 Green Energy Markets, 6PDOOVFDOHWHFKQRORJ\FHUWLÀFDWHVGDWDPRGHOOLQJIRUWR5HSRUWWRWKH&OHDQ(QHUJ\5HJXODWRU, 2014.
6.3      The current state of the small-scale market
The SRES has been highly successful in promoting small-scale renewable energy. Over 1.2 million 
rooftop PV systems and around 870,000 solar water heater units have been installed under the 
RET since 2001.46 These systems produced the equivalent of around 6,400 GWh of generation in 
2013, which is already above the original 4,000 GWh estimate for the SRES by 2020.47 The sector 
has received a cross-subsidy of around $4 billion to install rooftop PV systems and solar water 
heaters since the RET was expanded in 2010.48
In the past, the costs of the SRES have been high (comprising 60 per cent of the costs of the RET 
in 2012-13)49 and unpredictable,  largely due to the high uptake of rooftop PV incentivised by 
state and territory feed-in-tariffs, the solar credits multiplier under the RET and falling system 
costs. In response, the scheme has been adjusted several times to bring forward the phase-out of 
the multiplier. As a result of these adjustments, and the removal of state and territory premium 
feed-in-tariff schemes, installations of residential solar PV systems have fallen by around 
40 per cent in the past 18 months.50
System costs for rooftop solar PV installations have declined rapidly since 2009, reflecting the 
global decline in PV module costs and the strong Australian dollar. Figure 37 shows average solar 
PV system costs per watt since 2001.
Figure 37 Average solar PV system price
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance
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Figure 38 Simple payback period by state: 3 kW residential solar PV system
Source: Green Energy Markets, Small-scale technology certificates data modelling for 2014 to 2016
51 Secretariat calculation based on data in Green Energy Markets, 6PDOOVFDOHWHFKQRORJ\FHUWLÀFDWHVGDWDPRGHOOLQJIRUWR
The average cost of installing a 3 kW solar PV system in 2014 is $7,670 and STCs contribute 
around 30 per cent of this cost.51 With the RET in place the average payback period is reduced 
from around 10 years to nearly seven years. Figure 38 shows the simple payback period for a 
3 kW solar PV system in the various states, after receiving certificates, as calculated by 
Green Energy Markets.
The decline in system costs and continued uptake has led many stakeholders to argue that 
rooftop PV systems no longer need support through the SRES, and the continuation of the SRES 
is unnecessarily adding to electricity bills. For example, Major Energy Users submitted:
7KH65(6KDVEHHQH[WUHPHO\FRVWO\DQGLQHTXLWDEOHLQLWVLPSDFWVRQFRQVXPHUVVXFKDV
EXVLQHVVHVDQGWKRVHUHQWLQJ7KHFRVWVRIWKH65(6KDYHEHHQGLI¿FXOWWRFRQWURODQGWKH
scheme  has  shown  that  it  is  vulnerable  to  distortion  by  state  based  policies.  
0DMRU(QHUJ\8VHUVS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On the other hand, the solar industry points out that the SRES is providing the only remaining 
policy support for rooftop solar PV and solar water heaters now that premium state 
feed-in-tariffs have been removed, and the costs of the SRES are falling and will continue to fall 
through arrangements currently in place. For example, the Clean Energy Council submitted:
&RVWVDUHIRUHFDVWWRIDOOE\SHUFHQWLQUHDOWHUPVLQDQGWKHQVWD\ORZRXWWR
2019-­2020.  In  proportional  terms  the  retail  price  contribution  of  SRES  has  already  peaked  at  
3  per  cent  of  the  average  retail  bill  in  2012-­2013  and  will  continue  to  decline  to  between  
DQGSHUFHQWRXWWR&OHDQ(QHUJ\&RXQFLOS
Similarly, the REC Agents Association suggest that the cost of the SRES will amount to 0.4 cents 
per kWh in 2014, which is less than half the level in 2012, and that this cost will be offset by a 
greater reduction in wholesale electricity prices. 
Other submissions pointed to potential cost benefits from reducing peak demand and reliance on 
gas. For example, the REC Agents Association submitted:
6RODU39FRQWULEXWHG0:WRPHHWLQJWKHFRPELQHG6RXWK$XVWUDOLDDQG9LFWRULDQSHDN
GXULQJWKHKHDWZDYHLQ-DQXDU\7KLVDPRXQWHGWRSHUFHQWRIFRPELQHGSHDN
demand.  Both  South  Australia  and  Victoria  would  have  achieved  record  peak  demand  if  it  
KDGQRWEHHQIRUWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIVRODU395(&$JHQWV$VVRFLDWLRQS
6.4      Options for reforming the SRES
6.4.1      Abolishing the SRES
The Panel received numerous submissions suggesting the SRES should be abolished. Submissions 
in favour of abolition indicate that the generation supported by the SRES greatly exceeds the 
amount anticipated and system costs have fallen to the point where they are competitive without 
a subsidy, and are therefore unnecessarily increasing electricity bills. For example, the Energy 
Networks Association stated:
[The]  65(6KDGDOUHDG\H[FHHGHGLWVDVSLUDWLRQDOWDUJHWRI*:KE\LQ,WLV
WKHUHIRUHKDUGWRDUJXHWKDWVRODUZDWHUKHDWHUV3KRWRYROWDLF39V\VWHPVDQGKHDWSXPS
technologies  should  continue  to  require  further  subsidies  at  the  expense  of  other  electricity  
FRQVXPHUV:LWKRYHUPLOOLRQLQVWDOODWLRQVLQDKRXVLQJVWRFNRIDURXQGPLOOLRQSULYDWH
UHVLGHQFHVLQ$XVWUDOLD(1$FRQVLGHUVWKDWWKHPDUNHWIRUWKHVHV\VWHPVLVPDWXUHDQG
WKHVHWHFKQRORJLHVGRQRWUHTXLUHDQ\IXUWKHUVXSSRUW(QHUJ\1HWZRUNV$VVRFLDWLRQS
Similarly, the Business Council of Australia argued that: 
,WSURYLGHVDQXQQHFHVVDU\VXEVLG\WRURRIWRSVRODUZKLFKLVQRZDWJULGSDULW\PHDQLQJ
electricity  produced  by  rooftop  solar  is  commercially  competitive  with  retail  electricity  prices  
in  its  own  right.  The  RET…  is  no  longer  required  to  incentivise  the  uptake  of  rooftop  solar.  
%XVLQHVV&RXQFLORI$XVWUDOLDS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Immediate abolition would increase the costs faced by consumers to install solar PV and solar 
water heaters, subsequently lowering demand for these products and leading to a reduction in 
income and employment for the small-scale solar industry. If the SRES was removed, the typical 
payback period for rooftop PV systems would increase by nearly three years to around 10 years 
for residential systems and around nine years for commercial systems, although this would vary 
between jurisdictions
Modelling by ACIL Allen indicates that abolishing the SRES would have a short-term impact on 
the rate of small-scale installations of about 30 per cent compared to continuing with the current 
scheme. However, the impact falls from 2017 as support under the SRES would have started to 
decline through reductions in the deeming rate. Installation rates are estimated to recover by the 
early 2020s as illustrated in Figure 39. ACIL Allen estimates that the total avoided certificate costs 
from abolishing the SRES would represent $3 billion over 2015 to 2030 (in NPV terms).
Figure 39 Annual additions to small-scale solar PV capacity: ‘Repeal’ and Reference case, 2015 - 2030
Source: ACIL Allen 
Figure 40 shows the difference in total small-scale solar PV system capacity over time between 
repealing the SRES and maintaining the current settings.
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Figure 40 Cumulative capacity of small-scale solar PV: ‘Repeal’ and Reference case, 2015 - 2030
Source: ACIL Allen 
ACIL Allen also conducted a sensitivity analysis of the effect of high capital costs for solar PV. 
In this sensitivity it was assumed that the cost reductions projected in the central scenario are 
achieved up to 10 years later. The results indicate that higher capital costs lead to a lower uptake 
of small-scale PV, but growth is still robust even under repeal of the SRES. Compared with 4.1 GW 
of capacity in 2014, capacity in 2020 with higher capital costs is projected to be 7.4 GW under 
the reference case and 6.6 GW under repeal (compared with 7.8 GW and 6.9 GW under core 
assumptions).
Modelling by ROAM Consulting (submitted by the Clean Energy Council) includes an estimate 
from SunWiz that removing the SRES would cause a reduction in annual rooftop PV installations 
of 40 to 45 per cent by 2017-18, and by 2030 solar PV installations would be 30 per cent 
lower than under the current scheme.52 The Clean Energy Council’s submission also stated that 
abolishing the SRES would lead to 3,800 fewer jobs by 2020 in small-scale renewables, compared 
to continuing with current policy settings.53
Modelling of the RET by Bloomberg New Energy Finance suggested that the impact of abolishing 
the SRES would be less severe, resulting in a reduction in installation rates of 26 per cent over 
2015 - 20 for residential systems and 10 per cent for commercial-scale systems.
Tindo Solar’s submission highlighted the effects of abolition on its own operations.
Tindo  Solar  as  a  manufacturer  and  installer  of  solar  systems  nationally  would  be  impacted  
VLJQL¿FDQWO\ZKLFKZRXOGFHUWDLQO\OHDGWRMREORVVHV7KLVZRXOGKDSSHQULJKWDWDWLPH
when  the  future  looks  bright  for  Tindo  with  imminent  expansion  of  our  work  force  as  we  
FRQWLQXHWRZLQDQGFUHDWHQHZEXVLQHVV7LQGR6RODUS
A number of submissions pointed out that SRES subsidies are paid upfront through conversion of 
the expected certificates into a capital subsidy. Abolishing the scheme would not have an impact 
on existing systems. For example, the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network submitted:
52 ROAM Consulting report to Clean Energy Council, 5(73ROLF\$QDO\VLV, April 2014, p.23.
53 Clean Energy Council, 6XEPLVVLRQWRWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHW5HYLHZ,VVXHV3DSHU, 2014, p.4.
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Small-­scale  investments  under  the  SRES  are  typically  provided  with  full  credit  in  advance;;  this  
LVVXEVWDQWLDOO\GLIIHUHQWWRFRPPHUFLDOLQYHVWPHQWVWKDWUHFHLYHFHUWL¿FDWHVWKURXJKWKH/5(7
DVHQHUJ\LVSURGXFHG7KHUHIRUHWKH65(6FDQEHDEROLVKHGDWVKRUWQRWLFHZLWKRXWVWUDQGLQJ
LQYHVWPHQWVRUFDXVLQJVRYHUHLJQULVN$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*UHHQKRXVH1HWZRUNS
Although households that have installed systems have received certificates upfront, businesses 
operating in the small-scale supply chain may face losses associated with stock-on-order or 
stranded investments if the SRES was abolished, for example in manufacturing or distribution 
facilities. As an example, Tindo Solar submitted:
«RXUDXWRPDWHGSURGXFWLRQOLQHLQ0DZVRQ/DNHV6RXWK$XVWUDOLD«ZRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQ
possible  without  the  RET  and  any  change  to  the  RET  will  put  the  viability  of  manufacturing  
SDQHOVLQ$XVWUDOLDDWVHULRXVULVN7LQGR6RODUS
The impact of abolishing the SRES may be greater for the solar water heater industry. The 
Australian Solar Council’s submission stated:
6RODUKRWZDWHUVDOHVKDYHVKUXQNE\VRPHSHUFHQWVLQFHIROORZLQJWKHUHPRYDORI
D)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQWUHEDWH7KHORVVRIWKH5(7ZLOOFRPSOHWHO\GHVWUR\WKHPDUNHWDQG
HQG$XVWUDOLDQPDQXIDFWXULQJRIVRODUKRWZDWHUV\VWHPV$XVWUDOLDQ6RODU&RXQFLOS
Rheem Australia’s submission discussed expansion activities undertaken by the company in both 
the solar hot water and PV business in support of their manufacturing operations and dealer 
network, and expressed concern over potential changes to the SRES:
5KHHPLVFRQFHUQHGWKDWDQ\FKDQJHWRWKH65(6FRPSRQHQWRIWKH5(7WKDWUHVXOWVLQ
DVHULRXVUHGXFWLRQLQGHPDQGIRUWKHWHFKQRORJLHVFRYHUHGE\WKH65(6ZLOOUHVXOWLQ
factory  closures  and  job  losses  amongst  both  larger  manufacturers  and  the  small  business  
FRPPXQLW\5KHHP$XVWUDOLDS
Alternatively, some submissions argued that solar water heaters should not receive assistance 
on the basis that they displace rather than generate electricity. For example, the Energy Supply 
Association of Australia submitted:
There  is  also  a  strong  case  to  reconsider  arrangements  for  “displacement  technologies”  
such  as  air-­sourced  heat  pumps  and  solar  water  heaters.  These  technologies  do  not  result  
in  any  renewable  generation  but  rather  reduce  conventional  generation.  They  have  more  in  
FRPPRQZLWKHQHUJ\HI¿FLHQF\PHDVXUHVWKDQUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\JHQHUDWLRQ  
(QHUJ\6XSSO\$VVRFLDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDS
Similarly, the Energy Networks Association argued that solar water heaters and heat pumps do 
not meet the objectives of the Act, stating:
Solar  water  heaters  and  electrically  boosted  heat  pump  water  heaters  do  not  generate  
UHQHZDEOHHOHFWULFDOHQHUJ\5DWKHUWKH\LQFUHDVHWKHHI¿FLHQF\ZLWKZKLFKIRVVLOIXHOVDUH
consumed  by  using  solar  inputs  or  ambient  air  temperature  to  contribute  to  water  heating.  
(QHUJ\1HWZRUNV$VVRFLDWLRQS
A study by Energy Analysis Engineering, provided to the review by Apricus Australia, indicates 
that removing the SRES would increase the cost of a residential solar water heater system by 
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$500 to $1,500 (or 10 to 30 per cent) and the expected payback would increase from around 
seven years to nearly nine years.54 Although this is similar to the impact on the cost and payback 
period for solar PV systems, the industry argues that it will result in a greater reduction in 
installations, as hot water systems are replaced at short notice and consumers tend to replace ‘like 
with like’, particularly if the cost of an alternative is significantly higher or involves a delay in 
re-establishing access to hot water. 
ACIL Allen’s modelling suggests that abolition of the SRES could result in around 36,000 fewer 
solar water heaters being installed between 2015 and 2020 (around 16 per cent less than the 
number of systems forecast to be installed if the current SRES were to continue), which would 
have been expected to have displaced around 110 GWh of electricity. It would save energy users 
approximately $390 million in SRES subsidies.
6.4.2      Accelerating the phase-out of the SRES
As an alternative to immediately abolishing the SRES, the costs of the scheme could be reduced 
by shortening the duration of the scheme and reducing the level of the cross-subsidy, therefore 
providing a period of transition for the small-scale renewable energy industry.
There are various ways to reduce the level of the subsidy. Under current settings, installers of 
small-scale solar PV systems are entitled to receive (‘deem’) 15 years worth of certificates at the 
time of installation, while installers of solar water heaters are entitled to receive 10 years worth of 
certificates. Under current arrangements, the period for which certificates may be created for solar 
PV systems (the deeming rate) will fall by one year each year from 2017 until the scheme ends on 
31 December 2030, when the deeming rate would be one. Similarly, the deeming rate for solar 
water heaters (which is currently 10 years) falls by one year each year from 2022 to 2030.
The phase-out of the SRES could be accelerated through a faster decline in the deeming rates in 
combination with bringing forward the end-date of the SRES from 2030 to 2020. 
A number of submissions considered that there was a case for winding back support under the 
SRES. For example, the National Generators Forum submitted:
7KHFXUUHQWGHHPLQJSURYLVLRQVSURYLGHD\HDUVXEVLG\LQDQXSIURQWSD\PHQWWRSURMHFWV
installed  under  the  SRES  provisions.  Changing  this  provision  would  not  impact  on  existing  
SURMHFWVDQGZRXOGHQVXUHFRQVLVWHQWWUHDWPHQWRIUHQHZDEOHSURMHFWVUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHVL]H
of  the  facility.  
:LWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHREMHFWLYHRIWKH5(7DVDQµLQIDQWLQGXVWU\¶VXEVLG\LWPD\EH
prudent  to  wind  back  some  of  the  arrangements  for  SRES  noting  that  PV  units  are  
FRQWLQXLQJWRIDOOLQSULFHWKH39LQGXVWU\LVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGDQGLQVWDOODWLRQVDUHQRZSULFH
FRPSHWLWLYHZLWKRXWVXEVLGLHV1DWLRQDO*HQHUDWRUV)RUXPS
The Australian Industry Group submission suggested implementing a formula, as opposed to a 
fixed timetable, to reflect the increasing competitiveness of solar PV technology that would take 
account of changes in the consumer cost of small-scale technologies and in retail electricity prices:
54 Energy Analysis and Engineering, 3ROLF\,PSDFW$QDO\VLV5HPRYDORIWKH5(7RQWKH:DWHU+HDWHU,QGXVWU\, For: Apricus Australia, May 2014. 
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This…  would  also  be  more  likely  to  produce  well-­calibrated  levels  of  support.  This  could  be  
GRQHWKURXJKFKDQJHVWRWKHGHHPLQJSHULRGRUFHUWL¿FDWHSULFHRUE\DSSO\LQJDGLVFRXQW
IDFWRUWRWKHQXPEHURIFHUWL¿FDWHVLVVXHG$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*URXSS
A number of submissions suggested that ensuring distributed solar PV received a fair price and 
connection conditions could obviate the need for the SRES. For example, WestWind submitted:
In  our  view  though  it  would  be  far  preferable  to  wean  off  small  scale  renewable  energy  
systems  of  any  upfront  payment  support  systems  and  ensure  a  fair  treatment  and  valuation  
RIWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHRYHUDOOHQHUJ\VXSSO\LQVWHDG:HVW:LQG(QHUJ\S
Modelling from ACIL Allen suggests that phasing out the SRES by 2020 may provide savings while 
avoiding some of the adverse impacts that could result from abolition of the SRES. Reducing the 
deeming rate to 10 years in 2015, followed by further reductions from 2015 to 2020 would save 
approximately $2 billion (in NPV terms) in cross-subsidies which would have flowed to the sector 
from 2015 to 2030 under current settings. 
Where the reduction in deeming rate is publically foreshadowed, it is likely to cause a surge in 
system installations followed by a rapid decline. This could be averted through small reductions in 
the deeming rate of one year at a time. 
Similar to abolishing the SRES, the impact of bringing forward the phase-out of the SRES is likely 
to be greater for the solar water heater industry than the solar PV industry. However, considering 
solar water heaters represent high cost abatement and displace rather than generate electricity 
(and therefore are included in some energy efficiency measures), it is questionable whether 
providing greater assistance to solar water heaters under the SRES could be justified. 
Additionally, the submission from Mr Alan Pears from RMIT University and Sustainable Solutions 
indicated that there may be a case to review the number of STCs allocated to solar hot water 
systems based on the scale of energy savings they achieve: 
There  is  some  evidence  that  average  electricity  savings  for  those  who  install  solar  hot  water  
DUHVPDOOHUWKDQLVHVWLPDWHGE\WKHUHJXODWRU)RUH[DPSOHD,3$57VWXG\VXJJHVWHG
DW\SLFDOVRODU+:6LQ16:UHGXFHGHOHFWULFLW\FRQVXPSWLRQE\N:K\HDUZKLFK
LVDURXQGKDOIRIWKHQXPEHURI67&VWKH\QRZFUHDWH$ODQ3HDUVS
The solar PV industry is starting to develop new products such as solar leasing and battery 
storage with battery costs declining in recent years. An accelerated phase-out with a period 
of transition may provide sufficient time for the industry to innovate and develop alternative 
business models to engage new customers before SRES support is completely removed. It 
would also provide for a smoother transition to a size that is sustainable in the long term for the 
industry. 
6.4.3      Recombine the SRES and LRET schemes
The RET was separated into the LRET and SRES in January 2011 in response to a large increase 
in the uptake of small-scale systems. This resulted in an oversupply of certificates which caused 
the price to fall dramatically to a level that was not sufficient to support large-scale projects, and 
investment stalled. 
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As many of these factors are no longer at play, some stakeholders suggest that the schemes 
should be re-combined. This would cap the total renewable generation supported through 
the RET, providing certainty to liable entities on the number of certificates required to meet 
obligations each year. It is also suggested that the cost of the RET would be lower as large-scale 
projects would be in direct competition with small-scale installations, which require a lower 
certificate price. The two schemes could be recombined with or without deeming. 
Recombining the scheme was not an option supported by many stakeholders, although Origin 
Energy’s submission suggests that recombining schemes without deeming could be considered:
:HVXJJHVWWKDWUHWXUQLQJWRRQHVLPSOHVFKHPHZLWKQRXSIURQWGHHPLQJIRUDQ\
WHFKQRORJLHVLVWKHVLPSOHVWDQGPRVWHTXLWDEOHVROXWLRQWRUHWDLQLQJWKH5(7,WDYRLGV
further  messy  policy  interventions  in  the  SRES  and  it  also  avoids  the  need  to  predict  how  
PXFKJHQHUDWLRQPD\FRPHIURPVPDOOVFDOHWHFKQRORJLHVE\ZKLFKLVDGLI¿FXOWWDVN
2ULJLQ(QHUJ\S
In contrast, a large number of submissions recommended against recombining the schemes, 
arguing they serve two different markets. For example, the Australian Photovoltaic Institute 
submitted:
…the  SRES  and  LRET  schemes  target  very  different  types  of  investment  and  were  
VHSDUDWHGDIWHUDIHZ\HDUVRIWKHPDUNHWRSHUDWLQJGXHWRWKLVIDFW&RPELQLQJWKHWZR
VFKHPHVULVNVRQHGRPLQDWLQJWKHRWKHUZKLFKUHJDUGOHVVRIWKH³ZLQQHU´ZRXOGKDYHDQ
RYHUDOOQHJDWLYHHIIHFWLQKLELWLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIRSWLPXPVROXWLRQV0DLQWDLQLQJERWK
VFKHPHVSURYLGHVWKHRSWLPXPPL[RIVXSSO\DQGGHPDQGZLWKERWKODUJHVFDOHDQG  
VPDOOVFDOHVROXWLRQV$XVWUDOLDQ3KRWRYROWDLF,QVWLWXWHS
The Energy Supply Association of Australia made a similar point and cautioned against 
recombining the schemes without considering the potential for up-front deeming to distort the 
market:
The  concept  of  deeming  itself  is  less  of  a  problem;;  it  is  that  it  leads  to  the  up-­front  provision  
RI67&VHTXLYDOHQWWR\HDUVRIHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQIRUDOOV\VWHPVXSWRN:WKDW
LVSUREOHPDWLF«,QFRQWUDVW/*&VDUHDOORFDWHGWRUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\JHQHUDWRUVRQD
PRQWKO\TXDUWHUO\RUDQQXDOEDVLVE\WKH&OHDQ(QHUJ\5HJXODWRU,IVPDOODQGODUJHV\VWHPV
IHOOXQGHUWKHRQHVFKHPHZLWKXSIURQWGHHPLQJSURYLGHGWRVPDOOV\VWHPVWKHUHLVDKLJK
risk  of  distorting  the  market.  This  is  what  occurred  prior  to  the  split  of  the  RET  into  the  LRET  
DQG65(6(QHUJ\6XSSO\$VVRFLDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDS
The Panel considers that there are risks with this approach. Recombining the schemes with 
deeming for small-scale installations would require adding an estimate of certificates expected 
to be created by small-scale installations to the annual LRET targets. If the level of installations 
were higher than predicted, it could oversupply the market and lead to a repeat of the conditions 
that led to the schemes being separated in the first place. If installations are lower than predicted, 
more large-scale generation would be required to meet the target, potentially at a higher cost. 
The uncertainty over the amount of large-scale generation required in a combined scheme could 
mean that liable entities are reluctant to enter into PPAs and would meet their obligations by 
purchasing certificates on the spot market. This could add to the cost of financing projects and 
subsequently increase the price of certificates. A capped scheme may also create uncertainty for 
those wanting to install small-scale systems as to whether the cap will be reached early in the 
period, meaning that certificates would be unavailable. 
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Alternatively, the deeming arrangements could be ended so that small-scale systems would 
create certificates annually based on the amount of electricity generated. While this lessens the 
potential for recombined schemes to distort either the large or small-scale market, it would be 
less attractive to households, who require the RET to assist with the upfront cost of purchasing a 
system and the effect may be similar to terminating the scheme all together. 
In addition, many residential electricity meters lack the functionality to accurately record total 
generation from a rooftop solar PV system. The rules governing the relationship between 
distribution businesses, the metering provider (which may be the same party) and the individual 
resident vary greatly, making a uniform approach to metering and LGC creation and/or data 
aggregation extremely difficult. The administrative burden associated with recombining the 
scheme may be extremely high for both the CER and householders. 
6.4.4      Reduce the 100 kW threshold
Under the current arrangements, solar PV systems that have a capacity of up to 100 kW are 
eligible for the SRES. This compares with 10 kW for small-scale wind and 6.4 kW for small-scale 
hydro systems. Although average system sizes in Australia have increased, the vast majority of 
solar PV installations (which are for households) are no more than 10 kW. 
According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the average system size of commercial installations 
in Australia in 2013 was 18.1 kW.55 These larger solar PV units can be deployed on shopping 
centres, storage facilities, office blocks or farms. The cost and payback period for commercial PV 
systems has decreased over recent years. 
The commercial market is growing in every state in Australia, though it is yet to take off to the 
extent of the residential sector. With commercial systems eligible under the SRES able to access 
a 15 year deeming period for STCs, there is a risk that strong growth in the deployment of larger 
installations on commercial buildings could add substantially to the costs of the scheme. If the 
threshold were lowered, say to 10 kW, system sizes above this would be included in the LRET 
without deeming (if the LRET is open to new entrants), reducing the impact on the cost of the 
SRES. 
Commercial-scale systems (between 10-100 kW) made up 14 per cent of the solar PV capacity 
installed in 2013. The number of installations increased by 123 per cent between 2012 and 2013, 
representing an increase in installed capacity of 150 per cent. Most of this growth occurred in the 
10-30 kW range. This rapid increase in installations was incentivised, in large part, by a number of 
government grants programs which have since closed. Although the commercial scale sector has 
experienced steady growth, overall, the uptake of commercial solar PV remains very low.56 
There are still barriers to uptake which reduce the probability of a significant boom in 
commercial-scale installations. Generally, commercial and industrial businesses access lower 
electricity tariffs and frequently lease premises, reducing the incentive to install solar systems. 
Additionally, it can be difficult for commercial businesses to secure finance, and costs may be 
incurred to cover network improvements to ensure the new generation does not disrupt local grid 
voltage and frequency parameters. On the other hand, solar retailers are increasingly targeting 
this sector as a potential growth market with leasing arrangements likely to assist take-up in this 
sector. 
55 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Australia Client Roundtable – RET Review and 20 GW solar future, 6 and 8 May 2014.
56 Green Energy Markets, 6PDOOVFDOH7HFKQRORJ\&HUWLÀFDWHVGDWDPRGHOOLQJIRUWR5HSRUWWRWKH&OHDQ(QHUJ\5HJXODWRU, January 2014, p.32-‐35.
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Most market analysis predicts the sector to grow steadily. Green Energy Markets have forecast the 
installation of commercial-scale solar PV systems to grow by 20 per cent from 2014 to 2015, and 
by 25 per cent in 2016.57 Bloomberg New Energy Finance projects that 19 per cent of commercial 
and industrial premises will have installed rooftop solar PV by 2020, rising to 33 per cent by 2030. 
This is lower than the penetration rate forecast for residential buildings (53 per cent by 2020), 
however it still represents a significant increase in capacity.58
The Energy Supply Association of Australia supports lowering the threshold, arguing deeming 
arrangements provide an advantage for larger solar PV systems not available to LRET projects: 
$QRWKHURSWLRQFRXOGEHWRUHGXFHWKHN:WKUHVKROGIRUHOLJLELOLW\IRUWKH65(6WRDORZHU
OHYHOSURYLGLQJWKDWWKHWKUHVKROGIRUXSIURQWGHHPLQJZDVPRYHGWRWKHVDPHOHYHO7KH
ESAA  considers  that  this  would  provide  better  incentives.  It  would  allow  households  and  
EXVLQHVVHVLQVWDOOLQJVPDOOV\VWHPVWRFRQWLQXHWRUHFHLYHWKHEHQH¿WVRIGHHPLQJZKLOH
HQVXULQJFHUWL¿FDWHVIRUODUJHUV\VWHPVZHUHDOORFDWHGPRUHDFFXUDWHO\RQDFWXDOJHQHUDWLRQ
0RYLQJPHGLXPVL]HVRODU39RURWKHUV\VWHPVLQWRWKH/5(7ZRXOGDOVRFUHDWHDPRUH
OHYHOSOD\LQJ¿HOGDFURVVWKHUDQJHRIUHQHZDEOHWHFKQRORJLHVDVWKH\GHYHORSIXUWKHU
(QHUJ\6XSSO\$VVRFLDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDS
Origin Energy submitted:
:HVXJJHVWWKHEHVWVROXWLRQLVWRUROOWKHVFKHPHVEDFNWRJHWKHULQWRRQH+RZHYHUDQRWKHU
SODXVLEOHRSWLRQLVWRUHGXFHWKHWKUHVKROGRIWKHV\VWHPVL]HHOLJLEOHXQGHUWKH65(6IURP
WKHFXUUHQWOHYHORIN:WRDERXWN:7KLVZRXOGPHDQWKDWODUJHUV\VWHPVZRXOGEH
SDUWRIWKH/5(7ZLWKQRGHHPLQJ7KH65(6FRXOGWKHQEHSKDVHGRXWDVSDQHOFRVWVIRU
VPDOOVFDOHV\VWHPVGHFUHDVHRYHUWLPH2ULJLQ(QHUJ\S
In contrast, the Property Council and Tindo Solar argued for increasing the SRES threshold to 
250 kW and 500 kW respectively, to encourage commercial installations. Other businesses with 
interests in commercial-scale solar systems suggested that lower uptake in the commercial sector 
could stifle an emerging market that the industry is hoping will help to fill the gap created by 
lower demand for residential systems. For example, power and automation technology company 
ABB Australia, argued against reducing the threshold, submitting:
$%%¶VYLHZLVWKDWWKHUHLVQRVWURQJHFRQRPLFMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUDUHGXFWLRQLQWKH65(6XSSHU
WKUHVKROGRIN:RUGHHPLQJDUUDQJHPHQWVZKLFKFRXOGQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWWKHDGRSWLRQRI
VRODU39VROXWLRQVZLWKLQWKHFRPPHUFLDOVHFWRU$%%$XVWUDOLDS
Similarly Yingli Solar argued:
/RZHULQJWKHN:WKUHVKROGIRUDFFHVV>WR@65(6VXSSRUWZRXOGUHGXFHWKHDELOLW\RI
small  and  medium  businesses  to  invest  in  solar  –  and  their  ability  to  take  control  of  their  own  
SRZHUELOOVLQWKHIXWXUH<LQJOL6RODUS
Lowering the threshold introduces the compliance costs of the LRET to medium-scale solar PV 
systems, where generation must be metered and certificates claimed annually rather than upfront. 
57 Green Energy Markets, 6PDOOVFDOH7HFKQRORJ\&HUWLÀFDWHVGDWDPRGHOOLQJIRUWR5HSRUWWRWKH&OHDQ(QHUJ\5HJXODWRU, January 2014, p.35. 
58 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, $XVWUDOLD,QVLJKW²6RODU²5HVHDUFKQRWH$XVWUDOLD·V*:VPDOOVFDOHVRODUIXWXUH, June 2014, p.7.
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The Panel considers that a suitable threshold would be around 10 kW, consistent with the 
threshold for small-scale wind systems. This would mitigate the risk that a potential boom 
in commercial-scale installations could add substantial costs to the SRES, while enabling 
households to access deeming arrangements that reduce the upfront cost of a system and avoid 
administrative costs associated with claiming certificates annually. 
6.5      Reforming the SRES: Conclusions
The SRES has already exceeded the original expectation of achieving a minimum of 4,000 GWh of 
annual generation.59 System costs for rooftop solar PV installations and out-of-pocket costs for 
consumers have declined rapidly since 2009 and although the number of new installations has 
fallen from its peak, installations have continued at high levels despite significant reductions in 
support. 
The cost of reductions in CO2-e emissions achieved by the SRES is very high, in the order of 
$100 - $200 per tonne. On this basis its role as an emission reduction tool cannot be justified 
when other CO2-e emissions reduction policies are available at much lower cost. 
The combination of significant cost reductions and the increase in retail electricity prices means 
that the industry is becoming commercially viable. Even in the situation where capital costs 
do not decline as quickly as expected, the modelling suggests that the uptake of small-scale 
solar PV remains reasonably strong. Given its high abatement costs, and the fact that it adds 
proportionally higher costs to households and businesses than the LRET, the Panel considers that 
the SRES should be wound back. 
Under the SRES subsidies are provided at the time a unit is installed, unlike under the LRET where 
the cross-subsidy continues to be paid until 2030. As a consequence repealing the SRES gives rise 
to no adverse effect on existing owners of small-scale systems.
The ACIL Allen modelling indicates that while repealing the SRES would have an immediate effect 
on the sector by reducing the annual amount of PV generation capacity being installed by around 
a third, and the number of solar hot water systems by around 16 per cent, these reductions 
would be only short-lived. The amount of generation capacity and solar hot water systems being 
installed each year would recover by the early 2020s. The modelling found that growth in 
small-scale systems would continue under all scenarios modelled and total investment in small-scale 
systems over the period to 2040 would not vary by more than 16 per cent under any scenario.
However, the immediate effects of repeal of the SRES on the industry could be significant, 
including job losses and the possible stranding of investments made by the small-scale industry in 
manufacturing facilities.
An alternative to immediately ending the SRES would be to adopt an earlier phase-out. This could 
soften the impact on the industry, allowing it to transition to its long-term sustainable level. While 
this would delay some of the benefits to the broader community of removing the full cost of the 
cross-subsidy, it would mitigate the impact of a severe contraction on the interests of those who 
have invested in parts of the small-scale supply chain (as distinct from those who have invested 
in the systems themselves). An appropriate transitional approach would be to accelerate the 
59 The Clean Energy Regulator estimates that small-‐scale generation units supported by the RET generated or displaced the equivalent of 6,400 GWh of electricity in 2013. 
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currently legislated phase-out of the SRES by bringing forward the end date of the SRES from 
2030 to 2020, and reducing the deeming period.  
This provides the industry with time to adapt and innovate, developing products to target new 
customers. It also provides a predictable, smoother transition, and may allow time for energy 
market reforms to deliver more efficient signals for investment in distributed generation. 
There is a risk that the uptake of solar PV in the commercial sector could increase rapidly 
before 2020. This would reduce the cost savings achieved from the accelerated phasing out of 
the scheme. To safeguard against this the Panel considers that, if the SRES is to continue, the 
threshold should be reduced from 100 kW to 10 kW.
Recommendation 3: The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) should be amended 
in one of the following two ways:
Option  1  –  Abolition
In order to address the cost of the SRES (and its effect on electricity markets), the Panel 
recommends that it be closed immediately in the following manner:
a. The SRES should terminate upon announcement.
b. Those who contracted before the announcement for the installation of a small-scale 
system should receive the certificates they would have done.
or
Option  2  –  Bring  forward  the  phase-­out  of  the  SRES
To reduce the cost of the SRES while providing some support for new small-scale renewable 
systems, the Panel recommends that the phase-out of the SRES be brought forward in the 
following manner, to take effect immediately:
a. Bring forward the last year of operation of the SRES from 2030 to 2020. 
b. Reduce the period for which certificates may be created for rooftop solar PV systems 
from 15 years to 10 years, and in each year from 2016 onwards further reduce the 
period for which certificates may be created, as set out below:
5RRIWRSVRODU39SHULRGFHUWL¿FDWHVPD\EHFUHDWHG
Year installed Period
Prior to announcement 15 years
From announcement 10 years
2016 9 years
2017 8 years
2018 7 years
2019 6 years
2020 5 years
2021 Scheme closed
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c. Reduce system size eligibility threshold for rooftop solar PV systems from no more than 
100 kilowatts to no more than 10 kilowatts.
d. Reduce the period for which certificates may be created for solar and heat pump water 
heaters by one year each year, commencing in 2016, as set out below:
5RRIWRSVRODU39SHULRGFHUWL¿FDWHVPD\EHFUHDWHG
Year installed Period
Prior to 2016 10 years
2016 9 years
2017 8 years
2018 7 years
2019 6 years
2020 5 years
2021 Scheme closed
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7 OTHER ISSUES FOR THE REVIEW
7.1      Exemptions
The RET scheme contains two types of exemptions. The first is a partial exemption for electricity 
used by businesses conducting EITE activities. The second is a full exemption from liability 
under the scheme for entities producing and consuming their own electricity, provided certain 
conditions are met. 
The number of certificates required to be surrendered under the LRET and SRES each year is not 
adjusted for the exemptions granted under the scheme. Consequently, the exemptions have no 
impact on the level of renewable energy generation supported by the RET. However, this means 
the exemptions have the effect of increasing the costs of the scheme for non-exempt electricity 
consumers as certificate costs are borne by a smaller number of electricity consumers than would 
be the case in the absence of the exemptions.
7.1.1      Emissions-intensive and trade-exposed activities
With the expansion of the RET in 2010, businesses conducting EITE activities were granted a 
partial exemption from liability on a similar basis to arrangements being developed under the 
proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). The Government considered that a partial 
exemption should be provided in recognition of the combined impact of the higher RET targets 
and the CPRS on emissions-intensive businesses that are price-takers in a global market.
The exemption is only applicable to the portion of RET liability above the original MRET liability, 
EITE businesses face the cost of the RET that relates to the original 9,500 GWh of liability under 
the MRET. At the time the RET was expanded, the Australian Government considered whether 
the partial exemption should be extended to the MRET component, ultimately deciding to 
retain the original approach on the grounds that businesses had incorporated MRET costs into 
their operations and had not faced carbon related costs to that point in time. The Government 
at the time considered it reasonable to require all businesses to contribute towards the cost of 
deploying renewable energy. 
The exemption is provided through a PEC issued by the CER to EITE businesses. Each PEC 
represents a volume of electricity, in MWh, to which RET costs will not apply for a given year. 
EITE businesses exchange the PECs with their electricity suppliers in return for lower electricity 
costs. The suppliers then surrender these PECs to the CER to reduce the total number of STCs and 
LGCs that they must surrender to meet their liabilities under the scheme. Where an EITE business 
is directly liable under the RET, the PEC is deducted from the amount of electricity that would 
otherwise attract a RET liability. 
Highly emissions-intensive businesses are eligible to receive a 90 per cent exemption of their RET 
liabilities above the MRET amount, while moderately emissions-intensive activities are eligible for 
a 60 per cent exemption above the MRET amount. Accounting for the MRET component, in 2013 
this translated to an exemption rate of around 75 per cent for highly emissions-intensive activities 
and around 50 per cent for moderately emissions-intensive activities.60
60 Information provided by the Clean Energy Regulator to the RET Review Secretariat.
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However, many large energy users argue that the cost of the RET remains significant, with 
some indicating they have not benefited from any reduction in wholesale prices which may be 
attributed to the RET due to the nature and duration of their electricity supply contracts. 
Stakeholders suggested a number of ways in which the EITE exemption may be increased to 
reduce or remove the cost of the RET for EITE businesses. A number of stakeholders including 
Rio Tinto, Alcoa and the Australian Aluminium Council, Australia Pacific LNG, the Cement Industry 
Federation, the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, the Business Council of Australia, the 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, the Chamber of Minerals and 
Energy of Western Australia and the Tasmanian and Queensland State Governments support 
increasing the exemption for EITE businesses, with some suggesting a 100 per cent exemption. 
For example the Queensland Government stated:
The  Queensland  Government  supports  amendment  of  the  application  of  the  RET  to  assist  in  
alleviating  some  of  the  cost  burdens  being  experienced  by  emissions  intensive  businesses  
DFURVV$XVWUDOLD,IWKH&RPPRQZHDOWKGHFLGHVWRUHWDLQWKH5(74XHHQVODQGUHFRPPHQGV
WKDWKLJKO\(PLVVLRQV,QWHQVLYH7UDGH([SRVHGEXVLQHVVHVEHJLYHQDH[HPSWLRQIURP
OLDELOLW\4XHHQVODQG*RYHUQPHQWS
As an alternative, some stakeholders suggested that the exemption could be extended to cover 
the MRET component. This would result in an exemption of 90 per cent for highly 
emissions-intensive businesses and 60 per cent for moderately emissions-intensive businesses 
from the full RET liability. 
Nyrstar commented that: 
Nyrstar  would  also  encourage  the  Expert  Panel  and  the  Government  to  consider  
H[WHQGLQJWKH3(&VWRFRYHUWKHLQLWLDO*:KWDUJHWRQWKHEDVLVWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDO
FRPSHWLWLYHQHVVKDVVLJQL¿FDQWO\HURGHGWKURXJKWKHDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKH$XVWUDOLDQGROODU
VLQFHWKHLQFHSWLRQRIWKH5(7LQ1\UVWDUS
Additionally, specific industries raised issues relating to the definition of their activities under the 
regulations. The LNG and cement industries requested the respective definitions be expanded 
to cover additional aspects of their operations (in addition to increasing the level of partial 
exemption from 60 to 100 per cent). For example, Australia Pacific LNG submitted:
APLNG  supports  the  APPEA  submission  which  recommends  that  effective  assistance  be  
provided  for  the  LNG  industry  by:
  -­ 3URYLGLQJDKHDGOLQHDVVLVWDQFHUDWHRI
  -­ 5H¿QLQJWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIWKH/1*LQGXVWU\VRWKDWLWLQFRUSRUDWHVWKHIXOO/1*SURFHVV
(both  upstream  and  downstream)  and  applying  it  so  that  it  takes  into  account  new  projects.  
$XVWUDOLD3DFL¿F/1*S
Extending the assistance provided to EITE businesses increases the volume of liable electricity 
covered by the exemption. In turn, this transfers a greater share of the cost of the RET to all other 
electricity consumers. For example, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal noted:
$VWKHRYHUDOO5(7WDUJHWLVNHSWFRQVWDQWWKHVHH[HPSWLRQVUDLVHWKHFRVWVRIFRPSO\LQJ
ZLWKWKHVFKHPHIRUDOORWKHUHOHFWULFLW\FXVWRPHUVSDUWLFXODUO\DVWKHH[HPSWHGLQGXVWULHV
FDQEHODUJHXVHUVRIHOHFWULFLW\DQGDFFRXQWIRUDVLJQL¿FDQWSURSRUWLRQRIHOHFWULFLW\XVHLQ
$XVWUDOLD,QGHSHQGHQW3ULFLQJDQG5HJXODWRU\7ULEXQDOS
81
These views were supported by the renewable energy industry and consumers groups. 
For example, Acciona submitted:
Any  exemption  arrangement  spreads  the  cost  of  compliance  over  a  smaller  pool  of  liable  
HQWLWLHV%DVHGRQWKH5HYLHZ¶VLQWHUHVWLQHQVXULQJWKHORZHVWFRVWRXWFRPHIRUFRQVXPHUV
it  seems  counterproductive  that  the  Review  would  consider  further  increasing  the  
H[HPSWLRQVIURPWKH5(7$FFLRQDS
The Australian Aluminium Council noted that recalibrating the LRET to a ‘real 20 per cent’ with 
a 100 per cent exemption for EITE businesses could result in reduced costs to both industry and 
households:
7KLVSURYLGHVWKHÀH[LELOLW\WRUHGXFH5(7FRVWVIRUWKHDOXPLQLXPLQGXVWU\DQGIRUDOO
RWKHUHOHFWULFLW\XVHUV±RWKHU(,7(LQGXVWULHVQRQ(,7(LQGXVWU\FRPPHUFLDOXVHUVDQG
KRXVHKROGV)XUWKHUPRUHLWZRXOGQRWOHDYHH[LVWLQJUHQHZDEOHVLQYHVWPHQWVVWUDQGHGDQG
HYHQDFKLHYHUHQHZDEOHHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQLIWKDWLVGHVLUHG$XVWUDOLDQ$OXPLQLXP
&RXQFLOS
Alternatively, some submitters suggested that the portion of electricity covered by the EITE 
exemption could be removed from the calculation of electricity demand used to establish the 
targets in order to avoid increasing costs to other electricity users. For example, the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated:
2QEDODQFHZHZRXOGVXSSRUWDFRQWLQXDWLRQRI(,7(DVVLVWDQFHXQGHUWKH5(7EXW
recommend  that  the  target  be  adjusted  downwards  to  exclude  the  EITE  component  so  that  
costs  to  non-­EITE  consumers  are  at  least  contained  to  a  target  that  matches  their  electricity  
FRQVXPSWLRQ:HQRWHWKDWLIWKH5(7ZHUHWREHDEROLVKHGQR(,7(DUUDQJHPHQWVZRXOGEH
QHHGHG$XVWUDOLDQ&KDPEHURI&RPPHUFHDQG,QGXVWU\S
Currently, the portion of electricity that falls under the EITE exemption accounts for around 
13 per cent of liable electricity. Extending the exemption to cover the MRET component would 
increase the portion of electricity covered by the exemption to an estimated 18 per cent and to an 
estimated 20 per cent if a 100 per cent exemption was provided to all EITE businesses.61
It is further estimated that extending the exemption to cover the MRET component would add 
a further $2 per year and $13 cumulative to 2020 to household bills. Providing a 100 per cent 
exemption would add $4 in 2015 and $26 cumulative to 2020.62
If the LRET was closed to new entrants from 2015, extending the EITE exemption to cover the 
MRET component is estimated to increase household bills by an extra $2 in 2015 and by around 
$11 cumulative to 2020. Providing a 100 per cent exemption is estimated to add an extra $2.50 in 
2015 and around $15 cumulative to 2020.63
61 Calculations based on ACIL Allen forecast EITE electricity prices, assuming 90 per cent of EITEs are eligible for a 90 per cent assistance rate with average residential 
consumers using 6,800 kWh per annum.
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid.
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Other businesses, ranging from small and medium enterprises to large manufacturers, not 
conducting EITE activities would also face higher electricity costs. These higher costs would vary 
greatly according to electricity use, but for many the increase in costs would be larger than for 
households both in dollar and percentage terms. Some of these businesses, in particular in the 
manufacturing sector, also face international competition even though they fall outside the 
definition of ‘emissions intensive’ and currently receive no relief from the RET costs.  
The Panel notes the concerns raised by EITE businesses about the cost of the RET. However the 
rationale for providing the exemption was to reduce the combined impact that a carbon tax and 
higher RET costs would have on EITE businesses. The repeal of the carbon tax will lower electricity 
prices for all consumers. If adopted, the Panel’s recommendations on both the LRET and the SRES 
would reduce the costs of the RET faced by EITE businesses in the future compared with current 
settings. The Panel also notes that changes to exemption arrangements for EITE businesses are 
likely to have a much smaller impact than factors such as exchange rate movements and global 
supply and demand conditions for goods produced by EITE businesses, which are likely to be far 
more important determinants of profitability. Given these factors, it is difficult to justify extending 
the exemption arrangements for EITE businesses considering the additional cost this would 
impose on other electricity consumers.
Recommendation 4: The current partial exemption arrangements for emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed businesses should be maintained. 
7.1.2      Self-generation exemption 
Self-generators that consume the electricity they produce within one kilometre of the point of 
generation or via a dedicated line are exempt from liability under the RET. This exemption has 
been in place since the commencement of the scheme in 2001. 
The Panel heard from a number of stakeholders that the operation of the self-generation 
exemption is arbitrary and poorly aligned with the original intent. Broadly, these concerns fit into 
two categories: 
The ownership, distance and dedicated line requirements restrict resource projects from 
qualifying for the exemption. 
The REE Act creates unintended consequences for remote resource projects that provide small 
amounts of electricity from an otherwise dedicated line to remote communities and for the 
purpose of supporting public infrastructure such as mobile phone towers that are crucial in 
providing support to emergency services in remote areas.
A number of stakeholders including the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association, the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia, the Australian 
Industry Greenhouse Network and Rio Tinto requested substantial changes to the exemption 
arrangements on the basis that the current eligibility requirements unduly restrict self-generators 
from accessing the exemption. For example the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
submitted:
The  one  kilometre  radius  restriction  for  the  self-­generator  exemption  is  unnecessarily  
SUHVFULSWLYHDQGGRHVQRWWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHRSHUDWLRQRIODUJHLQGXVWULDOLQGXVWULHV
VXFKDVVWHHOPDQXIDFWXULQJ)RUH[DPSOHDVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWRI3RUW.HPEOD6WHHOZRUNV¶
manufacturing  activities  lie  outside  the  one  kilometre  radius  from  point  of  generation  used  in  
the  self-­generator  exemption.  It  is  also  not  always  possible  for  the  transmission  line  from  the  
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self-­generated  electricity  to  be  used  solely  for  transmission  between  the  point  of  generation  
and  point  of  use.  These  restrictions  are  unnecessarily  prohibitive  for  large  industries.  
$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*UHHQKRXVH1HWZRUNS
Rio Tinto suggests amending the self-generation exemption to enable resource projects to 
expand without penalty, by removing the requirement for a dedicated line and/or removing the 
one kilometre limit between generation and consumption. Rio Tinto also suggest increasing the 
100 MW grid capacity threshold for attracting liability under the RET. The Australian Petroleum 
Production and Exploration Association broadly supports this position and raised the possibility of 
resource projects combining to share generation and network infrastructure to avoid duplication 
if the criteria around the self-generation exemption was relaxed:
A  number  of  contemporary  or  planned  projects  may  not  meet  the  strict  eligibility  criteria  
outlined  above.  Project  proponents  may  then  be  forced  to  make  development  decisions  
WKDWDUHQRQHFRQRPLFSXUHO\WRPHHWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH$FW$XVWUDOLDQ3HWUROHXP
3URGXFWLRQDQG([SORUDWLRQ$VVRFLDWLRQS
However, not all submissions supported changes to the self-generation exemption. For example, 
West Wind Energy submitted:
:LWKWKHORZFRVWRIUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\RSWLRQVDYDLODEOHWRGD\IRUVHOIJHQHUDWRUVZHGR
QRWVHHWKHPHULWLQH[HPSWLQJVHOIJHQHUDWRUVIURPWKH5(7,QIDFWWKHVHJHQHUDWRUVDUH
PRVWOLNHO\WREHQH¿W¿QDQFLDOO\IURPLQFRUSRUDWLQJUHQHZDEOHHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQV\VWHPV
Taking  away  the  current  exemption  would  most  likely  further  encourage  them  to  review  
their  power  generation  options  and  help  reduce  emissions.  This  would  be  in  line  with  the  
REMHFWLYHVRIWKH5(7ZKHUHDVH[HPSWLQJWKHVHSDUWLHVLVQRW,QIDFWLWUDLVHVWKHTXHVWLRQ
whether  self  generators  using  renewable  energy  sources  could  on  one  hand  sell  LGCs  and  
EHQH¿WIURPWKH5(7ZKHUHDVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGWKH\DUHH[HPSWIURPWKHREOLJDWLRQVXQGHU
WKH5(7:HVW:LQG(QHUJ\S
The Panel heard from a number of stakeholders including Alcoa, Telstra and the Australian 
Industry Group that the dedicated line restriction has created unintended consequences by 
preventing the supply of small amounts of electricity to third parties who provide essential 
services. For example, Alcoa supplies self-generated electricity to its refining facilities at Wagerup 
and Pinjarra but also provides small amounts of electricity to remote community services 
including a police station and a community radio station. As a result, Alcoa faces a RET liability for 
the electricity it consumes along these otherwise dedicated lines. Alcoa submitted: 
7RUHWDLQWKHVHOIJHQHUDWLRQH[HPSWLRQLQFOXGLQJDGHGLFDWHGOLQHWKH$FWUHTXLUHVWKDWWKH
OLQHEHXVHGµVROHO\¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWUDQVPLWWLQJHOHFWULFLW\EHWZHHQWKHWZRVLWHV:KHQ
$OFRDGHFODUHGWKLVVLWXDWLRQWRWKH&OHDQ(QHUJ\5HJXODWRULWZDVDGYLVHGWKHH[HPSWLRQ
QRORQJHUDSSOLHGDQG$OFRDZRXOGQHHGWRSXUFKDVH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\&HUWL¿FDWHVIRUWKH
UHOHYDQWXVDJH7KHXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHDGGHGRYHUFRVWLQDGGLWLRQDO5(&
purchases  in  2013  alone.  Options  to  avoid  this  high  cost  include  disconnecting  the  incidental  
XVHUVRUVHHNLQJDPHQGPHQWWRWKH$FW$OFRDS
The Australian Industry Group’s submission stated:
These  off-­takes  enable  valuable  services  to  be  provided  to  the  local  communities  in  which  
they  are  based.  Those  services  may  otherwise  not  be  provided  as  the  cost  of  investing  in  
QHZLQIUDVWUXFWXUHWRVHFXUHWKHLURZQRIWHQYHU\VPDOOUHTXLUHPHQWIRUHOHFWULFLW\ZRXOGEH
SURKLELWLYHO\KLJK$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*URXSS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Recommendation 5: The self-generation exemption should be amended to extend 
the one kilometre radius restriction and to permit self-generators to supply incidental 
amounts of electricity (below a set threshold) to third parties without attracting a RET 
liability. The Government should consult with affected parties to determine an appropriate 
distance limit and threshold for incidental off-takes.
Amendments to the self-generation exemption need to balance accommodating the 
circumstances of different resource projects with the potential for increasing costs to non-exempt 
parties, including households. Additionally, the EITE and self-generator exemptions interact to the 
extent that a large energy user may qualify for partial exemption for the portion of electricity that 
is not covered by the self-generation exemption. 
Expanding the self-generation exemption reduces the volume of liable electricity covered by the 
RET and proportionally increases RET costs faced by all other electricity consumers. However, the 
Panel considers the current self-generation exemption criteria to be too restrictive and not well 
aligned to the nature and geographical spread of remote resource projects. To the extent that the 
application of the strict eligibility criteria has resulted in genuine self-generators facing RET costs 
through project expansions beyond the one kilometre restriction, amendment to the exemption 
arrangement is warranted.
The Panel considers that criteria for a dedicated line between the point of generation and the 
point of consumption (where consumption is outside the distance boundary) should remain 
in place. Removing this rule and allowing electricity supplied and used by the same legal 
entity to be exempt, while placing a liability on electricity supplied to third parties potentially 
creates complicated measurement and reporting arrangements to determine the amount that 
would be liable. However, the Panel recommends that self-generators should be permitted to 
supply incidental amounts of electricity to third parties for community services on an otherwise 
dedicated line while still being eligible for the exemption. Implementation arrangements for the 
recommendations concerning the self-generation exemption are further discussed in Section 10.3. 
7.2      Native forest wood waste
The Terms of Reference for the Review require the Panel to consider the Government’s election 
commitment to reinstate native forest wood waste as an eligible renewable energy source under 
the RET scheme.
Native forest wood waste was included as an eligible source of renewable energy when the MRET 
was established in 2001. Eligibility was conditional upon the wood waste being harvested under 
a Regional Forestry Agreement and complying with relevant government planning and approvals 
processes. Generators also needed to demonstrate that the wood waste was a genuine by-product 
of higher value logging activities. The use of native forest wood for the sole or primary purpose of 
generating renewable electricity has never been eligible to create certificates under the scheme. 
Native forest wood waste was eligible for certificates under four of the five wood waste 
sub-categories, but only had to be specified as native forest wood waste when classified under 
the sub-category of ‘biomass from native forest waste’. The other eligible sub-categories of 
native forest wood waste were: manufactured wood product; waste products from construction 
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or furniture; and sawmill residue. Eligibility under these sub-categories did not require the source 
(non-native or native forest) to be specified.64 Between 2001 and 2013, wood waste electricity 
generation (including native forest waste) created over 1.6 million certificates under the RET 
scheme.65
In November 2011, eligibility for native forest wood waste under the four eligible sub-categories 
of wood waste was removed from the RET. Transitional measures were introduced for the 
22 power stations that listed wood waste as an eligible energy source and are effective until 2020. 
The transitional measures allow these power stations to create certificates under the superseded 
regulations for eligible electricity generation from wood waste (including native forest waste), 
below a contingent annual cap. Generation above the annual cap is considered under the current 
regulations; meaning it is only eligible if it comes from non native wood waste sources.
The amount of LGCs created from wood waste is illustrated in Figure 41. Except for the years 2009 
and 2010, the long-term trend in the number of LGCs from wood waste has remained relatively 
stable despite the removal of native forest wood waste in 2011. LGCs created from wood 
waste often trade at a discount compared to certificates created from other renewable energy 
sources. Fluctuations in the number of certificates created from wood waste are more likely to 
be dependent on specific industry trends (like domestic and international demand for forestry 
products) as the wood waste is a by-product of higher value forestry activities. 
64 7KHÀIWKFDWHJRU\´QRQQDWLYHHQYLURQPHQWDOZHHGVKDUYHVWHGIRUFRQWURORUHUDGLFDWLRQµKDVQHYHULQFOXGHGQDWLYHIRUHVWZRRGZDVWH
65 7KLVLQFOXGHVZRRGZDVWHIURPERWKQDWLYHDQGQRQQDWLYHVRXUFHV2IWKHIRXUHOLJLEOHFDWHJRULHVIRUQDWLYHIRUHVWZRRGZDVWHRQO\RQHFHUWLÀFDWHZDVFUHDWHG
IURPWKHFDWHJRU\´ELRPDVVIURPQDWLYHIRUHVWZRRGZDVWHµEHWZHHQWR
66 The Coalition’s Policy for a Strong and Sustainable Forestry Industry, September 2013.
Figure 41 LGCs created for wood waste generation, 2001 - 2013 
Source: Clean Energy Regulator Register of Large-scale Generation Certificates. 
As part of its election commitments, the Government announced that it would reverse the 
exclusion of native forest sourced wood waste as an eligible source of energy for RECs.66 The 
Panel’s Call  for  Submissions paper asked stakeholders to comment on the administrative and 
regulatory arrangements that should be in place to ensure that the reinstatement of native forest 
wood waste is consistent with the sustainable management of native forests. 
There were 46 submissions in response to this question. In general, these submissions focussed 
on the framework for the sustainable management of forests and whether native forest wood 
waste should be considered an “ecologically sustainable” renewable energy source in the RET, 
rather than the regulatory arrangements that could be in place to support its reintroduction.
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Forestry bodies, the Australian Sugar Milling Council, and state governments (New South Wales, 
Victoria, and Tasmania) supported reinstatement for a number of reasons. The Australian Forest 
Products Association noted that the:
Existing  high  standards  and  regulatory  arrangements  operating  in  Australia  more  than  
adequately  deal  with:  
  -­ the  sustainable  environmental  management  of  wood  waste  used  for  renewable  energy;;  and  
  -­ the  use  of  wood  waste  as  a  by-­product  of  existing  logging  practices  rather  than  as  an  
DGGLWLRQDOSULPDU\DFWLYLW\$XVWUDOLDQ)RUHVW3URGXFWV$VVRFLDWLRQS
The Australian Sugar Milling Council noted that: 
*LYHQWKDWWKHSURGXFWLVZRRGZDVWHWKDWLVFXUUHQWO\LQFLQHUDWHGRUGHFRPSRVHGLWLV
unclear  why  the  handling  or  inclusion  of  the  resource  has  been  considered  problematic.  
$XVWUDOLDQ6XJDU0LOOLQJ&RXQFLOS
The regulation of logging activity is managed by state and territory governments through 
forestry plans, such as Regional Forestry Agreements, and requires harvesting to be conducted in 
accordance with ecological sustainability requirements. The Tasmanian Government noted in its 
submission: 
Tasmania  considers  that  there  is  a  strong  case  for  the  reinstatement  of  renewable  energy  
GHULYHGIURPQDWLYHIRUHVWZRRG$SSURYDOXQGHUD5HJLRQDO)RUHVW$JUHHPHQW5)$VKRXOG
EHDFFHSWHGDVVXI¿FLHQWHYLGHQFHRIVXVWDLQDEOHPDQDJHPHQW7DVPDQLDQ*RYHUQPHQWS
The New South Wales Government submitted that: 
It  is  considered  that  concerns  regarding  forest  biomass  utilisation  are  best  addressed  
through  alignment  of  State-­based  regulations.  There  is  agreement  between  State  and  
Commonwealth  Governments  in  relation  to  forest  operations  (especially  with  respect  
WRVXVWDLQDELOLW\WKURXJKSURFHVVHVVXFKDVWKH5HJLRQDO)RUHVW$JUHHPHQWV  
1HZ6RXWK:DOHV*RYHUQPHQWS
In contrast, environmental and community groups raised concerns about the potential impacts of 
reinstatement on native forests. The Conservation Council of South Australia argued that: 
7KHUHLVDUHDOGDQJHUWKDWWKHPRYHE\WKH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQWWRUHLQVWDWHELRPDVVIURP
QRQSODQWDWLRQQDWLYHIRUHVWVWREHHOLJLEOHXQGHUWKH5(7ZLOODJDLQGULYHXQVXVWDLQDEOHSUDFWLFHV
DQGSURORQJXQVXVWDLQDEOHIRUHVWU\SUDFWLFHV&RQVHUYDWLRQ&RXQFLORI6RXWK$XVWUDOLDS
The WA Renewable Energy Alliance stated in its submission:
:HEHOLHYHWKDWVXFKDUHLQVWDWHPHQWZRXOGEHDQXQQHFHVVDU\GLVWUDFWLRQWRWKH5(7,W
ZRXOGDOVRULVNWKHORVVRIWKHVLJQL¿FDQWPDLQVWUHDPFRPPXQLW\VXSSRUWIRUDQGFRQ¿GHQFH
LQUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\DVDZKROH:$5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\$OOLDQFHS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Recommendation 6: The Government’s commitment to the reinstatement of native 
forest wood waste as a renewable energy source under the LRET should be implemented 
through the reintroduction of the relevant regulations in force prior to 2011.
Other interested parties, such as the Clean Energy Council, Keppel Prince Engineering and Acciona 
were impartial to reinstatement of native forest wood-waste provided that implementation 
arrangements are consistent with the sustainable management of native forests.
The Panel has not been presented with any evidence that, under the previous arrangements, 
eligibility of native forest wood waste promoted unsustainable logging activities. Concerns about 
sustainable logging of native forests more broadly are outside of the scope of this review. In 
contrast to disposing of native forest wood waste by either incineration or allowing the waste to 
decompose, utilising the wood waste in a power station may be a more efficient use of resources 
and lead to lower CO2-e emissions by reducing the use of gas or coal. 
State and territory governments have responsibility for ecologically sustainable management of 
forests and control the amount of logging activity that can occur in native forests. This acts as a 
safeguard to limit the amount of eligible wood waste that is available for electricity generation. If 
states or territories change the regulations regarding harvesting native forests, the wastes from 
native forests could increase and be subsequently burned for electricity generation. However, no 
evidence has been provided to the Panel that demonstrates eligibility under the RET would create 
an incentive for ecologically unsustainable logging practices in native forests. Reintroducing an 
appropriate accreditation mechanism, as was in place between 2001 and 2011, would provide a 
further safeguard for potential unintended consequences. 
In conclusion, the Panel supports the reinstatement of native forest wood waste as an eligible 
renewable energy source under the RET and considers that this should be based upon the 
regulations that previously governed its eligibility. As mentioned above, the previous regulations 
provided eligibility on the condition that native forest wood waste was being harvested under 
a Regional Forestry Agreement, complied with relevant government planning and approvals 
processes, and were demonstrated to be genuine waste. The superseded regulations would also 
provide for consistent accreditation rules between existing accredited wood waste generators and 
newly accredited generators.
7.3      Frequency of reviews
Section 162 of the REE Act requires that the Climate Change Authority (CCA) review the scheme 
every two years. The Government is committed to abolishing the CCA and a CCA abolition bill is 
currently before the Parliament. This bill would amend the REE Act so that the biennial reviews are 
conducted by a body or person nominated by the Minister for the Environment.
The Panel heard evidence from a wide range of stakeholders across the energy sector that 
frequent statutory reviews undermine investor certainty and hinder the achievement of the 
scheme’s objectives, For example, IFM Investors stated:
Consistent  with  our  views  around  the  importance  of  taking  a  long  term  view  in  an  
HQYLURQPHQWRILQYHVWPHQWFHUWDLQW\WKHSRWHQWLDOIRUFKDQJHVWRWKHVFKHPHHYHU\WZR\HDUV
is  counter-­productive  as  it  introduces  uncertainty  and  increases  risk.  Investment  in  Australian  
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHLVDORQJWHUPLQYHVWPHQWDQGLWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRPDNHORQJWHUPGHFLVLRQVLI
WKHUXOHVFKDQJHHYHU\WZR\HDUV,)0,QYHVWRUVS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Recommendation 7: The requirement for statutory reviews of the scheme should be 
removed from the Renewable  Energy  (Electricity)  Act  2000.
A common suggestion from stakeholders was that reviews should be no more frequent than four 
or five years. However, others recognised that simply reducing the frequency of reviews would 
not remove the risk that a statutory review would lead to significant changes to the scheme and 
suggested that the scope of such reviews also needs to be constrained. Hydro Tasmania stated:
:HEHOLHYHWKDWWKH5(7VKRXOGEHUHYLHZHGQRPRUHIUHTXHQWO\WKDQHYHU\IRXU\HDUVDQG
LGHDOO\OHVVIUHTXHQWO\WKDQWKDW)XUWKHUIRULQYHVWRUFHUWDLQW\WRUHWXUQWRWKH5(7LWLV
HVVHQWLDOWKDWIXWXUHUHYLHZVFDQRQO\LQFUHDVHDQQXDOWDUJHWVDQGQRWUHFRPPHQGVLJQL¿FDQW
QHJDWLYHFKDQJHVWRWKHPHDVXUH+\GUR7DVPDQLDS
The broad nature of the statutory reviews and the possibility that they may lead to significant 
change to the scheme also leads participants to divert attention and resources to engaging with 
the reviewer to ensure that their interests are taken into consideration. The Victorian Department 
of State Development, Business and Innovation considered the two yearly review cycle 
burdensome on participants and suggested the review period be extended or removed.
A number of other stakeholders, including the Clean Energy Council, also favoured disposing of 
statutory reviews altogether. Vestas Wind argued:
It  is  utterly  counterproductive  to  review  a  policy  every  two  years  when  that  very  same  policy  
is  aimed  at  attracting  investment  in  power  stations  with  effective  lives  of  more  than  20  years.
:KLOHZHXQGHUVWDQGDQGDFFHSWWKDWDQ\JRYHUQPHQWFDQUHYLHZDQ\RILWVSROLFLHVDQ\WLPH
LWOLNHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDOHJLVODWLYHUHTXLUHPHQWWRUHYLHZWKH5(7HYHU\WZR\HDUVLVD
cumbersome  and  counterproductive  provision  and  it  should  be  removed.
:HEHOLHYHWKH5(7VKRXOGQRWKDYHVWDWXWRU\UHYLHZVLQWKHLQWHUHVWRISURYLGLQJFHUWDLQW\WR
both  renewable  and  conventional  energy  markets  and  reducing  the  cost  of  capital  for  both.  
The  existence  of  statutory  reviews  merely  prevents  all  players  in  the  industry  from  getting  on  
with  the  job  in  front  of  them  and  the  current  review  process  has  effectively  a  form  of  paralysis  
E\DQDO\VLVDQGKDVPDGHWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIWKHDQQXDO/5(7WDUJHWVPRUHGLI¿FXOW
9HVWDV:LQGS
The legislated requirement for biennial reviews was not present in the original 2001 legislation, 
but was introduced with other changes in 2010. In practice the institution of biennial reviews has 
resulted in the scheme operating under the shadow of constant review since 2010. The ongoing 
speculation that the next review could lead to significant or material change to the scheme has 
had a detrimental effect on investors’ willingness to make binding investment decisions and 
is likely to have led to higher financing costs because of heightened perceptions of increased 
regulatory risk. Any feature that generates such uncertainty undermines the scheme’s primary 
purpose of encouraging investment in long-life assets.
Moreover, the provision is redundant as it is always open to the Government to initiate a review 
at any time when it considers that circumstances warrant one. As the Clean Energy Council 
acknowledged, this point in time is very difficult to predict and therefore legislate in advance.67
67 Clean Energy Council Submission to RET Review Issues Paper, p.26. 
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8 INTERACTION WITH OTHER POLICIES AND MEASURES
The Terms of Reference require the review to consider the interaction of the RET scheme with 
other Commonwealth and state/territory policies and regulations, including the Direct Action 
policies under development.
A range of national and state based climate change and energy policies affect the renewable 
energy sector and potentially have an impact on the operation and effectiveness of the RET. This 
chapter focusses on the following Commonwealth and state/territory policies: 
The Government’s Direct Action Plan, specifically the ERF
State, territory and local government renewable energy targets
State and territory feed-in-tariffs, and energy efficiency and GreenPower schemes
State and territory general planning regulations
Reforms to energy markets and electricity pricing
8.1      Direct Action and the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) 
The ERF is central to the Government’s Direct Action Plan, which aims to meet Australia’s CO2-e 
emissions reduction target of five per cent below 2000 levels by 2020. 
Through the ERF, the Government intends to purchase CO2-e emissions reductions at the lowest 
available cost and has allocated $2.55 billion over four years from 1 July 2014. A reverse auction 
process will be established whereby confidential bids will be submitted to the CER, specifying 
emission reductions at a nominated price, with auction rounds beginning in late 2014 and 
running quarterly.68
The ERF will be designed to link the existing Carbon Farming Initiative, supporting emission 
reductions from agricultural and forestry activities, with new projects such as industrial and 
commercial energy efficiency and emissions avoidance projects. The Government will only pay 
for emission reductions after they have been delivered and measured and that are genuine, 
additional reductions.
The ERF will also include a CO2-e emissions safeguard mechanism. This mechanism will apply to 
a small number of large facilities and will be designed to ensure that CO2-e emissions reductions 
paid for by the ERF are not displaced by significant increases in CO2-e emissions elsewhere in the 
economy.69 The safeguard mechanism is scheduled to begin in July 2015. Details of its design, 
operation, and how it might affect the electricity sector are still to be determined. Given the 
significance of electricity to Australia’s CO2-e emissions profile the Government has committed 
to consulting with the sector on the specific application of the safeguard mechanism and its 
interaction with the RET.70
68 Commonwealth of Australia, (PLVVLRQ5HGXFWLRQ)XQG:KLWH3DSHU, 2014, p.11.
69 Ibid, p.12.
70 Ibid, p.57.
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8.1.1      The relationship between the ERF and the RET
Both the RET and the ERF have the potential to contribute towards meeting the Government’s 
stated CO2-e emissions target following the abolition of the carbon tax. 
The ERF White Paper states:
[The]  (5)ZLOORSHUDWHDORQJVLGHH[LVWLQJSURJUDPVWKDWDUHDOUHDG\ZRUNLQJWRZDUGV
UHGXFLQJ$XVWUDOLD¶VHPLVVLRQVJURZWKVXFKDVWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHWDQGHQHUJ\
HI¿FLHQF\VWDQGDUGVRQDSSOLDQFHVHTXLSPHQWDQGEXLOGLQJV  
&RPPRQZHDOWKRI$XVWUDOLD(PLVVLRQ5HGXFWLRQ)XQG:KLWH3DSHUS
Many in the renewable energy industry, such as the Clean Energy Council and Hydro Tasmania, 
consider that the two schemes can work in parallel. For example, Hydro Tasmania considers that:
,QSDUWLFXODUWKHORQJWHUPGHVLJQRIWKH5(7PDNHVLWDQDSSURSULDWHPHFKDQLVPWRVXSSRUW
energy  sector  investments  which  may  not  be  supported  under  Direct  Action’s  Emissions  
5HGXFWLRQ)XQGGXHWRLWVVKRUWHU¿YH\HDUDEDWHPHQWFRQWUDFWLQJZLQGRZ+\GUR7DVPDQLDS
A number of stakeholders have further argued that in the absence of a specific price on carbon, 
both the RET and the ERF are needed to meet the Government’s CO2-e emissions reduction 
target. These stakeholders generally argue that reducing or removing the RET would mean more 
emissions reductions are needed through the ERF which may require additional funding.
The Grattan Institute, for instance has argued that:
8QGHUWKH'LUHFW$FWLRQ3ODQWKHUHLVDWDUJHWIRUHPLVVLRQVUHGXFWLRQEXWQRELQGLQJFDS
7KHUHIRUHWKHWZRSULPDU\PHFKDQLVPVWKH(PLVVLRQV5HGXFWLRQ)XQG(5)DQGWKH5(7ZLOO
ERWKFRQWULEXWHWRHPLVVLRQVUHGXFWLRQ2WKHUWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDOFKDQJHVWRWKH5(7FKDQJH
WKHHPLVVLRQVUHGXFWLRQORDGWKDWZRXOGKDYHWREHGHOLYHUHGE\WKH(5)  
7KH*UDWWDQ,QVWLWXWHS
On the other hand some stakeholders such as the Business Council of Australia suggest that the 
ERF should be the primary mechanism to reduce emissions:
7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVWDWHGREMHFWLYHLQWKH(PLVVLRQV5HGXFWLRQ)XQG7HUPVRI5HIHUHQFH
is  to  “invest  in  technologies  that  will  reduce  our  emissions  at  lowest  cost”.  Given  that  the  
5(7LVDQH[SHQVLYHIRUPRIDEDWHPHQWWKHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGVHHNWRPHHWWKHELSDUWLVDQ
FRPPLWPHQWWRUHGXFH$XVWUDOLD¶VHPLVVLRQVE\¿YHSHUFHQWE\RQOHYHOVWKURXJK
LWVSULPDU\PHFKDQLVPWKH(PLVVLRQV5HGXFWLRQ)XQG%XVLQHVV&RXQFLORI$XVWUDOLDS
This view is supported by the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network:
The  new  policy  environment  poses  some  serious  questions  as  to  how  the  RET  can  be  
reconciled  with  broader  climate  policy.  The  cost  of  abatement  under  the  RET  will  be  
FRQVLGHUDEO\KLJKHUWKDQXQGHUWKH(PLVVLRQV5HGXFWLRQ)XQG2QWKLVEDVLVLWLVYHU\KDUGWR
PDLQWDLQDFDVHIRUWKHFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFHRIWKH5(7JLYHQWKDWLWZLOOLPSRVHPXFKKLJKHU
abatement  costs  on  one  sector  of  the  economy  than  are  acceptable  elsewhere.  
$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*UHHQKRXVH1HWZRUNS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Recommendation 8: Projects, or components of projects, receiving support under the RET 
should be excluded from participating in Emissions Reduction Fund auction processes.
8.1.2      Eligibility of projects 
It seems clear that the ERF and the RET could both contribute toward the Government’s CO2-e 
emissions reductions targets and there is some potential for duplication between the two 
schemes. The Panel is of the view that projects should not be eligible for funding under the ERF if 
they are eligible for support under the RET.
8.2      Other Commonwealth policies that support renewable energy 
8.2.1      The Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and the Clean Energy Finance   
Corporation (CEFC)  
ARENA was established to support the research, development and demonstration of renewable 
energy technologies. ARENA has two broad objectives: to improve the competitiveness of 
renewable energy technologies; and to increase the supply of renewable energy in Australia. 
ARENA is supporting more than 190 projects, worth close to $2.5 billion, with around $1 billion of 
funding from ARENA.71 These projects span the innovation chain, but most are at the research and 
development stage and have a value under $10 million. At the point of writing, the Government 
has introduced legislation to transfer ARENA’s commitments to the Department of Industry. 
Support for projects with funding agreements in place will continue.  
The CEFC was established to help overcome capital market barriers that hinder the financing, 
development and commercialisation of renewable energy, low emission technologies and energy 
efficiency. The CEFC generally finances projects and technologies at the later stages of development 
that have a positive expected rate of return and the capacity to service and repay capital. Its 
focus is on improving the risk understanding of co-financiers and using financial aggregation to 
attract investment in clean energy.72 It is funded through the provision of $2 billion per annum 
in investment funds provided by the Australian Government. The Australian Government has 
introduced legislation to abolish the CEFC.
Ultimately, the future of ARENA and the CEFC is a matter for the Australian Government and the 
Parliament to determine. The Panel notes that ARENA and the CEFC are directed at increasing the 
range of technologies that could become competitive with already established renewable energy 
technologies, and to this extent these programs serve a different purpose to the RET.
However, the Panel notes that the CEFC has also provided support for established renewable 
energy technologies – specifically wind farms – through debt financing or re-financing 
contributions. Should the CEFC continue to operate, the Panel is of the view that projects that have 
received support under the RET should not receive further assistance from the CEFC. In addition, 
71 Australia Renewable Energy Agency at a glance infographic http://arena.gov.au/about-‐arena/.
72 Clean Energy Finance Corporation 6XEPLVVLRQWRWKH5HYLHZRIWKH5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHW, May 2014, p.2.
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Recommendation 9: Projects that receive support under the RET should not be eligible 
to receive further assistance from the Clean Energy Finance Corporation or the Australian 
Renewable Energy Agency. 
the provision of non-commercial finance creates a risk of undermining investments based solely 
on support through the RET. 
Similarly, ARENA is also able to provide support to a wide range of renewable projects, some of 
which may also receive support under the RET. The Panel is of the view that ARENA should focus 
on funding research and development and demonstration projects and should not fund proven 
technologies. Therefore, projects eligible to receive support under the RET should not receive 
further assistance from ARENA.
73 Commonwealth of Australia, %XGJHW0HDVXUHV%XGJHW3DSHU1R, p.130.
74 The Government of South Australia, 6XEPLVVLRQWRWKH5(7UHYLHZ, p.1.
8.2.2      Solar Towns program
As part of the 2014-15 Budget, the Government committed to establish the Solar Towns program 
which will provide $2.1 million over three years to community groups to support the uptake of 
solar technologies.73 The program will provide grants to support the installation of solar PV and 
solar water heater systems and reduce energy costs. It is likely that systems receiving assistance 
under the program would also be eligible to receive assistance under the RET. The Panel suggests 
that the Government consider the level of assistance available under the RET when designing the 
rules for the Solar Towns program to ensure that installations under the program are additional to 
what would have otherwise been achieved.
8.3      State, territory and local government policies 
Most jurisdictions have at various times introduced polices that support the development and 
deployment of renewable energy. These policies have taken many forms including: state or local 
government renewable energy targets; direct subsidies or capital grants to deploy renewable 
energy; solar feed-in-tariff arrangements; regulations mandating particular technologies; and 
funding for research and development. In recent years most of these programs have been wound 
back as a result of concerns about their impacts on electricity prices, budgetary impacts and the 
introduction of national climate change policies. However some significant polices still remain in 
place as described below.
8.3.1      State and territory renewable energy targets
South Australia
The Government of South Australia has a number of commitments in relation to renewable 
energy including:74
South Australia’s Strategic Plan target of 33 per cent of the State’s electricity production to be 
from renewable energy sources by 2020.
South Australia’s Strategic Plan target to limit the carbon intensity of total South Australian 
electricity generation to 0.5 tonnes of CO2/MWh by 2020.
An investment target of $10 billion in low carbon generation by 2025. 
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In 2012-13, renewables accounted for around 31 per cent of South Australia’s energy production. 
The Panel notes that the targets stated by the South Australian Government largely rely on the 
RET in order to be met, rather than specific South Australian Government policies.  
The Government of South Australia noted in its submission that there is a need for 
complementary jurisdictional policy in the area of renewable energy to ensure that the RET is 
achieved and considers that its renewable energy targets have also provided investors with 
assurance that renewable energy investment will be supported.
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
The ACT Government has established a target of 90 per cent of all electricity consumed in the ACT 
to be from renewable sources by 2020.75 The ACT Government estimates that around 490 MW of 
additional large-scale generation capacity will be required to achieve this target, which it intends 
will be made up of 91 MW of solar, 382 MW of wind and 17 MW of energy from waste to energy 
projects. This is additional to capacity that will be installed under the RET.
In order to meet the target the ACT Government will issue large-scale feed-in-tariffs through a 
reverse auction process. Under this process the large-scale feed-in-tariffs will guarantee revenue 
for a maximum of 20 years through contract for difference based payments (i.e. the difference 
between the wholesale electricity prices and the agreed feed-in-tariff). As a condition of receiving 
the feed-in-tariff, any LGCs awarded will be surrendered to the ACT Government who will in turn 
surrender these to the CER under the GreenPower scheme, to ensure that the renewable energy 
generated is additional to the RET. Under the first solar auction the average feed-in-tariff price 
was $183/MWh, with the net cost to ACT electricity consumers being the difference between 
the feed-in-tariff and the wholesale electricity price. The first auctions for wind feed-in-tariffs are 
expected to be held in late 2014 and will result in additional wind capacity being constructed in 
the surrounding regions. The cost of meeting the ACT target will be passed on to ACT consumers 
through their electricity bills with total costs per household expected to peak in 2020 at around 
$5 per household per week.76
New South Wales (NSW)
In September 2013, the NSW Government released its Renewable Energy Action Plan. This Plan 
supports the achievement of the national goal for 20 per cent renewable energy by 2020.
The Plan has three overarching goals, namely to:
attract renewable energy investment;
build community support; and
attract and grow renewable energy expertise.
75 Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development (ACT), $&76HWV5HQHZDEOH(QHUJ\7DUJHW,Q/DZ, 4 November 2013). http://www.cmd.act.gov.au/
open_government/inform/act_government_media_releases/corbell/2013/act-‐sets-‐90-‐renewable-‐energy-‐target-‐in-‐law7.
76 ibid.
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The NSW Government has established a working group (chaired by the NSW Renewable Energy 
Advocate) to deliver 24 actions outlined in the plan. The plan will operate alongside the Energy 
Efficiency Action Plan, the Regional Clean Energy Program and the Energy Savings Scheme. The 
NSW Department of Planning and Environment is in the process of finalising planning guidelines 
to give greater certainty and consistency to the renewable energy wind industry, communities and 
investors. 
The NSW Government has announced it will supplement ARENA funding for the deployment of 
large-scale solar in Broken Hill and Nyngan, and will provide continued support for small-scale 
renewable technology including rooftop solar PV. The NSW Government has requested IPART 
determine a fair and reasonable solar feed-in-tariff each year to ensure the resulting uptake 
of residential PV does not increase electricity prices and lead to a boom and bust cycle for the 
industry.
8.3.2      Local government targets
A number of local governments have set targets for renewable energy for their respective areas, 
for example: 
The City of Sydney has set a target of 70 per cent reduction in CO2-e emissions by 2030 
compared to 2006.77 This target includes:
  -­ 1RUHOLDQFHRQFRDO¿UHGJHQHUDWLRQ
  -­ 30  per  cent  of  electricity  from  renewables  by  2030.
Marrickville Council (in inner Sydney) has a 25 per cent CO2-e emissions reduction target by 
2025. Five solar PV installations are planned to assist in achieving this objective.78
The City of Melbourne has a target to obtain 25 per cent of the municipality’s electricity from 
renewable sources by 2018
  -­ In  its  submission  the  City  of  Melbourne  noted  that  a  reduction  in  the  RET  will  reduce  its  
ability  to  meet  community  expectations  and  risks  the  achievement  of  their  renewable  
energy  and  zero  net  CO2-­e  emissions  targets.
79
8.3.3      State and territory feed-in-tariffs
Feed-in-tariffs were introduced by state and territory governments between 2008 and 2010 to 
support consumers in installing solar PV. In most jurisdictions these tariffs were set considerably 
higher than the wholesale price of electricity. Some jurisdictions also operated generous gross 
feed-in-tariff schemes for each kWh produced by a solar power system regardless of how 
much surplus power was exported to the grid. These factors along with the RET Solar Credits 
multiplier led to much higher solar PV installations than anticipated and significant costs for other 
consumers without solar PV. In recent years, governments have opted to wind back support and 
close premium feed-in-tariff schemes to new entrants. Nevertheless, there are still significant 
numbers of households receiving legacy tariffs, the costs of which are passed through to all 
electricity users as higher tariffs.
77 City of Sydney, Submission to Review of the RET, May 2014.
78 Marrickville Council, Submission to Review of the RET, May 2014.
79 City of Melbourne, Submission to Review of the RET, May 2014.
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For most jurisdictions feed-in-tariffs for new or upgraded solar PV are now much lower and operate as 
solar buy-back schemes generally reflecting the value of the avoided cost of wholesale electricity and 
value to the retailer of avoided costs at peak periods. In some states it is compulsory for retailers to offer a 
feed-in-tariff, based on a value, or range of values, determined by state regulators, while other jurisdictions 
leave it to the discretion of individual retailers. 
Table 4 below provides an indicative guide for the current feed-in-tariffs available in states and territories. 
Actual rates may vary subject to retailer policies and reviews by jurisdictional price setting authorities.
:ƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƟŽŶ Scheme  Name Rates  c/kWh ĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶŽƌƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞĚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ
ACT Solar buyback 
scheme
7.5 ActewAGL tariff. A very small number of customers may be with 
other retailers.
NSW Feed-in-tariffs for 
surplus generation
4.9 – 9.3 
(2014-15)
The benchmark range, determined by IPART, is a guide 
to retailers and customers on the likely value of electricity 
exported to the grid by customers from their solar PV and is not 
compulsory. 
Electricity retailers in NSW have the flexibility to set their own 
feed-in-tariffs.
NT Gross feed-in-
tariff
27.13 Maximum connection size is 4.5 kW.
QLD Feed-in-tariff 8 Mandated feed-in-tariff for customers in regional Queensland 
(outside the Energex supply network) set by the Queensland 
Competition Authority based on the market value of the 
electricity exported.
For South East Queensland (covering the Energex supply 
network), electricity retailers can set and pay their own 
feed-in-tariffs.
SA Minimum retailer 
payment
7.6 All residential and small business PV customers can receive a 
minimum retailer-paid feed-in-tariff from their retailer for the 
calendar year 2014. Rate will decrease to 6 c/kWh upon the 
repeal of the carbon tax.
TAS Feed-in-tariff 6.1 This rate is from 1 July 2014 and is set by the Tasmanian 
Economic Regulator.
VIC Feed-in-tariff 8 Must be offered as a minimum tariff by all retailers with more 
than 5,000 customers. 
The rate will decrease to 7.4 c/kWh upon the repeal of the 
carbon tax, and to 6.2 c/kWh from 1 January 2015. The tariff is 
available to solar and other eligible forms of renewable energy, 
such as wind, hydro or biomass, with a system size less than 
100 kW. The tariff will also be open to other low emission 
technologies, but at the time of writing these technologies have 
not been announced.
WA Renewable Energy 
buy back scheme
8.85 Mandated scheme for customers in the SWIS.
Table 4 Overview of current state feed-in-tariff or solar buy back schemes
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8.3.4      State and territory planning regulations
Planning regulations imposed by jurisdictions that apply to the development of particular 
renewable energy technologies such as wind farms are summarised in Table 5 below. Victoria 
has implemented strong restrictions on the siting of wind farms which ban development in 
certain areas and give residents power to veto developments within two kilometres of their 
homes. Other states, such as NSW and Queensland have proposed changes to their planning 
codes or guidelines, which strengthen the rights of local communities to challenge wind farm 
developments or impose stronger assessment conditions. 
State
Minimum  distance  
ĨƌŽŵĞǆŝƐƟŶŐ
dwelling
Consent  of  all  
residents  required  
within  minimum  
distance
ZĞƐƚƌŝĐƟŽŶƐĨŽƌĂƌĞĂƐ
ŽĨƉŽƚĞŶƟĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶ
growth
Noise  monitoring  
requirements  –  decibels  (db)
NSW 0.8-1.5km (current) Yes (proposed) No 35db proposed or max of 5db 
above background noise
VIC 2km Yes Yes Yes, 40db
QLD N/A No No Yes, 35db
WA No fixed rule but WA 
Planning commission 
suggests distance 
should be 1km (based 
on guidelines released 
in 2004)
No No 35db proposed or max of 5db 
above background noise
SA 1km dwellings, 2km 
townships
No No Yes, 40db
Table 5 Overview of planning requirements affecting wind farms80
80 6SHFLÀFSODQQLQJUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUZLQGIDUPVLQ7DVPDQLDWKH1RUWKHUQ7HUULWRU\DQGWKH$&7ZHUHQRWLGHQWLÀHG
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The NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure released Draft Guidelines for wind farms 
in December 2011. At the time of writing these guidelines have not been adopted. Adoption of 
these guidelines would impose additional requirements for wind farm developments. 
Under the proposed guidelines wind farms with a capital cost of more than $30 million 
(or $10 million in an environmentally sensitive area) will be considered as State Significant 
Development and assessed in most cases by the independent Planning Assessment Commission 
(PAC) rather than local councils.
Specific 16::LQG)DUP1RLVH*XLGHOLQHV are currently under development. For a new 
development, the predicted equivalent noise level should not exceed 35 decibels or exceed 
the background noise by more than five decibels, whichever is greater. According to the draft 
guidelines, these criteria are the most stringent in Australia and amongst the most stringent in the 
world and also include some ongoing noise monitoring requirements.
In Victoria, there is a ban on wind turbines within two kilometres of residences unless there is a 
written agreement with the relevant landowners. For NSW, where there is no written agreement 
from the relevant landowners within two kilometres, the development can still be assessed via 
a ‘gateway’ process. This process allows the state department to assess the proposal, undertake 
public consultations, and make a recommendation to a Joint Regional Planning Panel.
The effect of planning restrictions on wind farms in particular jurisdictions is to reduce the 
potential number of sites available for development. This could lead to developments in less 
desirable locations with lower output or higher costs, potentially making it more costly to meet 
the RET targets.
8.3.5      State-based energy efficiency schemes and rebates 
Energy efficiency schemes operate in NSW, SA, Victoria and the ACT. These schemes support 
projects in the household, industrial, commercial and small business sectors. They place 
obligations on energy retailers to find and implement energy savings or to purchase certificates 
that have been created by accredited agents who have implemented approved energy efficiency 
projects. 
The Victorian Energy Efficiency Target (VEET) scheme
The VEET commenced on 1 January 2009 and was legislated to continue until 2030. The purpose 
of the VEET scheme is to reduce CO2-e emissions, encourage the efficient use of electricity and 
gas, and to encourage investment, employment and technology development in industries that 
supply goods and services, which reduce the use of electricity and gas by energy consumers.
The scheme places a liability on large energy retailers in Victoria to surrender energy efficiency 
certificates, each representing a tonne of greenhouse gas abated, every year. 
Certificates are created when accredited persons under the scheme assist consumers to make 
selected energy efficiency improvements to their homes or businesses. Revenue generated 
through the sale of certificates is used to reduce the cost of undertaking these energy efficiency 
improvements. 
Activities covered under the scheme include the installation of high efficiency hot water systems, 
air heaters and coolers, lighting, draught proofing and window treatments and the purchase of 
high efficiency appliances like refrigerators and televisions.
The Victorian Government has recently announced that it will close its energy efficiency scheme at 
the end of 2015.81
81 Minister for Energy and Resources Victoria, (QHUJ\6DYHU,QFHQWLYH(6,5HYLHZ, 7 July 2014.
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The South Australia Residential Energy Efficiency Scheme (REES)
The REES requires larger energy providers to help households to save energy by offering energy 
audits and energy efficiency activities such as installing energy efficient light globes and stand-by 
power controllers to consumers. Each year the government sets a target for the number of energy 
audits and energy efficiency activities each energy provider must offer and it is up to the provider 
to decide how they will meet that target.
On 29 November 2013, the SA Government announced that the scheme will be extended to 2020 
and expanded to include small businesses. 
Activities included under the scheme include replacing or upgrading water heaters, installing 
draught proofing, window upgrades, installing efficient air conditioning, replacing inefficient pool 
pumps, and installing energy efficient lighting. 
The NSW Energy Savings Scheme
The Energy Savings Scheme aims to reduce electricity consumption in NSW by creating financial 
incentives for organisations to invest in energy savings projects. Energy savings are achieved by 
installing, improving or replacing energy savings equipment. The scheme places a mandatory 
obligation on electricity retailers to obtain and surrender energy savings certificates, which 
represent energy savings. 
Activities included under the scheme include draught-proofing, window upgrades, installing 
efficient air conditioning, replacing inefficient pool pumps, and installing energy efficient lighting. 
ACT Energy Efficiency Improvement Scheme (EEIS)
The EEIS commenced on 1 January 2013 and will run until 31 December 2015. Energy retailers 
are required to provide incentives for ACT households to achieve greenhouse gas reductions. 
Twenty five per cent of retailers’ obligations must be met through activities in priority low-income 
households.
Activities eligible under the scheme include upgrades to appliances and lighting, replacement 
of energy intensive water and space heaters, weather sealing, installation of thermally efficient 
windows, and installation of standby power controllers. The scheme is paid for through electricity 
bills.
8.3.6      GreenPower
GreenPower operates nationally as a voluntary program for consumers to support the generation 
of renewable power. It is a joint initiative of the governments of NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South 
Australia and the ACT.
GreenPower is a government accreditation program that facilitates energy retailers to purchase 
renewable energy on behalf of their customers. Consumers pay a premium of 5-8 c/kWh on their 
electricity bills, which retailers then use to purchase LGCs to demonstrate compliance with the 
scheme.
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Annual GreenPower purchases increased rapidly from 2005 to 2011, peaking at 2,094 GWh in 
2011. However, sales have since declined to around 1,800 GWh in 2012 due to a number of 
factors including increased uptake of solar panels by households, and consumer responses to 
the introduction of the carbon tax and higher electricity prices. Annual sales of GreenPower 
accredited electricity remain at less than one per cent of the demand in the NEM. 
Although GreenPower providers purchase and surrender LGCs for each megawatt hour of 
generation sold as part of a GreenPower product, these LGCs are not able to be used by energy 
suppliers to meet their RET obligations. This ensures that the renewable generation under 
GreenPower is additional to the RET. 
The Panel notes that as the GreenPower program currently utilises LGCs as a basis for 
compliance, the Australian Government and relevant state and territory governments may need 
to consider the potential interactions between the RET and GreenPower in light of the Australian 
Government’s preferred approach to the LRET. Should either of the Panel’s recommended options 
for the LRET be adopted, it may be appropriate to include some allowance for GreenPower 
LGC purchases in the setting of targets under the LRET. The Panel considers that the market 
for voluntary renewable energy programs is mature and other options, if required, for the 
measurement and verification of renewable energy under the GreenPower scheme could be 
developed. 
8.4      Electricity market reform
The RET operates in a very different environment to that which prevailed when it was first 
introduced. The Government is developing an Energy White Paper outlining its overall approach 
to energy policy and there is an ongoing process of electricity market reform. Both of these have 
the potential to interact with the RET. 
Priorities arising from the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) energy reform agenda and 
being progressed through AEMC rule change and other processes include:
Strengthening electricity network regulation to ensure network expenditure is efficient, 
including the setting of network prices.
 Improved demand side participation to assist in minimising peak demand and associated 
infrastructure investment.
The promotion of retail competition and retail price deregulation.
Strengthening regulatory arrangements, including access arrangements for renewable 
generators and small-scale solar PV.
8.4.1      Strengthening network regulation 
Reforms to the economic regulatory framework were introduced in November 2012. These 
reforms strengthen the ability of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to achieve efficient 
outcomes in setting revenues and prices for consumers in a number of areas, including how the 
regulated rate of return is set, and changes to the limited merits review arrangements which 
reduce the power of network companies to appeal against regulatory determinations. These 
changes are now being used by the AER as part of its regulatory processes.  
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The AEMC is considering a rule change which would alter the way in which network prices are 
determined. This change aims to provide better price signals to consumers by making prices 
more cost reflective, particularly around peak usage times. Although this rule change may not 
immediately reduce the overall cost of the network to consumers, it should reduce cross subsidies 
between different consumers inherent in flat pricing arrangements that favour users who place 
high demand on networks at peak times. 
8.4.2      Retail competition and National Energy Customer Framework 
State and territory governments retain responsibility for retail energy pricing. All jurisdictions 
have committed to remove retail energy price regulation where effective competition can be 
demonstrated. Effective competition in retail energy markets promotes customer choice. As has 
been demonstrated in jurisdictions with effective competition and price deregulation, competition 
has provided benefits for consumers through greater innovation in retail pricing and choice for 
consumers in their energy services and prices, and leads to more efficient decisions on future 
network expenditures.
Victoria, South Australia and NSW have already deregulated retail electricity prices and the 
Queensland Government intends to remove electricity price regulation in the South East 
Queensland electricity market and replace it with price monitoring by 1 July 2015, subject to 
certain preconditions. All other jurisdictions continue to regulate retail electricity prices for small 
customers on standing offer contracts. In Queensland, Tasmania and the ACT, prices are regulated 
by independent regulators. In the Northern Territory and Western Australia regulated electricity 
prices are set by the respective governments. 
There are a series of customer protection measures that remain in place to provide support to 
small customers in jurisdictions where price regulation is removed. These include jurisdictional 
and national protection measures. In particular, the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) 
is a national regime for retail customers of electricity and gas. The NECF deals primarily with the 
relationship between retailers, customers and distributors and the associated rights, obligations 
and consumer protection measures. 
The NECF facilitates an increase in retail competition by reducing regulatory complexity and 
lowering barriers for energy retailers to enter into the market across participating states and 
territories.
8.4.3      Power of choice reforms and demand side participation
In March 2011 the then Ministerial Council on Energy directed the AEMC to identify market and 
regulatory arrangements that would enable the participation of both supply and demand side 
options in achieving an economically efficient demand/supply balance in the electricity market. 
The AEMC’s report, titled Power  of  Choice, was considered by Ministers in November 2012. 
Significant progress has been made on recommendations made in the Power of Choice reforms 
including consumer protection. These changes encourage more efficient use of generators and 
electricity networks and services and manage costs in the long term. Key rule changes include 
support for the business-led competitive roll out of smart meters, formalising consumer access 
to their own metering data, improved incentives for networks to engage with consumers, and 
allowing innovative tariffs to be offered to provide incentives for more efficient electricity use. 
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Some of the reforms that are under consideration include:
Changes to promote competition in metering to promote greater opportunities for demand 
response at times of network peaks.
Allowing customers to have more than one electricity retailer for different services at the same 
site (for example one retailer for normal electricity supply and a different retailer for solar PV or 
electric vehicle charging).
Reforms to improve competition and remove barriers to the provision of energy related 
services by parties other than retailers or distributors.
8.4.4      National distribution connections contestability framework 
Energy Council officials are currently considering the benefits of the development and 
implementation of an opt-in national contestability framework for electricity and gas distribution 
connections.
Identified benefits include greater competition in connection service provision, particularly 
through the possibility of inter-state trade, which is expected to lead to lower costs, improved 
timeframes for connection and more customer-focused services. 
An Energy Council rule change proposal is expected to be submitted to the AEMC for 
consideration in mid-2015.
8.4.5      Embedded generation and other reforms
In April 2014, the AEMC completed a rule change, proposed by industry stakeholders, which will 
improve the processes for connecting larger-scale embedded generators, including renewables, 
to distribution networks. The AEMC is currently considering a similar proposal regarding the 
connection process for smaller scale embedded generators in the NEM. 
Recent reforms in the Northern Territory, which have resulted in the breakup of the Government 
owned Power and Water Corporation, could lead to changes in arrangements for embedded 
generators. 
Similarly in Western Australia the Government has announced a review of the SWIS electricity 
market. The first phase of this review will assess the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
industry structure, market institutions and regulatory arrangements, including arrangements for 
embedded generators and will examine options for reform. The first phase is due to report at the 
end of October 2014.
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8.5   Findings: Interaction with other policies and measures
The Panel is supportive of the continuing development of a nationally consistent energy 
market framework. This framework should minimise differences between jurisdictions and 
eliminate excess regulation and duplication. The Panel urges jurisdictions to speed up the 
process of reform that would be to the long-term benefit of consumers.
The Panel also supports reforming network regulation to better reflect the costs of providing 
electricity to different consumers and at different times. This will minimise cross subsidies 
between different customers and lead to more efficient investment and energy choices, 
including whether to invest in solar PV systems.
The Panel also notes that some projects that receive support under the RET may also be 
eligible for assistance from the CEFC and ARENA. The Panel considers that projects or 
components of projects that receive support under the RET should not be eligible for 
additional funding from either the CEFC or ARENA.
In relation to state and territory measures and policies, the Panel considers that in general 
these should not overlap with the RET. The Panel makes the following additional observations 
in terms of state and territory measures:
Although premium state based feed-in-tariffs are now largely closed to new entrants there 
is still a considerable, though declining, cost to consumers from legacy schemes. 
Feed-in-tariffs in most jurisdictions are now much lower and generally reflect the value of the 
avoided cost of wholesale energy and value to the retailer of avoided costs at peak periods. 
 Jurisdictions operating schemes which support solar water heaters should consider the 
level of assistance available under the SRES to ensure that installations are additional to 
what would have otherwise been achieved under the SRES. 
State and territory governments should adopt a consistent set of planning principles that 
minimise regulatory burden and apply to all forms of electricity generation, while recognising 
that different generation technologies have varying degrees of environmental, economic and 
social impacts.
The Panel notes that the GreenPower program currently utilises LGCs as a basis for 
compliance. Should the Panel’s recommendations on the LRET be adopted, it may be 
appropriate to include some allowance for GreenPower LGC purchases in the setting of 
targets under the LRET. The Panel considers that the market for voluntary renewable energy 
programs is mature and other options, if required, for the measurement and verification of 
renewable energy under the GreenPower scheme could be developed.
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9 REDUCING THE REGULATORY BURDEN OF THE RET
The Terms of Reference ask the Panel to consider the Australian Government’s commitment to 
reduce red and green tape. The Panel has investigated opportunities to reduce administration and 
compliance costs of the RET scheme while allowing it to meet its objectives. The majority of the 
submissions to the review indicate satisfaction with the administration of the scheme with only a 
few proposals for improving administrative arrangements. 
9.1      Reducing reporting requirements and improving data availability
The CER requires stakeholders to complete a number of forms and activities to demonstrate 
compliance with requirements in the Act. Power and Water Corporation, Stanwell Corporation 
and LMS Energy requested that forms and assessments be simplified and available online. For 
example, Power and Water Corporation stated that:
7KHLQWURGXFWLRQRIUHJLVWHULQJFRPSOHWLQJDQGVXEPLWWLQJUHWXUQVRQOLQHZLWKWKHRSWLRQWR
UHYLVHWKHUHWXUQVXSXQWLOWKHUHWXUQGDWHZRXOGEHKHOSIXO3RZHUDQG:DWHU&RUSRUDWLRQS
The Energy Retailers Association of Australia requested more functionality with the information 
that is available in the REC Registry:
The  CER’s  REC  Registry  (the  Registry)  creates  issues  for  retailers  as  information  on  STCs  
LQWKH5HJLVWU\PD\GLIIHUDQGQRWUHFRQFLOHZLWKLQWHUQDOV\VWHPV7KHUHIRUHXQFOHDUGDWDRQ
WKHDYDLODELOLW\RI67&VLQWKH5HJLVWU\FUHDWHVLVVXHVIRUUHWDLOHU¶VSXUFKDVHDQGVXUUHQGHU
decisions.  Improving  the  accuracy  of  the  publication  of  data  in  the  Registry  will  improve  the  
RSHUDWLRQDOHI¿FLHQF\RIUHWDLOHUV(QHUJ\5HWDLOHUV$VVRFLDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDS
The CER has advised the Panel that these concerns will be addressed when the CER releases its 
redesigned REC Registry in August 2014. The REC Registry is a secure web-based application that 
facilitates the creation, trade and surrender of LGCs and STCs. It also provides access to a number 
of public registers containing data about the RET. 
The redesigned REC Registry will have an improved user interface and enhanced functionality for 
scheme participants and the CER. Stakeholders will be able to access a number of simplified forms 
online and have more options for managing their certificate activities. Data analysts will also have 
the ability to download bulk data from public registers. A number of the CER’s assessments will 
move online, which will allow more efficient processing times and visibility for stakeholders.
9.2      Setting the Renewable Power Percentage and the Small-scale Technology Percentage 
The LRET places a legal requirement on liable entities to purchase LGCs equivalent to a proportion 
of wholesale electricity acquisitions, called the Renewable Power Percentage (RPP). Similarly, the 
SRES places a requirement on liable entities to purchase an amount of STCs each year, calculated 
using the Small-scale Technology Percentage (STP). The STP is based on modelled estimates of 
the number of STCs expected to be created in that year, adjusted for any surplus or deficit of 
certificates from the previous year. The STP and RPP are published annually by the CER by 
1 March of each compliance year. 
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Five stakeholders suggested bringing forward the date of setting the STP and RPP to the 
December prior to the compliance year to which they relate. This would provide liable entities 
with greater certainty over their RET liability, allowing them to manage it with a greater degree of 
accuracy. For example, Hydro Tasmania stated: 
This  is  an  important  change  which  could  be  easily  made  that  would  ensure  that  retailers  can  
pass  through  costs  at  an  appropriate  rate  to  consumers  and  are  not  left  out  of  pocket.  This  has  
WKHSRWHQWLDOWRUHGXFHWKHFRVWVRIWKHPHDVXUHIRUVRPHFRQVXPHUV+\GUR7DVPDQLDS
The STP is more complicated to calculate than the RPP and bringing forward the publication of 
the STP involves a trade-off between timeliness and accuracy of the estimate. However, the 
small-scale market has been relatively stable and predictable over the past two years and the CER 
has been estimating the uptake of small-scale installations with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
The Panel considers that the benefits of publishing these figures prior to the commencement of 
the compliance year would outweigh the possible loss of accuracy.
9.3      Opt-in for large energy users
The RET places a legal requirement on liable entities (typically electricity retailers) to purchase and 
surrender LGCs and STCs to comply with obligations under the Act. The cost of purchasing LGCs 
and STCs are passed on to electricity consumers. This approach minimises the number of entities 
subject to RET liabilities, compared to a scheme in which all electricity consumers are directly 
liable, thereby reducing compliance and administrative costs. 
A small number of respondents proposed amending the RET legislation to allow large electricity 
users to opt-in and manage liability under the RET for the electricity they consume. This is to 
reduce costs and improve flexibility for electricity users and provide greater market liquidity by 
increasing the number of buyers in the RET. For example, Pacific Hydro stated:
+LVWRULFDOO\PRVWHQHUJ\XVHUVKDYHPDQDJHGWKH5(7FRVWWKURXJKWKHLUUHWDLOHOHFWULFLW\
VXSSO\DJUHHPHQWV0RUHUHFHQWO\ZHKDYHVHHQDQLQFUHDVLQJQXPEHURIODUJHHQHUJ\
XVHUVFKRRVLQJWRLQFOXGHWKHRSWLRQWR³VHOIVRXUFH´/DUJH*HQHUDWLRQ&HUWL¿FDWHV/*&V
into  their  retail  tender  documents.  This  process  sees  energy  consumers  purchase  LGCs  
from  a  third  party  and  then  transfer  them  to  the  retailer  to  surrender  on  their  behalf.
Self-­sourcing  has  seen  larger  volumes  of  LGCs  sold  directly  from  LGC  generators  to  energy  
XVHUV±DQGJLYHVÀH[LELOLW\DQGFKRLFHWRHQHUJ\XVHUVWRPDQDJHWKHLUFRVWVLQWKHPDQQHU
RIEHVWILWIRUWKHLULQGLYLGXDOEXVLQHVV)RUH[DPSOHVRPHEXVLQHVVHVPD\ZLVKWRIL[D  
long-­term  LGC  price  as  part  of  a  strategy  to  fix  their  long-­term  input  costs  –  this  is  best  
enacted  with  a  direct  contract  between  the  energy  user  and  the  LGC  generator.  
The  further  extension  to  this  process  is  allowing  energy  users  to  “opt-­in”  themselves  and  
VHOIPDQDJHWKHLU5(7OLDELOLW\HQGWRHQG3DFL¿F+\GURS
The Australian Sugar Milling Council supports allowing liable parties to acquit their own liability in 
cases where they are able to generate renewable electricity:
6XJDUPLOOVLPSRUWHOHFWULFLW\GXULQJPLOOVWDUWXSDQGRXWVLGHRIWKHFUXVKLQJVHDVRQZKHQ
HOHFWULFLW\LVQRWEHLQJJHQHUDWHGDWWKHPLOO&RQVHTXHQWO\DOOPLOOVHQFRXQWHUDOLDELOLW\
&XUUHQWO\XQOHVVDPLOOLVLQDGLUHFWZKROHVDOHUHODWLRQVKLSDTXDVLUHWDLOHULWKDVQR
FDSDFLW\WRDFTXLWLWVOLDELOLW\DJDLQVWLWVRZQFHUWL¿FDWHVDQGLVWKHUHIRUHORFNHGLQWRWKHSULFH
passed  forward  by  its  electricity  retailer.  
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$60&VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHVHDUUDQJHPHQWVFRXOGEHVLPSOL¿HGE\HQDEOLQJDQRSWLQSURFHVV
WKDWHQDEOHVVLJQL¿FDQWOLDEOHSDUWLHVWRDFTXLWWKHLURZQOLDELOLW\ZKHWKHUWKURXJKVWRUHG
FHUWL¿FDWHVRUSXUFKDVHIURPWKHPDUNHW$XVWUDOLDQ6XJDU0LOOLQJ&RXQFLOS
However, such an arrangement is likely to be complex to implement and could significantly 
increase the cost of administering the RET scheme. The complexity of opt-in arrangements 
for liquid fuels under the previous carbon tax is instructive in this regard. The Panel’s broader 
recommendations for reforming the LRET and the SRES will lower the cost of the RET for 
electricity users compared to continuing with the current scheme, and therefore the Panel does 
not consider that the likely costs associated with implementing opt-in are justified.
The Panel notes the potential for an opt-in arrangement to improve the efficiency of the LGC 
market. Section 10.1 addresses implementation issues relating to the Panel’s recommendations 
for reforming the LRET, including mechanisms to support the stable and efficient functioning of 
certificate markets. Such mechanisms may reduce the need for an opt-in arrangement to improve 
market efficiency. 
The Panel also notes the submission from Pacific Hydro quoted above, stating that in some 
instances electricity customers have entered into voluntary agreements with their retailer to buy 
certificates in return for a reduction in the RET costs that would otherwise be passed through. The 
Panel encourages stakeholders interested in an opt-in mechanism to pursue opportunities for 
voluntary arrangements.
9.4      Aligning LRET and SRES acquittal obligations and shortfall carry-over provisions
Stakeholders raised two issues concerning the alignment of obligations and liability under the 
SRES and LRET schemes. These relate to the frequency of acquittal of LRET and SRES obligations 
and allowing liable entities to carry-over a shortfall of STCs to the following year, consistent with 
provisions under the LRET. 
Liability is currently acquitted (that is, certificates are surrendered to the CER) on an annual basis 
for the LRET and on a quarterly basis for the SRES. Quarterly acquittal for the SRES was introduced 
to improve the cash flow for small to medium sized businesses in the solar PV and solar water 
heater industries. However, some stakeholders suggested that this may no longer be necessary 
as the STC market and the businesses operating in it are now mature and proposed that STCs be 
surrendered annually to reduce administrative costs. For example the Energy Retailers Association 
of Australia stated:
6XUUHQGHULQJFHUWL¿FDWHVTXDUWHUO\LVDGPLQLVWUDWLYHO\RQHURXVRQUHWDLOHUVDQGFUHDWHV
DGGLWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOULVNVHDFKTXDUWHULIWKHUHTXLUHGQXPEHURI67&VLVQRWVXUUHQGHUHG
This  pattern  of  surrender  is  unique  to  SRES  as  no  other  environmental  scheme  has  this  
LPSRVLWLRQ$VWKH65(6KDVPDWXUHGDVDFRPSRQHQWRIWKH5(7VFKHPHWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
sophistication  should  also  have  increased.  The  moving  to  a  uniform  approach  with  all  other  
environmental  schemes  warrants  further  exploration.  
(QHUJ\5HWDLOHUV$VVRFLDWLRQRI$XVWUDOLDS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Alternatively, some stakeholders in the large-scale renewable industry proposed that the LRET 
liability be acquitted quarterly, in order to improve the market liquidity of LGCs. For example, 
Powershop Meridian submitted:
&XUUHQWO\/*&VFDQEHWUDGHGDWDQ\SRLQWDIWHUWKHLUFUHDWLRQXSXQWLOWKH\DUHVXUUHQGHUHG
/LDEOHHQWLWLHVRQO\QHHGWRVXUUHQGHU/*&VRQFHD\HDULQ)HEUXDU\*LYHQWKHKLJKFRVWRI
FDVKIRUPDQ\OLDEOHHQWLWLHVWKLVDFWVWRVXSSUHVVGHPDQGIRU/*&VLPPHGLDWHO\DIWHUWKH
VXUUHQGHUGDWHZLWKGHPDQGULVLQJLQWKHSHULRGLPPHGLDWHO\SUHFHGLQJWKHVXUUHQGHUGDWH
0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\OLTXLGLW\WHQGVWRIROORZGHPDQGVRWKDWOLTXLGLW\LQ/*&VIRUPRVWRI
WKH\HDULVQHJOLJLEOHDSDUWIURPWKHVKRUWZLQGRZFRLQFLGLQJZLWK/*&VXUUHQGHUGDWHV
3RZHUVKRS0HULGLDQS
The LRET allows liable entities to carry forward a 10 per cent shortfall in liability to the following 
year without incurring a penalty, however there is no corresponding provision in the SRES. Two 
respondents (EnergyAustralia and the Energy Retailers Association of Australia) suggest that this 
provision should also apply to the SRES in order to provide liable entities with more flexibility in 
managing RET costs and prevent them from incurring a penalty for minor errors in SRES liability 
calculations. The Panel considers that this proposal has merit, however it would need to be 
implemented in a way that prevents the quarterly surrender periods from allowing a shortfall of 
greater than 10 per cent to be carried forward in one calendar year. 
The Panel recognises the potential for greater alignment in acquittal provisions to provide 
efficiencies to liable entities and renewable generators. The Panel considers that biannual 
surrender of LGCs and STCs may provide an appropriate balance between reducing compliance 
costs and ensuring liquidity in LGC and STC markets and recommends that the Government give 
this further consideration.
9.5      Arrangements for Partial Exemption Certificates (PECs)
Section 7.1 explained the function of PECs provided to EITE businesses. EITE businesses 
that receive a PEC can only negotiate its value with the retailer that supplies their electricity. 
Theoretically, the reduction in RET costs passed on to the EITE should be equal to the reduction 
in the retailer’s liability from receiving the PEC. However, stakeholders claim that this may not 
necessarily be the case as the value of the PEC is negotiated as part of an electricity contract and 
may be influenced by other factors in the negotiation. A small number of stakeholders including 
the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia and the Australian Industry Group 
propose allowing PECs to be ‘tradeable’ (able to be sold to any liable entity) as a method for 
dealing with this issue. For example, the Australian Industry Group stated:
3(&VDUHQRWWUDGHDEOHFHUWL¿FDWHVDQGFDQRQO\EHXVHGDWSUHVHQWE\OLDEOHHQWLWLHV
Problems  have  been  created  for  both  EITE  businesses  and  retailers  as  a  consequence  of  
the  negotiation  process.  These  problems  arise  because  there  is  an  information  asymmetry  
between  retailers  and  customers  on  gross  costs  of  the  RET.  The  current  approach  also  
PDNHVLWPRUHGLI¿FXOWIRUDQ(,7(EXVLQHVVWRFKDQJHHQHUJ\UHWDLOHUGXULQJDFDOHQGDU\HDU
as  PECs  are  issued  in  the  current  retailer’s  name  for  the  whole  of  the  year.  PEC  tradability  
would  streamline  the  application  process  for  EITE  assistance  under  the  RET  by  reducing  the  
need  for  EITE  businesses  to  negotiate  the  value  of  their  PECs  with  their  energy  retailers.  
$XVWUDOLDQ,QGXVWU\*URXSS
While such an arrangement would provide greater flexibility to EITE businesses there would be 
administrative costs associated with implementation and administration. The Panel does not 
consider that the additional flexibility would justify the increased administrative complexity and 
cost. 
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EnergyAustralia raised an additional concern regarding notifying liable entities of PECs issued to 
EITE businesses:
&XUUHQWO\ZKHQD3(&LVLVVXHGWRDQ(PLVVLRQV,QWHQVLYH7UDGH([SRVHG(,7(FRPSDQ\
QRWL¿FDWLRQLVRQO\SURYLGHGWRWKH(,7(DQGQRWWKHOLDEOHHQWLW\+RZHYHULWLVWKHOLDEOH
entity’s  responsibility  to  ensure  that  it  has  obtained  all  the  relevant  PECs  from  its  customers  
for  the  annual  RET  return  and  liability  calculation.  
Obtaining  a  PEC  relies  on  the  EITE  providing  it.  To  ensure  that  all  PECs  are  obtained  the  
liable  entity  must  contact  all  customers  that  have  potentially  been  issued  a  PEC.  There  is  a  
ULVNGHVSLWHEHVWHIIRUWVWKDWDOLDEOHHQWLW\PD\QRWREWDLQDOOWKH3(&VLVVXHGLQLWVQDPH
(QHUJ\$XVWUDOLDS
Legislation stipulates that the name of the prescribed person to whom a PEC is issued and the 
EITE activity that the PEC relates to is published. The Australian Government may wish to consider 
amending legislation to include the publication of the RET liable entity with whom the EITE 
business will negotiate the provision of the PEC.
9.6      Bringing forward the date of registering LGCs
Accredited renewable power stations have until 31 December of the year following the year 
that generation occurs to create LGCs, which can allow up to two years for LGC creation. Infigen 
Energy submitted that LGC registration be required to occur within 12 months:
This  extended  registration  period  (up  to  23  months)  has  the  potential  to  distort  the  market  view  of  
VXSSO\DQGGHPDQGZKLFKFDQUHVXOWLQOHVVHI¿FLHQWLQYHVWPHQWGHFLVLRQV,Q¿JHQ(QHUJ\S
However, it is difficult from an administrative perspective to have LGCs created and registered 
within one year from the generation to which they relate. Power stations may generate at 
different times of the year and generation data may be updated or amended. For this reason, 
accredited power stations provide finalised annual generation data by 14 February in the year 
following generation. The CER requires at least six months to conduct assessments of these 
returns to ensure all accredited power stations create their LGC entitlement based on eligible 
generation.
9.7      Small-scale generation unit safety inspection program 
The CER is required to conduct inspections of a sample of small-scale solar panel, wind and hydro 
installations that have had STCs created against them in the REC Registry. The inspections ensure 
that selected installations meet the legislated requirements for the creation of STCs. These include 
applicable Australian standards and industry guidelines in force at the time the unit was installed 
and state and territory and local government requirements. 
The inspection program provides some reassurance, beyond that provided by state and territory 
regulations, that the extra demand for small-scale installations that results from the RET does not 
lead to any lessening of safety standards. 
Keppel Prince Engineering raised a concern about the cost associated with ensuring compliance 
of small-scale generation units and considers that this function should be undertaken by relevant 
state and territory authorities: 
It  is  our  understanding  that  largest  resource  demand  at  the  CER  is  required  to  oversight  the  
UHJXODWRU\FRPSOLDQFHRIWKHQHZ6PDOO*HQHUDWLRQ8QLWVWKDWDUHEHLQJLQVWDOOHG
LQ$XVWUDOLDHDFK\HDUaDWDVNWKDW.3(EHOLHYHVFRXOGDQGVKRXOGEHDFFRPSOLVKHGDWD
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VLJQL¿FDQWO\UHGXFHGFRVWZLWKLQWKHH[LVWLQJLQVSHFWLRQDQGFRPSOLDQFHV\VWHPVRSHUDWHG
and/or  administered  by  the  relevant  “Energy  Safe”  agencies  operated  by  State  Governments  
and  Territories.  It  should  be  possible  to  include  the  relevant  compliance  statements  for  all  
UHOHYDQWOHJLVODWLRQLQWRD6*8VSHFL¿FYHUVLRQRIWKHHOHFWULFDOVDIHW\FHUWL¿FDWHVUHTXLUHGE\
HYHU\VWDWHEHIRUHDV\VWHPFDQEHUHJLVWHUHG.HSSHO3ULQFH(QJLQHHULQJS
Alternatively, the Solar Energy Industries Association Inc. considers that the inspection program 
should be increased: 
If  a  strong  regime  of  auditing  is  not  in  place  then  the  chances  of  poor  quality  and  unsafe  
installation  is  increased  and  the  potential  for  fatal  accidents  could  result.  SEIA  would  like  
to  see  an  increase  in  funding  for  system  inspections  to  ensure  that  quality  is  maintained  
WKURXJKRXWWKHLQGXVWU\6RODU(QHUJ\,QGXVWULHV$VVRFLDWLRQ,QFS
The CER has now conducted the inspection program for four years. Inspection data show a slight 
decline over time in the number of unsafe systems being installed and of unsafe installations 
consistent with the overall rate of safety issues with electrical work. The data also show a 
significant decrease in substandard installations owing to the installation industry responding to 
feedback from the program after it was first rolled out.
The Panel has recommended either abolishing the SRES or bringing forward the close of the SRES 
from 31 December 2030 to 31 December 2020. The Panel considers that it would be prudent for 
the Australian Government to discuss safety and installation standards for both solar PV and solar 
water heaters with the relevant state and territory authorities to ensure appropriate arrangements 
are in place, if necessary, before the SRES ends.
9.8      Update eligibility guidelines for Municipal Solid Waste (MSW)
The combustion of MSW is listed in the Act as being eligible as a renewable energy source. 
Waste streams contain both renewable and non-renewable components, and therefore, eligible 
components need to be determined. The CER has guidelines in place for determining the eligible 
renewable components of municipal and commercial wastes for use by electricity generation 
plants that are utilising waste as a fuel source and want to create certificates. 
Phoenix Energy (an Energy from Waste (EfW) company) stated in its submission: 
8QGHUWKH*XLGHOLQHV(I:JHQHUDWRUVDUHUHTXLUHGWRFDUU\RXWVDPSOLQJRIWKHZDVWH
VWUHDPWRGHWHUPLQHWKHUHQHZDEOHFRPSRQHQWRIWKHLUZDVWHVWUHDPDQGWKHUHIRUHWKH
fraction  of  the  waste  stream  that  is  an  eligible  source.  This  is  a  costly  and  time-­consuming  
SURFHVVLQYROYLQJWKHHQJDJHPHQWRISURIHVVLRQDOH[WHUQDODXGLWRUVWRVDPSOHDQGDXGLWWKH
waste  stream  every  six  months.  
The  complexity  and  cost  of  sampling  requirements  acts  as  a  deterrent  for  municipal  councils  
FRQVLGHULQJZKHWKHUWRPDNHWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPODQG¿OOLQJWRDOWHUQDWLYHZDVWHWUHDWPHQW
7KHSURSRVDOWRUHPRYHWKHVDPSOLQJUHTXLUHPHQWDQGWRUHSODFHLWZLWKDTXDOLWDWLYHWHVW
DURXQGUHF\FOLQJSURFHVVHVZRXOGEHDPRUHHI¿FLHQWZD\RIPHDVXULQJWKHVXFFHVV
of  community  recycling  efforts  and  would  reduce  the  administrative  and  cost  burden  on  
FRXQFLOVDQGIDFLOLW\RSHUDWRUV3KRHQL[(QHUJ\S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Phoenix Energy has suggested that the Act should be amended to include all components of 
MSW and similar mixed waste streams as an eligible fuel source subject to meeting recycling 
standards. This would reduce the administrative burden for proponents of EfW facilities. Phoenix 
Energy has also suggested:
To  implement  this  regulatory  change  the  CER  Guidelines  would  need  to  be  replaced  with  a  
VHWRIUHF\FOLQJVWDQGDUGVWKDWPXVWEHPHWLQRUGHUIRU5(&VWREHLVVXHGIRU06:7KHVH
VWDQGDUGVFRXOGEHXSGDWHGDVUHF\FOLQJWHFKQRORJ\LPSURYHVRYHUWLPH3KRHQL[(QHUJ\S
The legislation stipulates that the fuel source must be a renewable energy fuel source. 
Components that are non-renewable are not eligible for certificates. The Panel recognises the 
complexity in determining the eligible renewable components of municipal and commercial 
wastes and recommends that the Government consider updating the guidelines in order to 
reduce the administrative burden for stakeholders.
Recommendation 10: To further reduce the costs of the RET the Government should 
consider the following proposals to improve the operation of the scheme:
a. Bring forward the dates for setting the Small-scale Technology Percentage and the 
Renewable Power Percentage from 31 March in the compliance year to a date prior to 
the commencement of the compliance year (e.g, 1 December).
b. Align the acquittal of LRET and SRES obligations so that both are acquitted six monthly, 
and allow liable entities to carryover a shortfall of STCs (as is currently the case for LGCs).
c. Publish the RET liable entity with whom an EITE business will negotiate the provision of 
the Partial Exemption Certificate.
d. Update guidelines for determining the renewable components in waste for electricity 
generation.
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10  IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1      Implementation of LRET Recommendations 
10.1.1   Ensuring a stable and functioning certificate market 
The Panel has recommended that the Government consider two options for reforming the 
LRET. The first is to close the LRET to new entrants, otherwise known as ‘grandfathering’, and 
the second is to implement a target that increases each year by half of the projected growth in 
electricity demand.
A key objective in implementing either option is to ensure that the RET continues to support 
projects already established under the scheme in a sustainable and orderly manner. 
The options favoured by the Panel for the LRET both entail lower targets than are currently in 
place. There are several factors that are more likely to contribute to volatility in the LGC market 
under a scheme with reduced targets. These include:
The current pool of excess LGCs, equivalent to roughly one and a half times the LRET target in 
2014. These excess certificates resulted from the large uptake of small-scale generation units 
prior to the split of the RET into the LRET and SRES schemes.
The high concentration of ownership of the surplus of certificates.
Variability in the generation of electricity from hydro power stations, and to a lesser extent wind 
farms.
Ideally, the market would deliver an appropriate LGC price to support investments. However, the 
factors above may drive significant price volatility in the spot market for LGCs. Market participants 
could face either an excess or a shortage of LGCs, depending on the circumstances that prevail, 
and hence the LGC price could fall below a level that would sustain renewable energy businesses 
or rise so high it reaches the level of the LRET shortfall charge. If such conditions were to persist, 
achieving the key objective of supporting existing projects would be put at risk.
Identifying options for addressing potentially extreme LGC price outcomes involves giving some 
consideration to the LGC price, or range of LGC prices, that would be appropriate to support 
renewable generators accredited under the RET. Renewable generators argue for a return 
equivalent to what would have been achieved under the current trajectory of LRET targets, which 
formed the basis of their investment decision. For example, Infigen Energy submitted:
These  arrangements  should  replicate  the  expected  trajectory  of  LGC  prices  based  on  the  
RULJLQDO/5(7WDUJHW7KLVFRXOGEHDFKLHYHGE\VHWWLQJDUHJXODWHGÀRRUSULFHIRU/*&VWR
EHSDLGE\WKHOLDEOHSDUWLHV,QVXFKDQHYHQW,Q¿JHQZRXOGZHOFRPHDQH[SHUWLQGHSHQGHQW
HFRQRPLFDQGFRUSRUDWH¿QDQFHDQDO\VLVRIDVXLWDEOH³FRPSHQVDWLQJ´ÀRRUSULFHIRUWKLV
SXUSRVH,Q¿JHQ(QHUJ\S
On the other hand, some electricity users and energy market incumbents consider there are 
grounds for a lower level of support as investments were not made in a risk-free environment and 
financial contracts may provide project owners with some protection from downside LGC price 
risk. For example, CS Energy stated:
Existing  renewable  investments  should  be  grandfathered  and  provided  with  a  price  
HTXLYDOHQWWRWKDWWUDGHGWRGD\&6(QHUJ\S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Options the Government could explore for ensuring price stability (once an appropriate price or 
range of prices is determined) include:
 Increasing the LRET targets for immediate years to absorb an appropriate amount of the 
prevailing surplus of certificates, noting this could place some upward pressure on electricity 
prices in the short term. (Some surplus level of certificates is desirable to ensure there is 
sufficient liquidity in the LGC market).
Setting a fixed LGC price for the remainder of the scheme (this is most relevant to the option of 
closing the RET to new entrants, where it is not necessary to establish a price or price range to 
support new investments).
Setting a price cap and a price floor within which certificates could trade.
 -­ A price cap could be implemented by establishing a clearing house or “central broker” 
function to help match certificate buyers and sellers by trading LGCs at a fixed price, as 
is currently the case under the SRES.
In order to improve market liquidity, the Government could also consider introducing an auction 
process, where all certificates required to meet the legislated LRET target for that year are traded 
through a central agency. Parties holding certificates (renewable energy generators, retailers, 
traders, etc.) could bid in any volume of LGCs that they own or expect to be able to deliver and 
liable parties would be required to purchase LGCs to meet its obligation from the central agency. 
This would establish a market clearing price for the entire supply volume required for that year.
The most appropriate mechanism will depend on if, and how the Government decides to amend 
the LRET. The Panel recommends that the Government consult further with stakeholders and the 
CER to determine an approach to implementation that will ensure the objectives of the preferred 
option for the LRET are met.
10.1.2   Setting targets
Closing the RET to new entrants
There are two broad methods available for setting targets in an LRET that is closed to new 
entrants. Targets could be set in advance for the duration of the scheme, based on expected 
generation from existing and committed power stations, plus an additional component to clear 
the market of excess certificates. 
Alternatively, targets could be set annually, in an approach similar to the current SRES. Each 
annual LRET target would be set at the beginning of the year based on a modelled estimate 
of certificates to be created for the year and adjusted to offset the error in the previous year’s 
estimate.
Target representing a share of new growth
Box 2 in Section 6.1.3 explains how a target could be set that allocates a 50 per cent share of 
growth in demand for electricity to renewable generators.
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The target would be set by the CER each year (for example, by September) to apply to the 
following calendar year. A formula for calculating targets could be set out in legislation along 
the lines of the example contained in Box 2, and a legislative or regulatory framework would be 
established to guide the CER. Should electricity demand be forecast to fall or to remain flat in 
any year, the target would not change and would only increase further when demand exceeds its 
previous maximum level.
10.2      Implementation of SRES recommendations 
The Panel recommended two options for reforming the SRES: abolishing it immediately or 
phasing it out by 2020. 
If the recommendation to abolish the SRES is implemented, some transitional arrangements may 
be required to cater for people holding certificates at the time of abolition. This would include 
investors, banks and people holding certificates in the STC Clearing House. Likewise, those in the 
process of installing systems, or who have signed a contract to do so, may have a reasonable 
claim to certificates. Therefore the Government may wish to continue SRES obligations for liable 
entities for a period after the scheme is closed in order to provide a market for certificates from 
these systems.
If the Panel’s option for phasing-out the SRES is implemented, the Panel considers that the 
reduction in the deeming from 15 years to 10 years for solar PV systems and the reduction 
in the size eligibility threshold from 100 kW to 10 kW should take effect from the date of 
announcement. This is to eliminate the potential for a foreshadowed change to create a spike in 
system installations, and a corresponding increase in the cost of the SRES, between the date of 
announcement and the date that the changes take effect. However, the Panel acknowledges that 
there will be some contracts for the installation of systems that were entered into on the basis of 
the current policy and for which certificates have not yet been created. It is reasonable that these 
installations receive 15 years of certificates as allowed for under current arrangements. 
The Panel’s recommendation to reduce the deeming for solar and heat pump water heaters 
would not take effect until 1 January 2016, where the deeming would change from 10 to 9 years. 
Systems installed on or after this date would be subject to the new arrangements.
10.3      Implementation of recommendations regarding the self-generation exemption
The Panel has recommended that the self-generation exemption be expanded to accommodate 
a broader range of circumstances. This would involve relaxing the one kilometre boundary for 
supplying and using self-generated electricity and allowing incidental off-takes of electricity for 
community purposes in a remote location on an otherwise dedicated line. 
In terms of the one kilometre boundary, submissions to the Review indicated that it should be 
relaxed, but did not suggest what would be an appropriate restriction. 
A boundary could be set as a defined distance, or in the form of some definition of a ‘site’ 
similar to the definition of a single site used in the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting 
(NGER) scheme legislation. A boundary defined by distance, while arbitrary to an extent, has the 
advantage of being easily measured and would provide less ambiguity over the electricity that 
would fall under the exemption. A site boundary would be more complex to administer as other 
legal entities could be operating on the same site and determining the self-generated electricity 
could involve complicated calculations of electricity imports and exports. The Panel considers 
that the Government should consult with affected parties to determine an appropriate kilometre 
restriction for the self-generation exemption.
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For electricity consumed outside the kilometre boundary by the same legal entity that generated 
it, the criteria for a dedicated line between supply and use would remain. However, the Panel 
recommends that incidental amounts of electricity should be able to be supplied to third parties 
for community services without disqualifying all the electricity supplied on that line from the 
exemption. Implementing this change involves defining the community benefits for which an 
off-take would be permitted and defining what amount constitutes an incidental off-take.
The definition of community services should be limited to entities that provide essential 
community services and to not-for-profit organisations. Essential community services could be 
defined to include:
Health and safety operations (e.g., hospitals, ambulance).
Municipal services (e.g., water, and sewerage).
Fire services.
Emergency services.
Police stations.
Ongoing maintenance of key infrastructure.
Community radio and telecommunication services.
Not-for-profit organisations could be defined using the Australian Taxation Office definition. 
Incidental supply would mean that supplying a third party is not the primary purpose of 
generating electricity, and that the amount supplied is not a significant proportion of total 
generation. To define incidental supply to third parties, a threshold could be set either as a percentage 
of total electricity generated, or as a fixed GWh amount. Given that some self-generators produce very 
large amounts of electricity, a limit set as a percentage of total generation would need to be quite small 
(possibly around one per cent) in order to avoid substantially increasing the amount of electricity 
that could be exempt. This may disadvantage some of the smaller generators. Alternatively, 
a fixed GWh amount limit could be set, placing a cap on the amount of electricity able to be 
supplied. The Government should consult further to determine an appropriate threshold.
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Recommendation 11: The Government should consult with affected parties on 
implementation of the Panel’s recommendations for the RET including:
a. Measures for ensuring that large-scale generation certificates trade in a suitable price 
range that provides an appropriate level of support for accredited power stations.
b. Methods for setting targets.
c. Setting the distance limit and threshold for third party off-takes for the self-generation 
exemption.
Recommendation 12: The Panel’s recommendations for progressively reducing the deeming 
rate for solar PV installations and reducing the size eligibility threshold from 100 kW to 
10 kW should take effect from the date of announcement. Transitional arrangements should 
be provided for parties that have entered into contracts on the basis of the current policy at 
the date of announcement.
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APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE
Renewable Energy Target Review 
Background
The Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme, comprised of the large-scale and small-scale 
schemes, is aimed at increasing renewable energy generation and reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from the electricity sector. It is designed to deliver the equivalent of 20 per cent of 
Australia’s electricity from renewable sources by 2020.
Scope of the review
The review is to examine the operation and costs and benefits of the Renewable  Energy  
(Electricity)  Act  2000 (‘the Act’) and related legislation and regulations, and the RET scheme 
constituted by these instruments. This includes considering:
1. the economic, environmental and social impacts of the RET scheme, in particular 
the impacts on electricity prices, energy markets, the renewable energy sector, the 
manufacturing sector and Australian households;
2. the extent to which the formal objects of the Act are being met; and
3. the interaction of the RET scheme with other Commonwealth and State/Territory policies 
and regulations, including the Commonwealth Government’s commitment to reduce 
business costs and cost of living pressures and cut red and green tape, and the Direct 
Action policies under development.
The review should provide advice on:
1. whether the objective of the RET scheme, to deliver 41,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) and 
small-scale solar generation by 2020, is still appropriate;
2. the extent of the RET’s impact on electricity prices, and the range of options available to 
reduce any impact while managing sovereign risk;
3. the operation of the small-scale and large-scale components of the RET and their 
interaction;
4. implications of projected electricity demand for the 41,000 (GWh) target; and
5. implementation arrangements for any proposed reforms to the RET, including how to 
manage transition issues, risks and any adjustment costs that may arise from policy 
changes to the RET.
The review is also to consider the Government’s election commitment to reinstate native forest 
wood waste as an eligible renewable energy source.
Process
The review is to be led by a panel of experts appointed by the Ministers for Industry and the 
Environment, supported by a secretariat in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
The panel is to undertake public consultations, seek submissions and provide a report to the 
Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the Ministers for Industry and the Environment by mid-2014.
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APPENDIX B: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION
Throughout the review, the Panel has consulted with a wide range of stakeholders representing 
a diverse range of views. This included energy users, electricity retailers, environmental groups, 
consumer groups, the renewable energy industry and state and territory ministers and officials.  
On 5 April 2014, the Panel called for submissions on issues relevant to the review and released a 
paper to assist the preparation of submissions. The submissions can be found on the published 
submissions page <https://retreview.dpmc.gov.au/published-submissions>, unless a submission 
was marked as confidential or an author specifically requested otherwise. 
The Panel also organised over 100 meetings in state capitals which were collectively attended by 
over 200 participants. In addition to this, the Panel conducted a number of site visits to energy 
facilities including hydroelectric power stations in Tasmania, a community wind farm in Victoria, 
a wind farm in New South Wales, a solar PV manufacturer in South Australia and a solar power 
installation in the Australian Capital Territory.
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APPENDIX C: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FROM ACIL ALLEN MODELLING REPORT
The Commonwealth Government has appointed an Expert Panel to conduct the 2014 review 
of the Renewable Energy Target (RET). The Expert Panel is supported by a secretariat in the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (the Secretariat).
The RET is comprised of two separate, but related schemes, namely: the Large-scale Renewable 
Energy Target (LRET) and the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES).
ACIL Allen Consulting (ACIL Allen) has been engaged to undertake detailed electricity market 
modelling of the RET impacts on Australia’s electricity markets and emissions from electricity 
generation. The modelling and analysis is designed to support the Expert Panel’s deliberations 
and inform the Government’s response to the Review.
Case and sensitivities 
ACIL Allen has been tasked with modelling a range of policy scenarios and sensitivities as required 
by the Expert Panel. These are:
Reference case: This case provides projections for the status quo where legislation underpinning 
the LRET and SRES schemes remains unchanged and the market develops in accordance with 
baseline assumptions in terms of demand and supply. All subsequent policy scenarios are 
compared against this Reference case.
Repeal case: This case assumes that the SRES and LRET schemes cease to operate from 
1 January 2015 with 2014 being the last compliance year. This scenario assumes that any 
mechanism introduced to compensate investments made under the RET (if any) does not affect 
wholesale or retail price outcomes.
Closed to New Entrants: This scenario assumes that the LRET scheme continues to operate, but 
is closed to new installations from 1 January 2015. The SRES, which operates under a deeming 
arrangement whereby installations receive certificates upfront, does not continue to operate and 
is closed from 1 January 2015. Under the LRET, installations receive certificates annually based 
on generation. Closure of the scheme to new entrants (new accredited generators) means that 
creation of LGCs is limited to existing or committed generators.
Real 20% case: The Real 20% scenario involves two significant changes to the current policy: 
Reducing the LRET 2020 target to 25,500 GWh (a level which, when evaluated using the Panel’s 
methodology, represents a ‘Real 20%’ of expected demand in 2020); Closing the SRES after 2020 
and reducing the period of deeming for solar PV from 15 years down to 10 years from 
1 January 2015 (deeming period is constant at 10 years through to the end of 2020).
Real 30% case: This scenario involves modifying the LRET target level to 30% of anticipated 
demand in 2030 and extension of the scheme to 2040. Annual targets from 2015 to 2030 follow 
a linear trajectory, reaching 52,500 GWh and are held constant at this level until 2040. There is no 
change to the current SRES, with the scheme terminating in 2030.
50% Growth case: This scenario was undertaken after the stakeholder workshop in late June 
where preliminary modelling results were presented. It involves moving the LRET away from fixed 
annual targets to floating targets with each year reset based on forecast demand growth for 
the year ahead. The LRET target would be increased each year based on 50% of the anticipated 
growth in market-facing demand; i.e. demand growth net of that absorbed by behind the meter 
solar PV. The scenario assumes SRES modifications as follows:
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A reduction in deeming for Small Generating Units (SGUs) to 10 years from 1 January 2015, 
with the deeming period for both SGUs and Solar Water Heaters (SWHs) declining by one year 
each year and the scheme terminating at the end of 2020.
A reduction in the maximum size eligibility of small generating units for inclusion under SRES 
down from the current 100 kW to 20 kW (systems above 20 kW would be eligible for the LRET).
Figure ES 1 summarises the LRET annual targets across the policy cases. In the 50% Growth case, 
the LRET annual targets are a function of demand growth and therefore vary across the demand 
sensitivities examined. The Real 30% case also includes an extension of the scheme to 2040 with 
targets held constant at the 2030 level until 2040 (not shown in the figure). Table ES 1 summarises 
the SRES settings under each policy scenario. 
Figure ES 1 LRET annual targets under the various policy scenarios
Note: Under all scenarios the LRET terminates in 2030 except for the Real 30% which extends out to 2040. 
Source: ACIL Allen based on input settings provided by the Expert Panel
Source: ACIL Allen based on input settings provided by the Expert Panel
Policy  scenario Scheme  end Treatment  of  SGU Treatment  of  SWH
Reference case End of calendar year 2030 15 years upfront, with deeming 
period declining by 1 year each 
year from 2017
10 years deeming upfront, with 
deeming period declining by 
1 year each year from 2022
Repeal case 2014 last compliance year No further subsidies No further subsidies
Closed to new 
entrants case
2014 last compliance year No further subsidies No further subsidies
Real 20% case End of calendar year 2020 10 years deeming from 
1 January 2015 (10 years 
available until scheme end)
No change to Reference case
Real 30% case End of calendar year 2030 No change to Reference case No change to Reference case
50% Growth 
case
End of calendar year 2020 10 years from 1 January 2015, 
with the deeming period 
declining by one year each year
10 years from 1 January 2015, with 
the deeming period declining by 
one year each year
Table ES 1 SRES settings under the various policy scenarios
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Figure ES 2 Proportion of renewables in Australia’s energy mix: Reference case
Note: Proportion of estimated total Australian electricity demand 
Source: ACIL Allen 
Input assumptions for the modelling have been sourced from a range of publicly available sources 
including AEMO and the Independent Market Operator for demand and BREE for capital costs 
and learning rates. These have been supplemented by ACIL Allen’s own in-house assumptions 
for other key inputs. Sensitivities have also been completed to test the effects of changes for a 
number of the key input assumptions where they are subject to considerable uncertainty. These 
include high and low demand growth; the potential introduction of other abatement policies 
modelled through a shadow carbon price from 2021; high capital costs for renewable energy 
technologies; and permanent retirements for incumbent generators which mothball capacity.
Analysis and findings
Currently renewable generation accounts for an estimated 16.1% of generation (at the end of 
calendar year 2014). Under the Reference case where the RET remains unchanged, renewable 
energy is projected to reach 26.3% by 2020 as shown in Figure ES 2.82
Under the Reference case assumptions, ACIL Allen’s modelling projects the renewable energy 
target can be met by new renewable developments with the LRET fully subscribed throughout 
the period to 2030. Much of the anticipated large-scale renewable development occurs over the 
period 2016 to 2021, with around 7,650 MW of wind developed throughout the NEM and SWIS 
regions and around 1,400 MW of utility-scale solar PV developed in the regional grids of the 
North-west Interconnected System (NWIS), the Darwin-Katherine Interconnected System (DKIS) 
and Mt Isa. Owing to the subdued demand conditions in electricity markets, the introduction of 
large volumes of renewable capacity results in a mothballing of generating plant by incumbent 
operators, with much of this capacity returning to service over time as demand grows. 
Across Australia, a total of $26.8 billion (real 2014 dollars) or $15.9 billion (in present value terms) 
in capital expenditure on new generating capacity is projected to occur over the period to 2040. 
Wind investment is projected to account for around 62% ($16.4 billion in real 2014 dollars or 
$12.1 billion in present value terms) of new large-scale generation investment in the period to 2040.
82 This assessment has been undertaken using a formula provided by the Expert Panel and excludes the displacement from solar water heaters (SWH). If displacement 
from SWH was to be added to both the renewable energy component (the numerator), and to aggregate electricity demand (the denominator), aggregate renewables 
would be around one percentage point higher at 27.3% by 2020.
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Gas-fired peaking plant and utility-scale solar PV each account for around 11% of the total 
($3 billion in real 2014 dollars). In present value terms, solar accounts for $1.8 billion compared 
with $0.7 billion for peaking gas as adoption times differ. Several categories of fossil fuel 
generation collectively account for the remaining 16% ($4.3 billion in real 2014 dollars or 
$1.3 billion in present value terms).
Small-scale systems (solar PV and solar water heaters) under the SRES are projected to see strong 
growth with solar PV capacity rising from 4,133 MW at the end of 2014 to just under 13,000 MW 
by 2030. Cumulative SWH installations are projected to increase from an estimated 915,000 at the 
end of calendar year 2014 to over 1.5 million systems by 2030. A total of $30.4 billion (real 2014 
dollars) or $18 billion (present value terms) of new investment is projected to occur in relation to 
solar PV and SWHs over the period to 2030. The majority of this is solar PV ($20.6 billion in real 
2014 dollars or $12.6 billion in present value terms).
However, the subsidies paid to the renewable energy industry through the RET to bring about 
this investment are high. Over the period to 2030, the projected total direct RET cost (projected 
number of certificates multiplied by price) is $37.8 billion (real 2014 dollars) or $22.4 billion in 
present value terms, of which over 80% is associated with the LRET.
The modelling also shows that much of this additional capacity developed under the LRET is 
surplus to market needs. Under the Repeal scenario, the modelling projects a net reduction in the 
development of generating capacity of around 8,500 MW. Given the current levels of oversupply 
in most electricity grids and muted demand growth, the existing generation fleet is almost 
sufficient to meet expected demand for the foreseeable future.
Generation sector resource costs
Figure ES 3 below presents a summary of the present value of aggregate generation sector 
resource costs over the period 2015-40 across each of the scenarios and sensitivities modelled. 
This measure can be interpreted as the cost to society of generating electricity for consumption 
by consumers and provides an indication of the sector’s labour and capital productivity under 
each scenario and sensitivity when viewed on a per MWh basis.
For the Reference case (under core assumptions) costs total $121.9 billion in present value terms 
over the period to 2040 using a discount rate of 7% pre-tax real. Under the core assumptions, all 
of the policy variants examined resulted in a reduction in sector resource costs, indicating capital 
and/or labour productivity gains for the economy. The Real 30% scenario has almost the same 
aggregate cost as the Reference case because the deferral of wind development early is offset by 
an overall larger amount of renewable development in the longer-term.
The Repeal case has the lowest projected resource costs, as expected, as there are no RET 
subsidies distorting supply costs and competitive wholesale electricity markets are left to 
determine the most efficient, least cost plant mix to meet demand. This was one of the 
fundamental intentions in the establishment of the NEM, with its rules and principles being 
deliberately technology agnostic. Another reason for the development of the NEM was to impose 
competitive disciplines on participants in order to avoid the large oversupply in generation that 
had occurred through state governments using electricity supply to support other industries and 
policies. In a market with little or no demand growth, the RET is creating the same oversupply in 
generation that the NEM was designed to correct. In the absence of the RET policy, the market 
determines the optimal level of generation investment, rather than having arbitrary targets 
imposed upon it. In a market environment where capacity is already oversupplied and demand 
may continue to decline, it is desirable (and efficient) for no new investment in capacity to occur.
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Figure ES 3 Aggregate generation sector resource costs (NPV 2015-2040): All scenarios/sensitivities
Figure ES 4 Aggregate emissions from electricity generation: 2015-2040: All scenarios/sensitivities
Note: Measure includes capital expenditure (on both generating capacity and any interconnector expansions/augmentations); 
refurbishment of existing and new generators for life extension beyond initial economic life; fixed operating costs (fixed costs 
associated with normal operation and stay in business capital expenditure associated with existing and new generating capacity); 
variable operating costs (fuel costs and variable O&M costs for existing and new generation) and unserved energy. NPV 
calculated using a 7% real discount rate.
Source: ACIL Allen
Note: Excludes non-scheduled generation in NEM regions, own-generation in the SWIS and off-grid generation ‘Other’ category 
includes cogeneration, liquid fuels, CCS-equipped technologies, biomass and geothermal.
Source: ACIL Allen
Emissions and cost of abatement
The RET policy delivers emissions abatement through displacing fossil fuel based generation 
with renewable generation. The level of abatement achieved is projected to be higher under 
the current market conditions relative to previous assessments because of the reduced role of 
gas-fired plant (increasing gas prices) and the repeal of the carbon price, both of which increase 
the competitiveness of coal fired plant within the generation mix. Figure ES 4 below shows 
that the policy scenarios which include the RET or an expansion to the RET (the Real 30% case) 
consistently result in the lowest emissions outcomes across assumption sets. Conversely the 
Repeal of the RET is projected to lead to higher emissions; between 8% and 14% relative to the 
Reference case over the period to 2040.
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As with any Government expenditure or program, an important consideration is whether the 
policy offers value for money relative to alternatives. Two methods for calculating the cost of 
abatement from the policy have been used. Method 1 calculates abatement costs as the present 
value of the change in resource costs divided by the discounted change in abatement. Method 2 
is the same, except the emissions in the denominator are not discounted.83 Using method 1, 
estimated abatement costs for the RET range from $59/tonne under the 50% growth case (core 
assumptions) to $77/tonne (Reference case High capital costs).84 Under method 2, these costs 
are lower, ranging from $30/tonne to $40/tonne under the same scenarios. Whilst the policy is 
somewhat effective in the abatement of emissions, it is at high cost compared to current global 
pricing and is therefore not the most efficient means of emissions abatement. There is also a 
large difference between calculated abatement costs for the LRET and SRES components, with the 
abatement costs for the SRES being at least 2 to 3 times higher than the LRET. Therefore policy 
scenarios which tend to reduce subsidies provided for solar PV will tend to lower the overall RET 
abatement cost.
Impacts on retail prices
The public analysis of the costs and benefits of the RET scheme has been dominated by views 
on the net benefits that the RET scheme provides to electricity consumers. These net electricity 
consumer benefits are generally calculated by assessing wholesale electricity price (pool) and 
RET certificate price changes for the market with and without the RET scheme (i.e. the modelled 
impact of the subsidised renewable generation on wholesale electricity market prices). Assessing 
the net consumer benefits limited to a specific economic sector cannot be considered to be either 
a social cost benefit analysis or an economy wide assessment of the RET scheme. Considering 
only the benefits that flow to consumers ignores the opportunity costs of the capital and labour 
involved and the other welfare effects of the policy.
Figure ES 5 below shows the projected aggregate cost for an average Australian household on 
electricity over the period 2015-40 in NPV terms. In most cases, moving from the Reference case 
to the Repeal case (the most extreme policy variant) results in projected household electricity 
costs rising in net terms (the reduction in direct compliance costs is outweighed by increases 
in wholesale electricity prices). This indicates that wealth transfers are occurring from existing 
generators to both new renewable energy projects and consumers.
Interestingly, this pattern of price changes does not hold under low demand conditions. This is 
because new renewable generation is incapable of supressing wholesale prices below levels which 
are sustainable for incumbent generators to keep operating. Under these conditions, removal of 
the direct compliance costs is not offset by any increases in wholesale prices and consumers are 
better off under a Repeal scenario.
The impact on retail electricity prices is subject to uncertainty in the modelled components. Pool 
prices are inherently uncertain. This is because many of the drivers of pool prices are uncertain, 
such as:
Weather driving demand is unpredictable and highly variable
Plant performance (outages) is also stochastic (random)
Fuel prices may vary over time although most fossil fuel fired plant tend to contract over 
several years and so these prices tend to be reasonably certain on an annual basis
Participant behaviour (mothballing, plant retirement, strategic bidding, etc.) may swamp other 
effects over time.
83 ACIL Allen has used the second method to calculate abatement costs at the request of the Expert Panel. However, ACIL Allen considers that the second method does 
QRWDSSURSULDWHO\UHÁHFWWKHFRVWVRIHPLVVLRQVDEDWHPHQWRQDQLQWHUWHPSRUDOEDVLV
84 This range excludes the 50% Growth low demand case which is an outlier with a much higher cost of $164/tonne.
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A key factor in the uncertainty around future electricity prices is participant behaviour. As 
electricity demand has fallen in recent years, an increasing willingness of participants to mothball 
or close generation plant has been observed. Closing or mothballing plant can cause a significant 
rebound in pool prices and may fully offset any downward pressure from renewable plant. 
While we have incorporated some mothballing of plant in the analysis, participants may have 
different objectives and take quite different views to mothballing and plant closure than we 
have taken. This could substantially change the net benefit to electricity consumers through net 
changes in retail prices. The Permanent retirement sensitivity, which includes a larger amount of 
incumbent capacity withdrawal, demonstrates that the impact on retail electricity prices can easily 
be reversed, with consumers benefiting from moving from the Reference case policy to a 50% 
Growth scenario. Directionally, the same outcome would also be seen if the scheme was closed to 
new entrants or fully repealed.
Figure ES 5 NPV of average household total expenditure on electricity (2015-2040): All scenarios/
sensitivities
Note: NPV of annual residential bills for average household over the period 2015-40. Uses a 7% real discount rate
Source: ACIL Allen
Regardless of direction, the impact on retail electricity prices is small, even when considered over 
the period to 2040. Under the core assumptions, moving from the Reference case to a complete 
repeal of the scheme is projected to increase a typical household’s expenditure on electricity over 
the period to 2040 by 0.6% in present value terms. By comparison, moving from the Reference 
case to a Repeal case under low demand conditions is projected to reduce a typical household’s 
expenditure on electricity (over the same period) by 2.1% in present value terms. In all cases 
examined, the benefits or costs are a very small percentage of the total electricity bill and could 
easily be swamped by the range of uncertainties in pool prices, especially the changes in the 
behaviour of generation participants.
Assessing the RET’s impacts on retail electricity prices in isolation does not provide a solid 
basis for economically evaluating the RET policy. That the RET may lower electricity prices for 
consumers does not mean that its benefits outweigh its costs when considered in society wide 
terms. The diversion of capital and labour from other productive activities to the electricity sector 
imposes real costs on other sectors of the economy. Other policies such as subsidising fossil fuels 
or fossil fuel generators would also likely have the effect of lowering costs to electricity consumers 
and probably at significantly lower resource costs, yet few would advocate these as being 
good policy positions. An economic evaluation of the policy would not normally include wealth 
transfers where either producers or consumers benefit at the expense of each other. This makes 
projected changes to retail electricity prices mostly irrelevant in any economic assessment of the 
policy.
In ACIL Allen’s view, the main focus of any evaluation should be on the cost of abatement achieved 
through the policy and whether this represents an efficient means of achieving abatement objectives.
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APPENDIX D: CALCULATING THE PERCENTAGE SHARE OF    
   RENEWABLE ENERGY
Calculating the percentage share of electricity generation attributable to renewables, for example 
in 2020, serves two purposes:
 It informs the evaluation of the effectiveness of the RET in achieving the previously stated 
policy goal for 2020 of a 20 per cent share; and
 It is used to calculate possible LRET target profiles to deliver a particular target share of 
renewables – for example a policy option to achieve a real 20 per cent in 2020 based on current 
energy forecasts.
The percentage calculation is made by adding estimates of the various components of renewable 
energy (the numerator) and dividing by an estimate of total Australia wide electricity (the 
denominator). While straightforward in concept, in practice methodological issues arise as to how 
components of these two numbers are defined and measured.
For consistency, measurements or estimates should refer to the same point in the electricity 
supply chain. For example, generation from rooftop PV should be adjusted upwards to account 
for distribution and transmission losses in order to be consistent with large-scale generation 
which is reported as ‘sent-out’ energy (that is, the energy that leaves the power station).
More broadly, forecasting the various components of renewable generation and overall national 
electricity is inherently uncertain, and can vary between forecasters/modellers and over time 
depending on methodologies and underpinning assumptions. This uncertainty increases with the 
time horizon.
Components of the calculation
There are four key components of the renewable energy estimate (the numerator) that need to be 
accounted for:
RELRET eligible
Generation from LRET-accredited power stations – (for power stations in 
operation prior to the MRET (the precursor to the RET) only generation above 
their annual baselines is included here).
REPre-RET
‘Below-baseline’ generation from pre existing (i.e. pre-MRET, mainly hydro)
renewable power stations, which is not eligible to create certificates under the RET.
RESRES
Generation from SRES-eligible small-scale renewables installations (mainly 
rooftop solar PV). As small-scale solar water heaters (SWH) are also eligible 
under the RET, the energy (mainly electricity and gas) they displace in heating 
water is often counted as well.
REOther non-RET
Additional generation supported by voluntary schemes (e.g. GreenPower), which 
is ineligible under the RET. 
ETotal electricity
The national electricity figure used in the denominator combines amounts for 
large-scale and small-scale electricity generation, whether supplied on regional 
transmission networks, embedded in local distribution networks, self-generated 
or generated and used off-grid.
127
For future years, these amounts are based on annual forecasts by the operators of the main NEM 
and SWIS grids, as well as estimates by BREE and other expert analysts for the smaller grids and 
off-grid. 
The formula below shows the various components of the calculation:
 
% RE (year)= 
The formula can be rearranged to calculate the LRET target that would achieve a particular share 
in a particular year (for example, a 20 per cent share in 2020):
RELRET eligible (2020) = (0.2 * ETotal electricity) - (RESRES + REPre-RET+REOther non-RET)
In addition to the uncertainty inherent in forecasting the components, three key issues need to 
be considered when calculating the percentage share and setting an LRET target to achieve a 
particular percentage share. These issues and their potential impacts are outlined below.
Treatment of the output from solar water heaters (SWH)
While the RET scheme is mainly focused on raising the share of renewables-based electricity, 
certificates may be created under the SRES component for the renewable energy produced by 
SWH.
Inclusion of this heat energy as part of the RESRES component in the calculations has been justified 
on the grounds that while not generating electricity, the heat produced by SWHs displaces 
electricity – which assumes SWH buyers would otherwise have bought an electric water heater.
The energy displaced by SWH has been eligible to contribute towards the annual targets legislated 
under the old MRET scheme and under the expanded RET as legislated in 2009. It was also included 
in analysis undertaken to inform the 2012 RET review.    
However, some in the renewable energy industry argue this energy is not consistent with the 
electricity focus of the RET and its inclusion in setting targets would reduce investment in 
large-scale renewable projects encouraged under the LRET. 
It can also be argued that householders buying SWH may otherwise have bought gas water 
heaters rather than electric ones. If the uptake of renewables (the numerator) is extended to the 
renewable energy produced in domestic water heating, then for consistency the denominator 
should be extended to include the total energy used nationally in domestic water heating. 
Consequently, there are several ways of treating the renewable heat from SWH in calculating 
the renewables percentage. The following approach separates out the generation (RESmall gen) and 
displacement (RESWH) components of the SRES term in the numerator, and adds a term for the 
non-electric energy used in domestic water heating (EHot water) to the denominator, to address a 
range of viewpoints:
% RE (year)=
(RELRET eligible+RESRES+REPre-RET+REOther non-RET) * 100
ETotal electricity
(RELRET eligible+RESmall gen+REPre-RET+REOther non-RET+[RESWH]) * 100
ETotal electricity+[EHot water]
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ACIL Allen estimates that under the current settings, around 3,500 GWh of energy will be 
displaced by SWH in 2020, which is around 600 GWh above the level in 2014. 
The ACIL Allen modelling indicates that if the energy displaced by SWH is added to the numerator 
of the calculation (and depending on how energy used in heating water is treated in the 
denominator), its inclusion could:
 raise the calculated share for renewables in 2020 by up to around 1.4 percentage points or 
reduce the calculated share by around 0.2 percentage points); and/or
 reduce the size of an LRET target calibrated to achieve a particular renewables share in 2020 by 
around 3,500 GWh. This would:
 -­ reduce the potential wind energy capacity stimulated by the LRET by around 
1,200 MW; and
 -­ for a 20 per cent share, reduce the RET cost in 2020 of the additional certificates to 
households and businesses by around $200 million based on ACIL Allen’s modelling.
Treatment of generation from voluntary schemes
Renewable energy is also generated by LRET accredited generators for use under voluntary 
schemes, the main one being GreenPower. The energy from these schemes is intended to be 
additional renewable energy beyond that encouraged through the RET. 
Including renewable electricity supplied under such schemes would more accurately represent the 
share of renewables in Australian electricity. However, its inclusion in setting a 2020 LRET target 
to achieve a particular percentage share for renewables would undermine the ‘additionality’ 
objective of these schemes.
Generation from voluntary schemes was not included in setting the annual RET targets in 2009 or 
in analysis by the 2012 RET review. 
ACIL Allen has estimated generation through these schemes to be in the order of 1,700 GWh in 
2020. If added to the numerator, this would raise the calculated renewables share for 2020 by 
around 0.7 percentage points. If used in setting an LRET target for 2020 it would have around half 
the impact of including the energy displaced by SWH.
Below-baseline generation from pre-existing power stations 
The variable and unpredictable nature of the hydro resource makes it difficult to forecast 
accurately the total below-baseline generation in any future year by pre-existing power stations.
RESmall gen
The small-scale renewable electricity component (predominantly solar PV) of the 
SRES.
[RESWH]
Energy produced by solar water heaters. If included, this energy could be total 
SWH production or some proportion of that, which can be taken as displacing 
electricity.
[EHot water]
The non-electric energy used to heat water. If included, this could be focused 
narrowly on SWH or more broadly on domestic water heating.
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Each pre-existing power station is able to create certificates for annual generation above its 
historical baseline set by the CER. However, for a variety of operational and resource-related 
reasons, not all power stations achieve their baselines in a particular year. Therefore, the sum of 
the baselines (around 16,600 GWh) is an upper limit for total below-baseline generation. 
A range of estimates have been made for this component of total renewables in 2020. For 
example, in setting the annual targets for the expanded RET in 2009, an estimate of 
15,000 GWh was used. Analysis for the 2012 RET Review used a lower value of 14,300 GWh 
reflecting a downward revision of long-term hydro capability. Industry analysis suggests that total 
below-baseline generation has historically averaged in the order of 14,000 GWh although the 
amount has varied from year to year.
For its modelling, ACIL Allen has recognised the potential for below-baseline generation in 2020 
to be below the maximum, but based its forecast less on historical levels and more on recent 
longer-term energy forecasts for the large hydro systems in NSW/Victoria and Tasmania. ACIL’s 
estimate used in the modelling was 16,150 GWh.
The ACIL Allen modelling indicates that reducing the forecast estimate for below-baseline 
generation by 2,000 GWh to reflect historical levels would:
Reduce the calculated renewables share by around 1 percentage point; and/or
 Increase the size of an LRET target calibrated to achieve a particular renewables share in 2020 
by 2,000 GWh.  This would:
 -­ increase the potential wind energy capacity stimulated by the LRET by around 
700 MW; and
 -­ for a 20 per cent share, increase the RET cost in 2020 of the additional certificates to 
households and businesses by around $120 million based on ACIL Allen’s modelling.
The approach adopted by the Panel for the ACIL Allen modelling
The Panel adopted the following approach for calculating the renewables percentage in 2020 and 
estimating a ‘real 20 per cent target’ for modelling purposes:
A 2020 forecast of Australia-wide renewables-based electricity which:
 -­ reflects ACIL Allen’s estimate of 16,150 GWh for below-baseline generation from 
pre-existing generators; 
 -­ reflects ACIL Allen’s modelling which indicates the LRET target of 41,000 GWh of 
additional generation from RET-accredited power stations would be achieved;
 -­ uses ACIL Allen’s estimate of underlying small-scale solar PV generation of 9,920 GWh 
in 2020 for current settings and 9,673 GWh under the modelled ‘real 20 per cent in 2020’ 
scenario; 
 -­ does not include generation under schemes designed to encourage renewable energy 
that is additional to the RET; and
 -­ does not include the energy produced by solar water heaters.
  A forecast of total Australia-wide electricity, including metered and unmetered supply in the 
NEM, SWIS and smaller grids, as well as off-grid electricity using the latest central electricity 
demand estimates from AEMO and the Independent Market Operator, along with BREE and 
ACIL Allen estimates for smaller grids, self-generation and off-grid electricity.
130
  This approach yields a 26.3 per cent renewables share in 2020 under the current design and a 
2020 LRET target of 25,200 GWh to achieve a ‘real 20 per cent’ share in 2020.
% RE (2020)=
= 26.3 %
RELRET eligible (2020)= 0.2 * (255,300 GWh) - (9,673 GWh + 16,150 GWh)
= 25,200 GWh (rounded)
The implications of adopting the various approaches 
Based on the analysis above, application of the various approaches to calculating the renewables 
percentage in 2020 would yield the following:
An upper estimate for the renewables share - based on the inclusion of energy produced by 
SWH, the ACIL Allen estimate of below-baseline generation and including additional generation 
under voluntary schemes is 28.3 per cent.
 -­ This approach would yield a lower estimate for an LRET target in 2020 to achieve a 
20 per cent renewable share: 20,000 GWh.
A lower estimate for the renewable share - based on exclusion of SWH and generation under 
voluntary schemes and a lower (14,000 GWh) estimate of total below-baseline generation is 
25.4 per cent.
 -­ This approach would yield an upper estimate for an LRET target in 2020 to achieve a 
20 per cent renewable share: 27,400 GWh.
The calculated percentage share and 2020 LRET target used in the modelling lie between these 
upper and lower estimates.
Changes to the Panel’s adopted approach to the treatment of SWH and estimation of below-
baseline generation would not be material to the Panel’s preferred options for the LRET 
(grandfathering or a share of growth model).
However, should the Government choose a policy option that involves setting LRET targets to 
achieve a specific share for renewables in a particular year, these issues, along with the electricity 
demand and small-scale renewables forecasts, could significantly impact on desired outcomes 
and would need to be further considered in implementing changes. 
41,000 GWh + 9,920 GWh + 16,150 GWh + 0) * 100
255,300 GWh
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APPENDIX E: INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES
Internationally, renewable energy is supported through a wide range of policy measures. 
According to the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), 
144 countries have renewable energy targets. Of those, 138 countries have policy measures in 
place to support those targets being met, including regulatory settings, public financing, fiscal 
incentives or tax settings, tendering and feed-in-tariffs (FiTs). While FiTs are the most prevalent 
support mechanism, many countries are moving away from FiTs to more competitive market 
arrangements including reverse auctions. Each country’s domestic energy policy is determined by 
a range of factors, including natural resource endowment, economic conditions, existing energy 
infrastructure, international or regional obligations, energy security and industry development 
objectives. 
Comparing the ambition, nature and progress of a particular country’s environmental or 
renewable energy policy is fraught as each country may express their targets differently, for 
example, as a percentage of electricity generation or final energy consumption. Information 
in Table 6 below is indicative of the variety of drivers influencing renewable energy policy 
internationally.  In Europe, new state aid rules released by the European Commission will 
require all European Union (EU) member countries to transition away from FiTs to market driven 
arrangements. Domestic energy policy reviews recently completed or underway in a number 
of member states have outlined new renewable energy policy settings to comply with the new 
state aid rules. For example, recent policy reviews in Germany and the United Kingdom have 
left the existing targets unchanged but endorsed new policy measures aimed at reducing costs, 
improving grid integration and transitioning to more competitive support mechanisms. 
In some countries, the support for renewables has been in decline for a number of reasons 
including high levels of penetration, the impact of climate and renewable energy policy on 
electricity prices, changes in the generation mix and broader fiscal circumstances. Spain, for 
example, has achieved high levels of renewable energy penetration at relatively high cost with 
the government electing to minimise future support for renewable installations to repair a long 
standing electricity tariff deficit. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) ranks renewable energy as the world’s fastest growing 
energy source, forecast to overtake natural gas and reach double the output from nuclear energy 
by 2016. By 2018, renewables are expected to reach 2,350 GW, or 25 per cent of gross electricity 
generation. Onshore wind is forecast to be deployed in 75 countries and large-scale solar in 
65 countries by 2018.85 Analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance and the IEA suggests that 
the areas of largest renewable growth to 2030 will be China and other developing economies. 
New fossil fuel capacity will be built to provide baseload support to the growing penetration of 
renewable generation and decentralised grids. Ambitious renewable energy policies and targets 
continue to drive investment in a number of major economies including China, Japan, India, 
France, California, Brazil, Mexico and Portugal.
Table 6 provides a brief overview of renewable energy targets and policies in a selection of 
counties.86
85 International Renewable Energy Agency, ‘Medium-‐Term Market Report 2013: Market Trends and Projections to 2018 Executive Summary,’ 2013, p.3
86 Prepared by the RET Review Secretariat for the Panel.
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su
pp
or
t 
fo
r o
ns
ho
re
 w
in
d 
an
d 
PV
 a
nd
 
a 
se
lf-
ge
ne
ra
to
r s
ur
ch
ar
ge
 to
 
co
ve
r n
et
w
or
k 
fe
es
. 
En
er
gy
 re
fo
rm
s 
re
ce
nt
ly
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 in
 li
gh
t o
f d
ec
lin
es
 in
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 d
em
an
d,
 ri
si
ng
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 p
ric
es
 to
 
ac
co
un
t f
or
 h
ig
h 
PV
 u
pt
ak
e 
an
d 
th
e 
ne
ed
 to
 e
xp
an
d 
ne
tw
or
k 
se
rv
ic
es
, c
lo
su
re
 o
f n
uc
le
ar
 fl
ee
t a
nd
 g
re
at
er
 c
os
t 
sh
ar
in
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
al
l s
ec
to
rs
. F
iT
s 
w
ill
 tr
an
si
tio
n 
to
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
te
nd
er
in
g 
w
ith
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 s
pe
ci
fic
 c
ap
s 
on
 n
ew
 
in
st
al
la
tio
ns
 in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 g
ro
w
th
 c
or
rid
or
s. 
N
et
w
or
k 
co
-p
ay
m
en
ts
 w
ill
 b
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
fr
om
 a
ll 
se
lf-
ge
ne
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 
en
er
gy
 in
te
ns
iv
e 
in
du
st
rie
s.
Ta
bl
e 
6 
O
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f r
en
ew
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
po
lic
ie
s 
in
 s
el
ec
te
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
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Co
un
tr
y/
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gi
on
Re
ne
w
ab
le
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ne
rg
y 
Ta
rg
et
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Po
lic
y/
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s
Ad
di
tio
na
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n
In
di
a
20
%
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
of
 fi
na
l e
ne
rg
y 
fr
om
 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
by
 2
02
0
20
 G
W
 o
f s
ol
ar
 b
y 
20
20
Fi
T,
 ta
x 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
, c
ap
ita
l 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
an
d 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 
po
w
er
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 
an
d 
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
 tr
ad
in
g 
sc
he
m
e.
In
di
a 
ha
s 
a 
ra
pi
dl
y 
gr
ow
in
g 
de
m
an
d 
fo
r e
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
a 
di
ve
rs
e 
en
er
gy
 m
ix
, w
ith
 c
oa
l t
he
 m
ai
n 
so
ur
ce
 o
f g
en
er
at
io
n 
fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
la
rg
e-
sc
al
e 
hy
dr
o,
 re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y,
 g
as
 a
nd
 n
uc
le
ar
 e
ne
rg
y.
 In
 2
00
8,
 In
di
a 
ad
op
te
d 
a 
N
at
io
na
l 
Ac
tio
n 
Pl
an
 o
n 
Cl
im
at
e 
Ch
an
ge
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 le
d 
to
 th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
bi
of
ue
ls
 ta
rg
et
s, 
a 
ta
x 
on
 
co
al
 e
xp
or
ts
, a
sp
ira
tio
na
l s
ol
ar
 in
st
al
la
tio
n 
ta
rg
et
s 
an
d 
en
er
gy
 in
te
ns
ity
 re
du
ct
io
n 
ta
rg
et
s 
fo
r n
ea
rly
 5
00
 in
du
st
ria
l 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s.
Ja
pa
n
28
 G
W
 o
f s
ol
ar
 b
y 
20
20
Fi
Ts
 fu
nd
ed
 b
y 
co
ns
um
er
 
su
rc
ha
rg
e,
 ta
x 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
W
ith
 li
m
ite
d 
do
m
es
tic
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
th
e 
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 a
ll 
nu
cl
ea
r f
ac
ili
tie
s 
in
 2
01
2,
 Ja
pa
n 
im
po
rt
s 
ov
er
 9
0 
pe
r c
en
t 
of
 it
s 
en
er
gy
 re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 re
ce
nt
ly
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 n
ew
 e
ne
rg
y 
pl
an
 w
ill
 li
ke
ly
 s
ee
 n
uc
le
ar
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
re
co
m
m
en
ce
 a
nd
 a
n 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
in
 in
st
al
le
d 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 c
ap
ac
ity
. T
he
 p
la
n 
in
cl
ud
es
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
re
du
ct
io
n 
ta
rg
et
s 
bu
t 
no
t r
en
ew
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
ta
rg
et
s.
Re
pu
bl
ic
 o
f 
Ko
re
a
11
%
 o
f f
in
al
 e
ne
rg
y 
fr
om
 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
by
 2
03
0
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 a
nn
ua
l r
en
ew
ab
le
 
en
er
gy
 ta
rg
et
s, 
Fi
Ts
 a
nd
 
po
rt
fo
lio
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
.
In
 2
01
0,
 K
or
ea
 e
m
ba
rk
ed
 o
n 
a 
ne
w
 e
ne
rg
y 
po
lic
y 
to
 s
tim
ul
at
e 
th
e 
ec
on
om
y 
an
d 
se
cu
re
 e
ne
rg
y 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
. 
An
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
Tr
ad
in
g 
Sc
he
m
e 
is
 s
ch
ed
ul
ed
 to
 c
om
m
en
ce
 in
 2
01
5,
 re
ne
w
ab
le
 p
or
tfo
lio
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 a
pp
ly
 a
nd
 a
 
na
tio
na
l s
m
ar
t g
rid
 in
iti
at
iv
e 
is
 in
te
nd
ed
 to
 b
e 
de
pl
oy
ed
 b
y 
20
30
.
Sp
ai
n
20
%
 o
f f
in
al
 e
ne
rg
y 
fr
om
 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
by
 2
02
0
In
 2
01
2,
 S
pa
in
 te
m
po
ra
ril
y 
su
sp
en
de
d 
Fi
Ts
. A
 n
ew
 
fo
rm
ul
a 
to
 c
al
cu
la
te
 re
tu
rn
s 
fo
r r
en
ew
ab
le
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
ha
s 
re
ce
nt
ly
 b
ee
n 
re
le
as
ed
.
In
 2
01
3,
 S
pa
in
 g
en
er
at
ed
 m
or
e 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 fr
om
 w
in
d 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 th
an
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
so
ur
ce
. S
pa
in
’s 
en
er
gy
 
po
lic
y 
ha
s 
be
en
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
in
g 
to
 ri
si
ng
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 p
ric
es
 a
fte
r 1
5 
ye
ar
s 
of
 ta
rif
f f
re
ez
es
 w
ith
ou
t c
os
t r
ec
ov
er
y 
fo
r t
he
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t s
ub
si
dy
 o
f r
en
ew
ab
le
 p
ro
je
ct
s.
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
15
%
 o
f f
in
al
 e
ne
rg
y 
fr
om
 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
by
 2
02
0
Re
ne
w
ab
le
 E
ne
rg
y 
O
bl
ig
at
io
n 
tr
an
si
tio
ni
ng
 to
 C
on
tr
ac
ts
 fo
r 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
n 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 in
 2
01
7.
Re
ce
nt
 e
ne
rg
y 
m
ar
ke
t r
ef
or
m
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
an
no
un
ce
d 
du
e 
to
 th
e 
re
tir
em
en
t o
f a
ge
in
g 
co
al
 fi
re
d 
ge
ne
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 
ris
in
g 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 p
ric
es
.  
Re
ve
rs
e 
au
ct
io
ns
 w
ill
 s
up
po
rt
 la
rg
e-
sc
al
e 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
w
hi
le
 s
m
al
l-s
ca
le
 re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
nt
in
ue
s 
to
 
re
ce
iv
e 
Fi
T 
su
pp
or
t.
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U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
of
 A
m
er
ic
a
St
at
e 
ba
se
d 
ta
rg
et
s, 
e.
g.
 
Ca
lif
or
ni
a 
ai
m
in
g 
fo
r 3
3%
 o
f 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
in
 fi
na
l e
ne
rg
y 
by
 2
02
0.
 N
ew
 Y
or
k 
ai
m
in
g 
fo
r 3
0%
 o
f f
in
al
 e
ne
rg
y 
fr
om
 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
by
 2
01
5.
Re
ne
w
ab
le
 E
ne
rg
y 
Po
rt
fo
lio
 
St
an
da
rd
s, 
fe
de
ra
l a
nd
 s
ta
te
 
ta
x 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 a
nd
 p
ub
lic
/
pr
iv
at
e 
pr
og
ra
m
s. 
 
Re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
de
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
re
m
ai
n 
st
ro
ng
 w
ith
 a
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 fe
de
ra
l a
nd
 
st
at
e 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
ta
x 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 in
 o
pe
ra
tio
n.
 M
or
e 
th
an
 h
al
f o
f s
ta
te
s 
ha
ve
 re
ne
w
ab
le
 p
or
tfo
lio
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 w
ith
 
ni
ne
 s
ta
te
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 a
 re
gi
on
al
 g
re
en
ho
us
e 
ga
s 
ca
p 
an
d 
tr
ad
e 
sc
he
m
e.
 
In
 2
01
2,
 fe
de
ra
l v
eh
ic
le
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
st
an
da
rd
s 
w
er
e 
in
tr
od
uc
ed
 fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
em
is
si
on
s 
in
te
ns
ity
 li
m
its
 fo
r n
ew
 a
nd
 
ex
is
tin
g 
po
w
er
 s
ta
tio
ns
 re
le
as
ed
 in
 2
01
4,
 w
ith
 s
ta
te
 b
as
ed
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
ta
rg
et
s 
se
t b
y 
th
e 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
Au
th
or
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. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
Abbreviation  Term
ACT   Australian Capital Territory
AEMC   Australian Energy Market Commission
AEMO   Australian Energy Market Operator
AER   Australian Energy Regulator
ARENA   Australian Renewable Energy Agency
BREE   Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics
CCA   Climate Change Authority
CEFC   Clean Energy Finance Corporation
CER   Clean Energy Regulator
CO2   Carbon dioxide
CO2-e   Carbon dioxide equivalent
CoAG   Council of Australian Government
CPRS   Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
CSIRO   Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
DKIS   Darwin-Katherine Interconnected System
EEIS    Energy Efficiency Improvement Scheme 
EITE   Emissions-intensive trade-exposed
ERF   Emissions Reduction Fund
ESAA   Energy Supply Association of Australia
FiT   Feed-in-Tariff
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
GW   Gigawatt
GWh   Gigawatt hour
IPART   Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
kW   Kilowatt
kWh   Kilowatt hour
LGC   Large-scale generation certificates
LNG   Liquefied natural gas
LRET   Large-scale Renewable Energy Target
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MFP   Multi-factor productivity
MRET   Mandatory Renewable Energy Target
Mt CO2-e  Million tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent
MW   Megawatt
MWh   Megawatt hour
NECF   National Energy Customer Framework 
NEM   National Electricity Market
NER   National Electricity Rules 
NSW   New South Wales
NPV   Net Present Value 
NWIS   North West Interconnected System
PEC   Partial Exemption Certificate
PPA   Power Purchase Agreement
PV   Photovoltaic
REC   Renewable Energy Certificate
REE Act   Renewable  Energy  (Electricity)  Act  2000 (Cth)
RET   Renewable Energy Target
RPP   Renewable Power Percentage
SGU   Small Generating Unit
SRES   Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme
STC   Small-scale Technology Certificate
STP   Small-scale Technology Percentage
SWH   Solar Water Heater
SWIS   South West Interconnected System
VEET   Victorian Energy Efficiency Target 
WCMG   Waste Coal Mine Gas
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Term Abbreviation Explanation
Australian Energy 
Market Operator
AEMO AEMO was established in 2009 and is responsible for the operation of the 
National Electricity Market which includes the east and south east regions 
of Australia (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South 
Australia).
Australian 
Renewable 
Energy Agency
ARENA ARENA is an independent statutory authority established under the 
&RPPRQZHDOWK$XWKRULWLHVDQG&RPSDQLHV$FW (Cth), tasked with 
the objectives of improving the competitiveness of renewable energy 
technologies and increasing the supply of renewable energy in Australia.
1997 baseline During the process of accreditation for a power station under the 
Renewable Energy Target, the CER determines a baseline value for 
generation prior to 1997 (when the scheme was first proposed). The 
baseline is generally calculated by using the average amount of annual 
electricity generated from eligible renewable energy sources in 1994, 
1995 and 1996. Accredited power stations are only able to create LGCs for 
generation above its baseline. 
Clean Energy 
Finance 
Corporation
CEFC The CEFC is an independent statutory authority established by the Clean 
Energy Finance Corporation Act 2012, tasked with the objectives of the 
financing, commercialisation and deployment of renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and low emissions technologies.
Clean Energy 
Regulator
CER The CER is an independent statutory authority that administers regulatory 
schemes relating to the Renewable Energy Target, the National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting scheme and the Carbon Farming 
Initiative.
Clearing House 
(for Small-scale 
technology 
certificates)
The small-scale technology certificate Clearing House facilitates the 
exchange of small-scale technology certificates between buyers and sellers 
at the fixed price of $40.
Climate Change 
Authority
The Climate Change Authority is an independent statutory authority 
established by the Climate Change Authority Act 2011 and provides advice 
on the operation of Australia’s emissions reduction targets, and other 
Australian Government climate change initiatives.
Closing the RET 
to new entrants
An ACIL Allen modelling scenario where the LRET scheme continues to 
operate, but only large-scale renewable energy power stations currently 
accredited under the scheme and those currently under construction or 
fully committed are able to create LGCs. For modelling purposes a fixed 
price of $40 in nominal terms per LGC was chosen. The SRES ceases from 1 
January 2015. 
Compliance 
period
A full calendar year, the period over which each annual target under the 
Renewable Energy Target must be achieved.
Council of 
Australian 
Governments
CoAG CoAG is the peak intergovernmental forum in Australia. The members 
of the CoAG are the Prime Minister, State and Territory Premiers and 
Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government 
Association. 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
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Deeming The estimation of the amount of electricity a small-scale solar power 
system or small-scale wind or hydro system generates, or the electricity a 
solar water heater or heat pump displaces. Deeming allows the owners of 
these technologies to receive their entitlement to small-scale technology 
certificates before the system has produced or displaced the electricity.
Emissions-intensive 
trade-exposed 
EITE Businesses conducting specified emissions-intensive trade-exposed 
activities are eligible for assistance under the Renewable Energy Target 
scheme. 
Floating target A floating target is where the RET target would be regularly updated in line 
with the most recent projections of electricity demand. This is in contrast 
to including fixed GWh targets in legislation. 
Gigawatt GW A measure of power (or demand) equal to a thousand Megawatts. 
Gigawatt hours GWh A measure of electricity generation/use over a period of time. 
Grandfathering See ‘Closing the RET to new entrants’. 
Kilowatt kW A measure of power (or demand). 
Kilowatt hour kWh A measure of electricity generation/use over a period of time (or energy). 
Large-scale 
generation 
certificates 
LGC Large-scale generation certificates may be created by power stations 
generating electricity from renewable sources. Each certificate represents 
one megawatt hour of renewable energy generation. 
Liable entities Entities that are required by legislation to surrender a specified number of 
renewable certificates or pay a renewable energy shortfall charge.
Large-scale 
Renewable 
Energy Target 
LRET The LRET encourages the deployment of large-scale renewable energy 
projects. It sets legislated targets for large-scale renewable generation 
each year that increase to 41,000 GWh of electricity in 2020.
Mandatory 
Renewable 
Energy Target 
MRET The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target commenced in 2001. The MRET 
had a target of 9,500 gigawatt hours in 2010 (mandated out to 2020) and 
interim targets that gradually increased year on year. 
Megawatt MW A measure of power (or demand) equal to one million watts. 
Megawatt hour MWh A measure of electricity generation /use over a period of time.
National 
Electricity Market
NEM The National Electricity Market interconnects five regional market 
jurisdictions (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania). Western Australia and Northern Territory are not connected to 
the National Electricity Market.
Net Present 
Value 
NPV The NPV of an amount of money accounts for the changing value of 
money over time by discounting future cash flows to an equivalent amount 
of money that is available to spend now.
North West 
Interconnected 
System
NWIS The NWIS supplies electricity to communities in the north west of Western 
Australia including the Pilbara region.
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Partial Exemption 
Certificate 
PEC The Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) and the Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 include provisions to provide 
partial exemption from Renewable Energy Target liability for electricity 
used in defined emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities. To obtain 
an exemption, prescribed persons may apply to the CER for a partial 
exemption certificate. 
Power Purchase 
Agreement
PPA A Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) is a contract between a renewable 
generator and an electricity retailer for the purchase of both electricity and 
LGCs. 
‘Real 20 per cent’ 
target
A modelled policy scenario where the LRET targets are reset to achieve a 
20 per cent share of renewables in the generation mix by 2020, based on 
the electricity demand projections used in the modelling. The LRET targets 
are maintained at 2020 levels until 2030. 
‘Real 30 per cent’ 
target
A modelled policy scenario where the LRET is reset to achieve a 30 per cent 
share of renewables in the generation mix by 2030, based on the electricity 
demand projections used in the modelling. The targets remain at 2030 
levels until 2040. 
Reference case The modelled scenario of the current legislated RET policy. It includes an 
LRET target of 41,000 GWh by 2020 and an uncapped SRES scheme, where 
solar PV installations receive 15 years of deemed certificates (progressively 
phased out from 2017) and solar water heaters receive 10 years of deemed 
certificates (progressively phased out from 2022).
Regional Forestry 
Agreements
The regulation of logging activity is managed by state and territory 
governments through forestry plans, such as Regional Forestry 
Agreements, and generally requires harvesting to be conducted in 
accordance with ecological sustainability requirements.
Renewable 
Energy 
Certificates 
REC The term used for renewable energy certificates generated under the 
Renewable Energy Target scheme prior to 2011. 
REC Registry A secure web-based application managed by the CER that facilitates the 
creation, trade and surrender of certificates.
Renewable 
Energy 
(Electricity) Act 
2000 (Cth) 
REE Act The legislative framework for the Renewable Energy Target scheme. 
Renewable 
Energy 
(Electricity) 
Regulations 2001 
(Cth) 
REE Regulations The detailed rules and provisions of the Renewable Energy Target scheme. 
Renewable 
Energy Target 
RET The Renewable Energy Target operates in two parts – the Small-scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme and the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target. 
Renewable Power 
Percentage 
RPP The RPP establishes the rate of liability for LRET and is the mechanism that 
liable entities use to determine how many LGCs need to be surrendered to 
meet their liability each year. 
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Repeal of the RET The complete removal of both the LRET and SRES schemes
Self-generators Self-generators produce and consume their own electricity.  Where a self-
generator consumes the electricity within one kilometre of the point of 
generation or via a dedicated line it is exempt from liability under the RET. 
This exemption has been in place since the commencement of the scheme 
in 2001. 
Small-scale 
Renewable 
Energy Scheme 
SRES The SRES supports the installation of small-scale renewable energy 
systems, including solar PV and solar water heaters. 
Small-scale 
Technology 
Certificate 
STC Certificates created by small-scale technologies like solar PV and solar 
water heaters. Each certificate represents one megawatt hour of renewable 
generation or the displacement of one megawatt hour of electricity. 
Small-scale 
Technology 
Percentage
STP The STP establishes the rate of liability for the SRES. The STP is the 
mechanism that liable entities use to determine the number of STCs 
needed to be surrendered to meet their liability each quarter.
Solar Credits The Solar Credits multiplier was introduced in mid-2009 to provide support 
for solar PV by multiplying the number of certificates that systems were 
able to create. The multiplier was originally set at five, so systems were 
eligible to create five times 15 years’ worth of certificates. Due to rapidly 
falling system costs and strong uptake, the mechanism was terminated on 
1 January 2013. 
South West 
Interconnected 
System 
SWIS The SWIS is the electricity network that services the majority of Western 
Australia’s population. 
‘50 per cent 
share of new 
growth’ scenario
A modelled policy scenario where annual LRET targets are set 
corresponding to the previous year’s target plus a 50 per cent share of 
expected growth in electricity demand on the main networks and large-
scale off-grid demand over the next year. The LRET targets are retained at 
2020 levels until 2030. 

142
August 2014
Renewable Energy 
Target Scheme
Report of the Expert Panel 
REN
EW
ABLE EN
ERG
Y TARG
ET SCH
EM
E
Renewable Energy 
Target Scheme
Report of the Expert Panel 
